Richardson v. Cogswell

• Decision Date: 05 June 1886
• Citation: 1 S.W. 51,47 Ark. 170
• Parties: RICHARDSON v. COGSWELL
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

1 S.W. 51

47 Ark. 170

RICHARDSON v. COGSWELL

Supreme Court of Arkansas

June 5, 1886

APPEAL from Garland Circuit Court, Hon. J. B. WOOD, Circuit Judge.

Judgment reversed and case remanded.

John J Sumpter for Appellant.

This action was barred by limitation. Gantt's Dig., sec. 4121. When the statute once begins to run, it continues to run over all intervening disabilities. Abbott's Nat. Dig., secs 165-166, p. 227, and cases cited.

The act makes no reservation in favor of non-residents, and the court can make none. 17 Ark. 199.

Z. P H. Farr for Appellant.

The account was barred. Mansf. Dig., sec. 4478. The reply of plaintiff was no answer to the plea of limitation, as the statute under which it was drawn has reference to non-resident debtors. Mansf. Dig., sec. --. Richardson was a resident. 8 Ark. 429.

Sanders & Husbands for Appellee.

The evidence shows that appellant was a non-resident when the suit was brought.

OPINION

COCKRILL, C. J.

The appellee is a hotel proprietor in Hot Springs. The appellant was a resident of the same city, and became indebted to her in the sum of $ 119.28 for board and lodging, and then absconded, as the evidence tended to prove, to prevent the commencement of an action against him. Somewhat more than five years thereafter he reappeared in Hot Springs, and Mrs. Cogswell sued him for the amount of his board bill. The defense offered was that the cause of action did not accrue within three years of the institution of suit. There was judgment against the appellant in the court of common pleas, and again on appeal to the circuit court, where judgment was rendered against the sureties in his appeal bond. It is in the interest of his sureties mainly that this appeal is prosecuted.

Mrs. Cogswell admits that her cause of action accrued more than three years before suit brought, and relies upon the following provision of the statute to prevent the bar: "If any person, by leaving the county, absconding or concealing himself, or any other improper act of his own, prevent the commencement of any action in this act specified, such action may be commenced within the times respectively limited after the commencement of such action shall have ceased to be so prevented." Mansf. Dig., sec. 4502.

In the case of Denton v. Brownlee, 24 Ark. 556, the statute in question, upon mature consideration, was construed to suspend the operation of the statute of limitations only when the obstruction to suit existed at the time the cause of action accrued. When no disability in the creditor,...