Richardson v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co.

Decision Date31 March 1899
Citation149 Mo. 311,50 S.W. 782
CourtMissouri Supreme Court
PartiesRICHARDSON v. CHICAGO & A. RY. CO.

Appeal from circuit court, Randolph county; John A. Hockaday, Judge.

Action by William A. Richardson against the Chicago & Alton Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Geo. Robertson, for appellant. A. H. Waller and B. B. Caples, for respondent.

ROBINSON, J.

Plaintiff recovered judgment against defendant for $1,000 as damages for negligently killing a jack belonging to plaintiff while said jack was being transported on defendant's railroad, and defendant appealed. This action was originally brought in the circuit court of Howard county, from which court it was transferred, on change of venue, to the circuit court of Randolph county. At the September term, 1894, of said court, judgment was rendered for plaintiff in the sum of $100; whereupon plaintiff appealed to the Kansas City court of appeals, where the judgment was reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial. The opinion of the appellate court is reported in 62 Mo. App. 1. The petition alleged defendant to be a common carrier, and its incorporation, and that as such it undertook, on the the 5th day of April, 1892, to transport plaintiff's jack from Armstrong to Higbee at the usual tariff rate; that by defendant's negligence the jack was maimed and killed, to plaintiff's damage in the sum of $1,000, for which he asks judgment. The answer admitted the incorporation of defendant, that it was a common carrier, and the shipment of the jack; but denied all other allegations in the petition. The answer further set up a special contract between J. B. Martin, the consignor of said jack, and defendant, and alleged as contributory negligence that the animal was insecurely fastened in the car, and was not provided with proper bedding upon which to stand. It was further averred that by agreement the valuation of the jack in question had been fixed at $100, and that the shipment had been charged for on a rate based upon such valuation; that, had a higher valuation been placed upon the jack, a higher rate could and would have been charged. The answer also averred that by such contract it was stipulated that plaintiff in case of loss or damage, while the animal was in defendant's possession, should notify defendant thereof in writing within five days thereafter, or be forever barred, and pleaded a failure to give such notice; that it was further agreed by the terms of said contract that a failure to commence suit against defendant in case of loss within 60 days after the same occurred should bar the action; and that suit had not been commenced until after the said 60 days had elapsed. Plaintiff replied, denying the new matter contained in defendant's answer, and averred that, if Martin entered into the agreement alleged, such action on his part was without plaintiff's knowledge or consent, and beyond the authority of the agency; and further claimed a waiver by defendant of the requirement in the contract of shipment that written notice should be given within five days after such loss or damage, and that the actions and conduct of defendant were of such character as to estop defendant from setting up the failure to give written notice as a defense in bar of this action. The record shows the value of the jack to have been $1,000; that early in March, 1892, plaintiff, who was a dealer in horses and jacks, had a sale at his farm near Moberly, Mo., at which sale one J. B. Martin, who lives at Armstrong, Mo., a station on the line of defendant's railroad, purchased a young jack; that on the 3d day of April, 1892, Martin went to Moberly, and there consummated a trade with plaintiff whereby he received an aged jack, giving in exchange therefor the young jack previously purchased of the plaintiff. Martin also at this time bought a horse of plaintiff, and shipped both of said animals by rail from Moberly to Armstrong. Plaintiff instructed Martin to ship the jack he received in the trade to him, and furnished him with a halter with which to tie the jack in the car. Upon his arrival home, Martin loaded the jack traded to plaintiff in a car furnished by defendant company, and tied him in one end of said car under the direction of defendant's station agent, and signed a contract of shipment as consignor. This was the usual live-stock contract furnished by the railroad to its station agents to be used in the shipment of stock, and contained the following provisions material to an understanding of this controversy: "Eighth. It is understood and agreed that the stock shipped under this contract is transported at the above rates upon the representations of the second party that its value does not exceed one hundred dollars for each horse or mule, twenty dollars for each bull, cow, or ox, and twenty dollars for each sheep, calf, or hog; and that the first party shall not be liable for loss or damage to said stock in excess of these sums, nor for any sum in excess of their fair cash value at the time and place of shipment. Ninth. And it is further mutually agreed that, should any loss or damage of any kind occur to the property specified in the contract while said property is in the possession of the first party, the said second party shall, within five days after said loss or damage has occurred, give notice in writing of his claim therefor to the said first party. If the property is consigned to stock yards, such notice shall be given to the live-stock agent of the first party at said yards, or to the general freight agent or nearest agent of the first party, and before the stock shall have been removed from said yards or mingled with other stock. In all other cases the said second party shall give such notice to the general freight agent or nearest agent of said first party, and, unless such notice is given within five days, said loss or damage shall not be recoverable, and a suit thereon shall be forever barred; and the second party hereby so expressly stipulates and agrees. And any suit against said first party for the recovery of the loss or damage to the property herein specified shall be commenced within sixty days next after such loss or damage shall have occurred, or be forever barred; and, should any suit be commenced against said first party after said sixty days, the lapse of time shall be taken as conclusive evidence against the validity of such claim, any statute of limitations to the contrary notwithstanding; and there shall be no waiver of the aforesaid time within which said claim shall be made or within which suit shall be commenced, unless the first party expressly agrees in writing to...

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29 cases
  • Donovan v. Sells Fargo & Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • June 1, 1915
    ...George v. Railroad, 214 Mo. 551, 113 S. W. 1099, 127 Am. St. Rep. 690; Railroad v. Cleary, 77 Mo. 634, 46 Am. Rep. 13; Richardson v. Railroad, 149 Mo. 311, 50 S. W. 782-for both the past and present condition of our own Missouri holdings, when unaffected by the Carmack Amendmeat to the Inte......
  • Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Norris Grain Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • March 15, 1965
    ...of the recently quoted language from the Act of 1887, but in relation to a shipping contract, see Richardson v. Chicago and Alton Railway Company, 149 Mo. 311, 50 S.W. 782. Among decisions, identically enforcing that statute, which have been made by this court or by Federal District Courts ......
  • Donovan v. Wells Fargo & Co.
    • United States
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    • June 1, 1915
    ... ... here, died and this cause has been properly revived in the ... names of John D. Richardson and J. G. Schneider as ... administrators of the estate of respondent, deceased. With ... this fact kept in mind we see no valid reason for ... 639, 57 L.Ed. 683, 33 ... S.Ct. 391; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v ... Harriman, 227 U.S. 657, 57 L.Ed. 690, 33 S.Ct. 397; ... Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cramer, ... 232 U.S. 490, 58 L.Ed. 697, 34 S.Ct. 383; Great Northern ... Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 232 U.S. 508, 58 ... ...
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    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • November 11, 1946
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