Richardson Drug Company v. Teasdall
Decision Date | 18 November 1897 |
Docket Number | 7595 |
Citation | 72 N.W. 1028,52 Neb. 698 |
Parties | RICHARDSON DRUG COMPANY ET AL. v. ALICE M. TEASDALL ET AL |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
ERROR from the district court of Lancaster county. Tried below before HALL, J. Reversed.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stevens & Cochran and John P. Maule, for plaintiffs in error.
Charles O. Whedon, contra.
On January 27, 1892, the Richardson Drug Company and the Lincoln Paint & Color Company, hereinafter called the Drug Company owned a stock of drugs, together with a lot of drug-store fixtures, including a soda fountain, then situate in a building in the city of Lincoln, and on said date, in consideration of $ 2,000 sold and delivered possession of said stock of goods to Alice M. and Thomas L. Teasdall hereinafter called the Teasdalls. The contract of sale between said parties was evidenced by a writing of that date which, so far as material here, was in words and figures as follows:
The Teasdalls took possession of the property mentioned in this contract and made the monthly payments provided therefor for some months. During the time the Teasdalls were in possession they purchased a large quantity of druggist's goods and added them to the stock. They then failed to make a payment due under the contract and the Drug Company replevied the entire stock of goods and fixtures, including the goods purchased and put into the stock by the Teasdalls after their taking possession under the contract. On the trial the district court directed a verdict for the defendants, upon which judgment was entered, to review which the Drug Company prosecutes here a petition in error.
1. The contract recited above evidenced a conditional sale of the property therein mentioned from the Drug Company to the Teasdalls. It vested the Teasdalls with the possession of the property embraced in said contract and reserved the title to said property in the Drug Company until the full payment of the purchase price of $ 2,000.
2. The first question presented is whether the default of the Teasdalls to make the monthly payments for the property purchased of itself conferred upon the Drug Company the right of possession of the property conditionally sold, the contract not specifying that in case such default occurred the Drug Company should be entitled to the possession of the property? The authorities constrain us to answer that it did though the precise question does not appear to have been determined by this court. In Aultman v. Mallory, 5 Neb. 178, it was ruled: "A sale and delivery of goods, on condition that the property is not to vest until the purchase money is paid or secured, does not pass the title to the vendee until the condition is performed; and a vendor, in case the condition is not fulfilled, has a right to repossess himself of the goods." The property involved in that case was a mowing machine, and the contract provided that the title should remain in Aultman, Miller & Co. until the purchase price was paid. The contract is not set out in the opinion, and we do not know whether it provided that, in case the purchaser of the machine made default in payment for the same, Aultman, Miller & Co. might retake possession thereof; nor does it appear whether the precise question under consideration here was presented. The Aultman case was followed in McCormick v. Stevenson, 13 Neb. 70, 12 N.W. 828. But the contract in that case expressly provided that the McCormick Company might take possession of the property sold if the vendee thereof made default in his...
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