Richardson v. Branker
| Decision Date | 06 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:08–HC–2163–BO.,5:08–HC–2163–BO. |
| Citation | 769 F.Supp.2d 896 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | Timothy RICHARDSON, Petitioner,v.Gerald BRANKER, Warden, Central Prison Raleigh, North Carolina, Respondent. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Stanley Franklin Hammer, Wyatt, Early, Harris & Wheeler, High Point, NC, Kenneth J. Rose, Durham, NC, for Petitioner.Jonathan P. Babb, N.C. Dept. of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for Respondent.
This matter is before the court on the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on behalf of Timothy Richardson (“Richardson” or “petitioner”). Richardson is a state inmate under a sentence of death for the murder of Tracy Marie Rich. Respondent has answered the petition and filed a motion for summary judgment [DE # 19]. Petitioner has responded [DE # 26] and the matter is ripe for ruling.
Richardson was tried at the April 24, 1995, criminal session of the Superior Court of Nash County on charges of first-degree murder, first-degree kidnaping, and robbery with a dangerous weapon. The following facts are summarized from the opinion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. See State v. Richardson, 346 N.C. 520, 488 S.E.2d 148 (1997).
On the night of October 6, 1993, Tracy Rich was working at the L & L Food Store in Castalia, North Carolina. According to computer records from the store alarm, Ms. Rich closed the store at approximately 11:41 p.m.
Approximately two hours later, at 1:50 a.m., the motion detector on the store's front-door triggered the store alarm. The police responded and found both the front and rear doors were secure. The officers noticed a red car parked behind the store. The car was not occupied and the hood was cool, but the officers wrote down the license plate number. Because nothing seemed amiss, the officers left the scene.
Later that morning, at approximately 5:55 a.m., the assistant store manager, Rose Hankerson, arrived to open the store. She unlocked the door and entered, but when she went to relock the door on the inside, she found a key already in the lock. She walked to the back of the store to turn off the alarm and noticed Tracy Rich's key ring on the floor. When she turned on the lights she discovered ceiling tiles had been knocked to the floor. She called the Sheriff's Department.
Lieutenant Brantley, one of the officers who had responded to the alarm call during the night, responded to the scene. Inside the store, pieces of ceiling material were on the floor, there were signs someone had tried to move the store safe, and a ventilator in the rear of the building had been removed. Lt. Brantley also noticed the red car was no longer behind the store.
Tracy Rich's car was found by the police off the side of a dirt road not far from the store. Tracy's eyeglasses and one of her tennis shoes were found on the road near the car. Given the position of the car, the officer could not see underneath it, but when the car was lifted by a tow truck Tracy Rich's body was found beneath the car.
The officers learned that the red car they had seen at the store the night before was registered to petitioner's wife. They went to petitioner's home and petitioner was apprehended hiding in his attic. While in custody, petitioner gave several statements to the police. Initially, petitioner denied any knowledge of the murder. When questioned further, petitioner acknowledged he was present, but said he was just a witness and that Kevin Hedgepeth was responsible.1
According to petitioner, on the night of the murder Kevin Hedgepeth asked for a ride to the L & L store so Hedgepeth could get some money. The victim was locking up when they arrived and Hedgepeth grabbed her when she came out of the store. He forced her into the passenger side of her car, and motioned for petitioner to follow in his car. They drove to a dirt road and when they stopped the victim got out and started running. Hedgepeth ran over the victim and when she tried to crawl away he ran over her again.
Hedgepeth returned to petitioner's car and told him that he had money and wanted to buy crack cocaine. Petitioner said that after they purchased the drugs, Hedgepeth directed him to go back to the L & L store because he had the keys. Petitioner drove to the store and the men went inside. When the police officers arrived to check on the alarm, Hedgepeth hid inside and petitioner left through the roof. After the officers left, Hedgepeth also left the store through the roof. Petitioner drove Hedgepeth home and Hedgepeth gave petitioner thirty dollars.
After petitioner implicated Kevin Hedgepeth in the crimes, the police located Hedgepeth. He told the police that on October 6, 1993, he got home around 11 p.m. He said petitioner showed up at his house a few hours later, around 2 a.m. Petitioner said he was out of gas and needed a ride to his car. Hedgepeth said he and his uncle dropped petitioner off near the L & L store. Relying on statements from Hedgepeth's uncle, grandmother, and others, the police cleared Hedgepeth as a suspect.
In a third statement to police, petitioner told the police that he and Hedgepeth were dropped off at the store together by Hedgepeth's uncle. He continued to say Hedgepeth was present during the murder.
At trial, the forensic pathologist testified that Tracy Rich died from multiple blunt-force injuries and compression injuries to her head, chest, and body from being run over by a car.
The State presented evidence at trial from an expert in footprint impressions that a shoe impression found inside the store on apiece of sheetrock from the ceiling matched petitioner's right shoe. The State also presented an expert in forensic fiber identification who testified that fibers from the t-shirt petitioner was wearing the night of the murder were consistent with fibers found on the victim's shirt and fibers found on plasterboard roof material at the store.
The defense did not present any evidence or witnesses during the guilt phase of trial. At the sentencing phase, the defense presented evidence from petitioner's wife and mother about his family situation and his history of problems with drugs and alcohol. The defense also presented testimony from two mental health experts about petitioner's drug and alcohol abuse, significant mental limitations, and personality disorder. His overall level of functioning was described by one of the experts as comparable to that of an eleven and a half or twelve-year-old.
On May 25, 1995, after a trial by jury, petitioner was found guilty of one count of first-degree murder and one count of first-degree kidnaping.2 St. Ct. R. Vol. 1 of 22, Tab 2 at 74–75. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty as to the charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon. Id. at 76. After the sentencing phase, the jury found both of the aggravating circumstances submitted as to the first-degree murder: 1) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; and 2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. St. Ct. R. Vol. 1 of 22, Tab 2 at 78. The jury found two statutory mitigating circumstances: 1) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal action, and 2) the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance.3 Id. at 79. The jury also found six non-statutory mitigating circumstances. Id. at 79–80. The jury returned a verdict of death on the first-degree murder count. The court subsequently sentenced petitioner to death and sentenced him to forty years imprisonment for the first-degree kidnaping conviction, the sentences to run consecutively.
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed petitioner's convictions and sentence. Richardson, 346 N.C. at 542, 488 S.E.2d at 162. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Richardson v. North Carolina, 522 U.S. 1056, 118 S.Ct. 710, 139 L.Ed.2d 652 (1998). Petitioner filed a motion for appropriate relief (“MAR”) in the Superior Court of Nash County on March 18, 1999. See St. Ct. R. Vol. 1 of 22, Tab 8. On June 13, 2001, petitioner field an amendment to the MAR, in response to the State's response to the MAR. St. Ct. R. Vol. 1 of 22, Tab 9. On January 31, 2002, petitioner filed an amendment to the MAR asserting he could not be executed because he is mentally retarded. Id.
In an order entered on April 9, 2002, the MAR court denied all of the claims in petitioner's MAR except his claim that he could not be executed because he is mentally retarded. St. Ct. R. Vol. 2 of 22, Tab 11. The MAR court held a hearing on the mental retardation claim on June 17, 2005. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court indicated it would deny petitioner's claim and directed the State to prepare an order including certain findings of fact. St. Ct. R. Vol. 2 of 22, Tab 12 at 268–72. The order was entered on June 17, 2005. St. Ct. R. Vol. 2 of 22, Tab 13. On July 13, 2005, petitioner filed a motion to amend motion for appropriate relief to conform to the evidence presented at the hearing on June 17, 2005, and the related amendment to MAR. St. Ct. R. Vol. 3 of 22, Tab 14. In an order entered on July 29, 2005, the court allowed the motion to amend, but denied the amended MAR. St. Ct. R. Vol. 3 of 22, Tab 15. The Supreme Court of North Carolina denied Richardson's petition for writ of certiorari. State v. Richardson, 667 S.E.2d 272 (N.C.2008).
On November 7, 2008, Richardson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this court. On January 28, 2009, respondent filed a response to the petition and moved for summary judgment. Petitioner has responded and the matter is ripe for ruling.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505,...
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