Richardson v. City of N.Y.
| Decision Date | 29 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | 17 Civ. 8622 (PAE) (RWL) |
| Parties | DEWAYNE JOAQUIN RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, ERICKS RODRIGUEZ, CARLOS PAGAN, and WILSON QUILES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Pro se plaintiff Dewayne Joaquin Richardson brings this action against New York City (the "City"), Police Detective Ericks Rodriguez, Police Detective Carlos Pagan, and Sergeant Wilson Quiles (collectively, the "individual defendants," and, together with the City, "defendants"). Richardson alleges that defendants violated his constitutional rights by falsely arresting him and maliciously prosecuting him, in violation of § 1983 and New York State law, after his then-girlfriend accused him of assault and robbery. He has not served the individual defendants in this case, the time to do so has long since passed, and they have not appeared in the action. The City, the sole defendant against whom Richardson has proceeded, has moved for summary judgment as to all of Richardson's claims.
Before the Court is the August 24, 2020 Report and Recommendation of the Honorable Robert W. Lehrburger, United States Magistrate Judge, recommending that the Court grant the motion for summary judgment in its entirety and dismiss this case. See Dkt. 94 ("Report"). For the following reasons, the Court adopts that recommendation.
The Court incorporates by reference the summary of the facts provided in the Report. See Report at 2-6. For purposes of addressing Richardson's objections, however, the Court briefly summarizes those facts here.
On December 9, 2016, Jaqueline Smalls—Richardson's then-girlfriend—called 911 to report that Richardson had assaulted and robbed her inside their shared apartment while carrying a firearm. See Dkt. 83 ("Def. 56.1") ¶ 1. According to the Complaint Report, Smalls identified Richardson by name and description as the perpetrator, and the two lived together. See Dkt. 82-5 ( ) at 2-3. Richardson denies that he had taken anything from Smalls or that he assaulted her. See Dkt. 82-2 ("Richardson Tr.") at 108-09. After contacting the police, Smalls sought medical attention due to stomach and back pain and was escorted by an ambulance to the hospital. Def. 56.1 ¶ 4-5.
On December 10, 2016, the individual defendants, who had not yet met Smalls, went to the shared apartment to gather details about the incident. Id. ¶ 8. When they arrived, they obtained a key from the attendant at the front desk of the apartment complex, and accessed the apartment without seeking further consent. Dkt 87 ("Richardson Aff.") ¶ 3. Because Smalls remained in the hospital overnight, Richardson was alone in the apartment when they arrived. Def. 56.1 ¶ 9. When the individual defendants encountered Richardson, he identified himself and acknowledged that he lived in the apartment, and the officers asked him to come to the precinct with them. Id. ¶ 10; Richardson Aff. ¶ 5. After he refused, the individual defendants pushed their way into the apartment, handcuffed Richardson, and placed him under arrest for robbery in the second degree. Def. 56.1 ¶ 10; Richardson Aff. ¶ 5. Incident to that arrest, the individual defendants searched the apartment without a warrant. Richardson Aff. ¶ 5.
Later that afternoon, the individual defendants met with Smalls for the first time at the hospital. Def. 56.1 ¶ 13. At that meeting, Smalls reiterated that Richardson had threatened her with a firearm the day before, and she signed a consent form permitting the officers to conduct a "complete and full search of [the] apartment" to locate the weapon and gave them a key to access the apartment. Id. ¶ 15; Rodriguez Aff. ¶¶ 6-7.
At the precinct that same day, a warrant search revealed that Richardson had an active parole warrant, which had issued in November 2016. Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 11-12. According to Richardson, it had been issued after he failed to report to his parole officer. Richardson Tr. at 45; see also Def. 56.1 ¶ 12 ().
Richardson was charged with first- and second-degree robbery for the December 9, 2016 incident, and he was arraigned on December 11, 2016. Def. 56.1 ¶ 16. On December 16, 2016, the grand jury was adjourned, and on March 1, 2017, the robbery charges were dismissed. Id. ¶¶ 17, 19. Richardson, however, remained incarcerated due to the active parole warrant issued by New York State. Id. ¶ 20. According to Richardson, he was ultimately released after he "did a year violation" due to the parole warrant. Richardson Tr. at 45.
On November 7, 2017, Richardson sued the City pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, false arrest, hardship, defamation of character, and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Dkt. 2 ("Compl.") at 2. On April 26, 2018, Richardson filed an amended complaint, adding Pagan and Rodriguez as defendants, adding a claim under the Sixth Amendment, and dropping his hardship and defamation claims. See Dkt. 16 ("FAC"). On June 26, 2018, Richardson again amended his complaint, this time to include Quiles. See Dkt. 25 ("SAC"). However, Richardson never served any of the individual defendants after naming them in the SAC, and the time to do so has now expired. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
On November 6, 2018, the Court referred this case to Judge Lehrburger for general trial supervision. Dkt. 35. On December 2, 2019, after the City requested a pre-motion conference in anticipation of a motion for summary judgment, the Court referred that motion, too, to Judge Lehrburger for a report and recommendation. See Dkt. 73.
On January 27, 2020, the City moved for summary judgment, see Dkt. 80, and filed a memorandum in support, Dkt. 89 ("Def. Mem."); a Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statement, see Def. 56.1; and the declaration of Adria J. Bonillas, Esq., see Dkt. 82 ("Bonillas Decl."), with accompanying exhibits. On March 19, 2020, Richardson opposed the City's motion, see Dkt. 86 ("Pl. Opp'n"), and filed his own affidavit, Richardson Aff., and Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statement, see Dkt. 88 ("Pl. 56.1"). On April 20, 2020, the City replied. See Dkt. 89 ("Def. Reply").
On August 24, 2020, Judge Lehrburger issued the Report, recommending that the Court grant the City's motion for summary judgment and dismiss this case in its entirety. See Report at 28. On September 9, 2020, the Court received Richardson's objections to the Report. Dkt. 95 ("Objections"). On September 24, 2020, the City responded. See Dkt. 96 ("Def. Resp.").
In reviewing a report and recommendation, a district court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). To accept the portions of a report to which no timely objection has been made, "a district court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record." Acevedo v. Lempke, No. 10 Civ. 5285 (PAE) (HBP), 2014 WL 4651904, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2014) (quoting King v. Greiner, No. 02 Civ. 5810 (DLC), 2009 WL 2001439, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2009)). When a timely and specific objection has been made, the court is obligated to review the contested issues de novo. See id.; see alsoFed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Hynes v. Squillace, 143 F.3d 653, 656 (2d Cir. 1998). But when the objections simply reiterate previous arguments or make only conclusory statements, the court may review the Report for clear error. Dickerson v. Conway, No. 08 Civ. 8024 (PAE) (FM), 2013 WL 3199094, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2013); see also Kirk v. Burge, 646 F. Supp. 2d 534, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (collecting cases). This is so even in the case of a pro se plaintiff. See Dickerson, 2013 WL 3199094, at *1; Molefe v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 602 F. Supp. 2d 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must "show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a question of material fact. In making this determination, the Court must view all facts "in the light most favorable" to the non-moving party. Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2008).
If the movant meets its burden, "the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment." Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). "[A] party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Rather, to survive a summary judgment motion, the opposing party must establish a genuine issue of fact by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009).
"Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law" will preclude a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, a court is "required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003)).
Liberally construed, Richardson's SAC alleges constitutional violations against all defendants under § 1983, as well as state law claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution against the individual defendants. The City argues that no evidence supports a municipal claim against the...
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