Richardson v. Communications Workers of America

• Decision Date: 25 April 1967
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 02673.
• Citation: 267 F. Supp. 403
• Parties: Dale C. RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, District 7, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 7495, etc., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska

267 F. Supp. 403

Dale C. RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, District 7, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 7495, etc., et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 02673.

United States District Court D. Nebraska.

April 25, 1967.

Dan J. Whiteside, and Craig, Coufal & Nelson, Omaha, Neb., for plaintiff.

Hird Stryker, of Fraser, Stryker, Marshall & Veach, Omaha, Neb., for defendants, Western Electric Co., Inc., and others.

Robert E. O'Connor, of Ross & O'Connor, Omaha, Neb., for all defendants except Western Electric Co., Inc.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RICHARD E. ROBINSON, Chief Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on motions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. The motions were filed by Western Electric Company, Inc. filing #8, and defendants Coffelt, Graves, Much, Garbena, Boge, Franzen, and McKay. Filing #7. The individuals named are supervisory employees of Western Electric Company.

Plaintiff's complaint alleges a breach of his employment contract with Western Electric Company as a result of a "conspiracy" between Western Electric, certain of the Company's supervisory employees, the Communication Workers of America Also District 7, and Local #7495 of the Union, and various members and officers of the union local either as agents of the local or in the alternative not as agents of any labor organization.

Defendant, Western Electric Company, contends that plaintiff has failed to state a claim because the complaint does not allege that plaintiff has exhausted the contractual grievance procedures provided in the collective bargaining agreement.

Plaintiff contends that his claims against each of these defendants arise under the provisions of Title 29 United States Code § 185. That section reads as follows:

"A Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."

For purposes of these motions it has been stipulated that Western Electric is engaged in an industry affecting commerce.

Section 185 has been interpreted to be more than a mere grant of jurisdiction to the district courts. Such interpretation was given final sanction by the Supreme Court in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 1957 where it was said:

"* * * We would undercut the Act and defeat its policy if we read § 301 29 U.S.C. § 185 narrowly as only conferring jurisdiction over labor organizations. The question then is, what is the substantive law to be applied in suits under § 301(a)? We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws." Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills supra at page 456, 77 S.Ct. at page 918.

The boundaries of § 301 a 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) are in the process of being "fashioned". The latest authoritative statement of the section's coverage was given in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 U.S. February 27, 1967 in which the Supreme Court decided that an action by an employee-plaintiff against his bargaining representative for breach of its duty of fair representation was a § 301 a suit. It was further indicated that, while the employee's failure to exhaust contractual grievance procedures would be a good defense to his action in some circumstances, such contractual provisions could not serve to bar the action where the employee had no effective access to the procedures.

"It is true that the employer in such a situation may have done nothing to prevent exhaustion of the exclusive contractual remedies to which he agreed in the collective bargaining agreement. But the employer has committed a wrongful discharge in breach of that agreement, a breach which could be remedied through the grievance process to the employee-plaintiff's benefit were it not for the union's breach of its statutory duty of fair representation to the employee. To leave the employee remediless in such circumstances would, in our opinion, be a great injustice. * * *" Vaca v. Sipes supra

In the present case the complaint alleges that the union and the employer conspired to breach the...