Richardson ISD v. GE Capital Corp., 05-99-02084-CV

• Decision Date: 12 October 2001
• Docket Number: No. 05-99-02084-CV,05-99-02084-CV
• Citation: 58 S.W.3d 290
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001) RICHARDSON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant v. GE CAPITAL CORPORATION, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 290

58 S.W.3d 290 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001)

RICHARDSON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant v. GE CAPITAL CORPORATION, Appellee

No. 05-99-02084-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas

October 12, 2001

On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 95-41035

Before Justices Morris, Moseley, and Fitzgerald

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Fitzgerald

Richardson Independent School District (RISD) appeals the trial court's judgment following a bench trial in a property tax collection suit. RISD contends the trial court erred when it found RISD's corrected tax bill postponed GE Capital Corporation's tax delinquency and when it failed to award RISD penalties. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Facts

The parties do not dispute the facts. GE Capital Corporation (GE) owned property located in Dallas County within RISD's jurisdiction. In the 1994 tax year, the Dallas Central Appraisal District (DCAD) valued GE's property at $1,772,050. RISD mailed GE a tax bill for the 1994 tax year, assessing tax in the amount of $27,817.64. This assessment was based on DCAD's valuation of GE's property. The 1995 tax bill clearly stated that $27,817.64 was the amount due if paid on or before January 31, 1995. The tax bill also stated that if GE paid in February, the amount due would be $29,764.88, which is the base levy plus seven percent in interest and penalties. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 33.01(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2001). Although payment of the tax was due on or before January 31, 1995, GE did not tender payment for the 1994 taxes until February 1, 1995, when it tendered a check for $27,817.64. RISD refused to accept the tender because it did not include any penalty or interest.

GE disputed DCAD's valuation of its property and, on July 25, 1995, filed a motion with DCAD to "correct" the valuation. The Dallas County Appraisal Review Board denied the motion, and GE filed suit against DCAD seeking judicial review of the decision. The trial court granted DCAD's motion for summary judgment, and GE appealed. This Court subsequently reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case. See GE Capital Corp. v. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist., No. 05-96-00955-CV (Tex. App.--Dallas Mar. 26, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication). On November 9, 1998, GE and DCAD settled their dispute and agreed to a judgment valuing GE's property at issue in this case at $1,632,790. On February 1, 1999, RISD sent GE a corrected tax bill for tax year 1994 assessing tax in the amount of $25,631.54, which was based on the new property valuation agreed to by GE and DCAD. The corrected bill stated the base levy was $25,631.54, but that GE owed $47,456.79 if it paid in February 1999, $47,751.55 if GE paid in March 1999, and $48,046.32 if GE paid in April 1999. On February 8, 1999, GE tendered payment for only $25,631.54 and requested RISD waive imposition of penalties and interest. RISD declined the tender or to waive any penalties or interest on the taxes. When GE continued to refuse to pay the tax and all penalties and interest, RISD brought suit for collection of the taxes.

After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for RISD in the amount of $25,631.54 plus interest of twelve percent per year, from February 1, 1995, until paid. The trial court denied RISD's requests to assess penalties against GE and grant it court costs and attorney's fees. Upon RISD's request, the trial court made and entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court concluded, among other things, that a corrected tax bill mailed on February 1, 1999 for the 1994 tax year postponed the delinquency date for the 1994 taxes until March 1 1999. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court specifically relied on section 31.04 of the tax code. This appeal then ensued.

Issues Presented

RISD contends the February 1, 1999 corrected tax bill did not extend the delinquency date under section 31.04 of the tax code and, pursuant to section 33.01¹ of the tax code, it is entitled to penalties for GE's failure to timely pay its property tax. GE contends the trial court correctly ruled that RISD's corrected tax bill postponed its delinquency date and that GE should not be assessed penalties.

GE contends in its brief that the trial court erred by awarding RISD interest and for not giving GE credit for the payment it tendered to RISD on February 8, 1999. RISD points out GE did not file a notice of appeal and, therefore, cannot request greater relief than granted by the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(c).² The record reflects GE did not file a notice of appeal. Moreover, GE has not shown "just cause" that would excuse its failure to file a notice of appeal. Because GE failed to file a notice of appeal or show just cause, it waived those issues. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Garza, 27 S.W.3d 64, 68 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2000, pet. denied).

Therefore, the central issue in this appeal is whether RISD's corrected tax bill postponed the delinquency date for the 1994 taxes GE failed to pay before the original delinquency date of February 1, 1995. RISD contends section 26.15 has no provision that would postpone GE's delinquency. RISD further contends section 26.15 postpones delinquency only in situations in which a taxpayer has paid his taxes and later incurs additional tax liability as a result of a correction in the tax roll. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 26.15(e) (Vernon Supp. 2001).³ GE contends section 26.15(d) explicitly incorporates Chapter 31 of the tax code and, therefore, imports the delinquency postponement provision of section 31.04 of the tax code. See id. § 31.04 (Vernon 1992).⁴

Standard of Review

The parties agree that the proper standard of review for the trial court's conclusions of law is de novo. See Hendrickson v. Swyers, 9 S.W.3d 298, 301 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, pet. denied); Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Godinez, 998 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1999, no pet.). We will not reverse a conclusion of law unless it is erroneous as a matter of law. See Piazza v. City of Granger, 909 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, no writ). Moreover, statutory construction is a question of law. See Monroe v. Frank, 936 S.W.2d 654, 659 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.).

Resolving Disputes Over Appraised Values

The tax code creates an appraisal district in each county, and the district is responsible for appraising property in its jurisdiction for each taxing unit that imposes ad valorem taxes on property in the district. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 6.01 (Vernon 1992). A property owner may request changes in the appraised value of his property to correct the inclusion of property that does not exist in the form or at the location described in the appraisal roll. See id. § 25.25(c)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2001). The owner must request this change before the end of five years after the beginning of the tax year in which the requested changes are to be made. See id. If the district's chief appraiser and property owner do not agree to the correction under section 25.25(c), the property owner may request a hearing before the district's appraisal review board to resolve the disagreement. See id. § 25.25(e).⁵ If the property owner does not agree with the review board's determination, he may file suit to compel the board to order a change in the appraisal roll. See id.§ 25.25(g). GE followed this procedure and ultimately settled with DCAD on an agreed valuation of GE's taxable property for 1994 of $1,632,790, which was $139,260 less than DCAD had appraised the property.

Corrected Tax Bills

In its first issue, RISD questions whether the trial court correctly concluded the delinquency date for the 1994 taxes was postponed by the correction to the tax roll. After the correction to the tax rolls in 1999, RISD sent GE a corrected tax bill on February 1, 1999. The issue in this case is the effect of that corrected tax bill on GE's previous liability for delinquency penalties. The trial court entered a conclusion of law that, pursuant to section 31.04 of the tax code, the corrected tax bill mailed on February 1, 1999 postponed the delinquency date for the 1994 taxes until March 1, 1999.

Section 26.15(d) of the tax code sets out the procedure for assessing taxes when a correction in the tax roll changes a property owner's tax liability:

Except as provided by Subsection (e) of this section [corrections that increase tax liability made after the tax is paid], if a correction in the tax roll that changes the tax liability of a property owner is made after the tax bill is mailed, the assessor shall prepare and mail a corrected tax bill in the manner provided by Chapter 31 of this code for tax bills generally. He shall include with the bill a brief explanation of the reason for and effect of the corrected bill.

Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 26.15(d) (Vernon Supp. 2001). GE asserts section 26.15(d)'s requirement that the assessor "prepare and mail a corrected tax bill in the manner provided by Chapter 31 of this code" incorporates the postponement of delinquency provision in section 31.04(a):

If a tax bill is mailed after January 10, the delinquency date provided by section 31.02 of this code [February 1] is postponed to the first day of the next month that will provide a period of at least 21 days after the date of mailing for payment of taxes before delinquent . . . .

Id. § 31.04(a) (Vernon 1992). GE argues that because the corrected tax bill was not mailed until February 1, 1999, it timely tendered payment under that corrected tax bill before March 1, 1999. The trial court found that section 31.04(a) applied and that section postponed the delinquency date for payment of the 1994 taxes to March 1, 1999.

GE's argument and the trial court's conclusion of law applying section 31.04(a) suffer from at least two flaws....