Richardson v. City of Tampa

Citation175 So.2d 43
Decision Date12 May 1965
Docket NumberNo. 33874,33874
PartiesJoseph C. RICHARDSON, Petitioner, v. CITY OF TAMPA and Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

T. Terrell Sessums, of Albritton, Sessums & Gordon, Tampa, for petitioner.

John M. Gilbert, Wm. Reece Smith, Jr., Tampa, Patrick H. Mears, Tallahassee, and J. Franklin Garner, Lakeland, for respondents.

THOMAS, Justice.

The petitioner complains because he was not declared permanently and totally disabled but instead was found to have suffered injury rendering him permanently partially disabled to the extent of 65% of the body as a whole.

At the time of his injury the petitioner was 51 years of age, totally illiterate--his intelligence quotient is 60 and according to the clinical psychologist who testified he is by the 'old nomenclature * * * feebleminded, and [in] the new nomenclature * * * mentally retarded, moderate to severe in degree.' We learn that the claimant has a mild case of diabetes mellitus and a significant degree of hypertension. His counsel frankly states in his brief that these are not traceable to the injury but that they do when combined with the results of the injury, namely, a protruded lumbar disc, nerve root pressure, partial sciatic palsy, complete paralysis of the peroneal and toe extensor muscles of the foot, left toe drop, atrophy and continued pain constitute obstacles to his employment.

All his life the claimant had worked as a farm hand, porter, car washer, and performed other unskilled manual jobs. He had had ailments on several occasions which did not leave hin with any residual disabilty. At the time of the injury for which he now seeks relief he was a laborer for the city of Tampa earning $56.46 weekly.

At first the city afforded medical treatment and paid temporary total compensation then filed notice to controvert.

The deputy commissioner entered an order that the claimant be furnished a myelogram to determine whether or not he had a herniated intervertebral disc. After this procedure the deputy found that as a result of the injury the claimant had a protruded lumbar disc causing him to be temporarily and totally disabled from 19 May 1962 to 14 February 1963 and that he was entitled to temporary total compensation during that period and until the condition ceased. Furthermore, he found that the claimant had not yet reached maximum medical recovery and was still, at the time of hearing, in need of further medical treatment.

Complying with the order effectuating these findings the city furnished the medical treatment until 5 September 1963 when the claimant declined surgery. At that time he was given a disability rating of 40% permanent partial disability of the body as a whole. The claimant in cooperation with Florida State Employment Service, Vocational Rehabilitation Service, the Rehabilitation nurse of the Florida Industrial Commission and certain employment agencies undertook to find employment but failed, except for a few days' work in mopping floors and cleaning pots at a golf and country club, which he had to discontinue because of his condition. For a period of 35 weeks he was able only sporadically to wash and wax automobiles.

For the third, and final, time the matter was entertained by the deputy who awarded him compensation on the basis of 65% permanent partial disability of the body as a whole.

The Full Commission subsequently affirmed this order and it is this affirmance that is now under attack.

We have recognized the rule that a laborer need not be completely immobilized or utterly incapacitated to be classified as permanently and totally disabled. Port Everglades Terminal Co. v. Canty, Fla., 120 So.2d 596. And he will not be removed from that status by infrequent odd jobs or by uncertain work prompted by family influence or resulting from gratuitousness. Despite any of these, this court indicated one may be unfit for remunerative or competitive employment in any "general field of human endeavor."

In the cited case we approved the language in ...

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9 cases
  • Lerman v. Broward County Bd. of County Com'rs
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • December 22, 1989
    ...show that he is totally physically incapacitated before a determination of permanent total disability can be made. Richardson v. City of Tampa, 175 So.2d 43, 44 (Fla.1965); Carson v. Gaineswood Condominiums, 532 So.2d 28, 32 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Rather, the test is whether the claimant is u......
  • Carson v. Gaineswood Condominiums, 87-1236
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • September 13, 1988
    ...benefits, an injured employee is not required to show that he is "completely immobilized or utterly incapacitated." Richardson v. City of Tampa, 175 So.2d 43, 44 (Fla.1965). However, a claimant must establish that his injury precludes him from doing even light work uninterruptedly. Alachua ......
  • H.G. Boddiford Painting Contractors, Inc. v. Boddiford
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • February 10, 1983
    ...that a claimant need not be "entirely out of commission to be awarded compensation for total permanent disability." Richardson v. City of Tampa, 175 So.2d 43, 45 (Fla.1965). See also, Larson § 57.51. The proper scope of inquiry is thus not whether a claimant is receiving some monies which e......
  • Ham v. Chrysler Corp.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
    • May 23, 1967
    ...157 Cal.App.2d 542, 321 P.2d 21 (1958); Lunsford v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 189 Tenn. 293, 225 S.W.2d 66 (1949); Richardson v. City of Tampa, Fla., 175 So.2d 43 (1965); In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826 (1941); Wheeler v. Northwestern Metal Co., 175 Neb. 841, 124 N.W.2d 377 (1963); ......
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