Richardson v. Bradley
| Decision Date | 25 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:17cv921/RV/EMT |
| Parties | IVIN ROMON RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. DETECTIVE PATRICK ALFRED BRADLEY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
This prisoner civil rights case, filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is before the court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment and supporting evidentiary materials (ECF No. 41). Plaintiff Richardson filed a response, with evidentiary materials, in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 51). The matter is referred to the undersigned for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(C). The undersigned concludes that Defendant's summary judgment motion should be granted.
Plaintiff Ivin Romon Richardson ("Richardson"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, was an inmate of the Escambia County Jail when he commenced this case (see Compl., ECF No. 1). Richardson became an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections during the pendency of this case (see Notice of Change of Address, ECF No. 16). Richardson sues Patrick Bradley, a detective with the Pensacola Police Department ("PPD") (Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 11). Richardson asserts claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, and a violation of his equal protection and due process rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (id.). Richardson alleges Detective Bradley filed an affidavit for his arrest for the shooting of Ms. Dominique Blount which intentionally omitted and misrepresented materials facts, and caused Richardson's arrest and prosecution without probable cause (see id.). Richardson also alleges Detective Bradley treated him less favorably than a similarly situated individual (see id.). As relief, Richardson requests compensatory damages in the amount of $1.7 million for "lost wages, attorney fees, pain and suffering, emotional collapse, reputation ruin, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution" (id.). Richardson also seeks punitive damages in the amount of $1 million (id.).
Detective Bradley moves for summary judgment claiming there exists no genuine issue of material fact with respect to Richardson's claims, and Bradley is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (see Mot. Summ. J.). Richardson opposes summary judgment claiming Detective Bradley lacked probable cause to arrest him, and Bradley intentionally withheld and misrepresented material facts from the probable cause affidavit submitted in support of the arrest warrant .
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support his or her case or present affirmative evidence that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove his or her case at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). If the moving party successfully negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's case, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with evidentiary material demonstrating a genuine issue of fact for trial. Id. The "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A dispute is "genuine" if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id., 477 U.S. at 248. A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. The nonmoving party must show more than the existence of a "metaphysical doubt" regarding the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). Speculation or conjecture from a party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact. See Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005). "A mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party will not suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Young v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. The nonmoving party must either point to evidence in the record or present additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency. See Celotex Corp., supra; Owen v. Wille, 117 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 1997) (); Hammer v. Slater, 20 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 1994).
Regarding the factual positions asserted by the parties, the court must apply the standard set forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
Facts asserted in hearsay statements which are not subject to a hearsay exception, and thus would not be admissible in evidence, are insufficient to show that a fact is genuinely disputed. "The most obvious way that hearsay testimony can be reduced to admissible form is to have the hearsay declarant testify directly to the matter at trial." Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Pritchard v. S. Co. Servs., 92 F.3d 1130, 1135 (11th Cir. 1996)). If a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence, it cannot be used for purposes of summary judgment. See Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court will consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion for summary judgment or grant summary judgment if the moving party's motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the moving party is entitled to it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2, 3).
Evidence presented by the nonmoving party in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and all reasonable factual inferences arising from it, must be viewed in the light most favorable to him or her. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970); Jones v. Cannon, 174 F. 3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999). Nonetheless, the nonmoving party still bears the burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence of every element that he or she must prove. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 317. A motion for summary judgment should be granted if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
As this case comes before the court on Defendant Bradley's motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view the facts in the light most favorable to Richardson, the nonmoving party. See Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ'g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The court does so here, referring to Richardson's verified Second Amended Complaint, and taking those facts from the parties' pleadings and summary judgment materials of record. See Perry v. Thompson, 786 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1986) (); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 56.1(B), (C), (F). Matters stated below as "facts" for purposes of summary judgment may not be the actual facts. See Montoute v. Carr, 114 F.3d 181, 182 (11th Cir. 1997).
Both parties submitted a copy of the Pensacola Police Department's ("PPD") Offense Report #PPD15OFF001542 ("Offense Report") in support of their positions . According to the Offense Report, on February 17, 2015, at approximately 4:01 a.m., Officer Rick Mauro responded to Baptist Hospital in reference to a gunshot victim, Dominique Blount (Offense Report, p. 8). Ms. Blount provided Officer Mauro with the following sworn verbal statement regarding the shooting:
Blount said that she was getting home and walking up to the door and felt a pierce in her leg. Blount siad [sic] that she didn't here [sic] or see anything at this time. Blount said her friend who was with her said "did you here [sic] that shot, you might of gotten shot" Blount at time [sic] thought she could of [sic] possibly been shot with a BB GUN or maybe just hit her knee on a...
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