Ruzicka v. General Motors Corporation, Civ. A. No. 36598.

• Decision Date: 20 January 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 36598.
• Citation: 336 F. Supp. 824
• Parties: William RUZICKA, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, International Union, United Auto Workers (UAW), Local Union 166, UAW, jointly and severally, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

336 F. Supp. 824

William RUZICKA, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, International Union, United Auto Workers (UAW), Local Union 166, UAW, jointly and severally, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 36598.

United States District Court, E. D. Michigan, S. D.

January 20, 1972.

Robert J. Dinges, Glotta, Adelman & Dinges, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff.

J. F. Wheatley, General Motors Corporation Legal Department, Detroit, Mich., for defendant GM.

Jordan Rossen, Asst. Gen. Counsel, International Union UAW, Detroit, Mich., for the Union.

MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

FEIKENS, District Judge.

Plaintiff in this action is William Ruzicka, a former employee of General Motors Corporation. Defendants are General Motors Corporation and the UAW. On March 31, 1970, he was fired by General Motors for being drunk on the job and for using abusive language to a management employee. Ruzicka filed a written grievance, protesting his discharge, which proceeded through steps one and two of the grievance procedure but was not appealed to the third and fourth steps. Plaintiff claims that he notified his Shop Committeeman to continue processing his grievance but that he (a man Panter, by name) failed to do so because of personal hostility towards Ruzicka.

Plaintiff alleges that the decision of management was contrary to consistent rulings of impartial umpires in that the correct disciplinary action should have been a temporary suspension. Therefore, plaintiff sued General Motors Corporation for breach of contract, claiming an improper discharge. He may maintain this, only if the defendant UAW breached its duty of fair representation.

Plaintiff's suit against his union, the UAW, is based on that claimed breach of the union's duty of fair representation. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S. Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). Plaintiff alleges that he had "lost favor" with his union and that the local union's Shop Committeeman was hostile towards him and therefore failed to process plaintiff's grievance to the third and fourth stages.

General Motors Corporation has filed a motion to dismiss based on the fact that plaintiff failed to complete the grievance procedures pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. Since plaintiff's claim against General Motors is based on breach of contract, contract law indicates that plaintiff must comply with the contract terms.

". . . If the wrongfully discharged employee himself resorts to the courts before the grievance procedures have been fully exhausted, the employer may well defend on the ground that the exclusive remedies provided by such a contract have not been exhausted. Since the employee's claim is based upon breach of the collective bargaining agreement, he is bound by terms of that agreement which govern the manner in which contractual rights may be enforced. For this reason, it is settled that the employee must at least attempt to exhaust exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures established by the bargaining agreement." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184, 87 S.Ct. 903, 914, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967).

An exception to this rule arises if the union has sole power to invoke the higher stages of the grievance procedure, and the plaintiff (as is alleged here) is prevented from exhausting grievance procedures by the union's wrongful refusal to process the grievance. Vaca v. Sipes, supra at 185, 87 S.Ct. 903. The court further stated:

"For these reasons, we think the wrongfully discharged employee may bring an action against his employer in the face of a defense based upon the failure to exhaust contractual remedies, provided the employee can prove that the union as bargaining agent breached its duty of fair representation in its handling of the employee's grievance." Supra at 186, 87 S.Ct. at 914.

Thus the validity of defendant General Motors' defense of failure to complete the grievance procedures depends upon whether the UAW breached its duty of fair representation.

The rationale for permitting the plaintiff to proceed where the union has breached its duty of fair representation is that otherwise the employee is remediless—abandoned by his union and fired by his company. It does no injury to the company to allow him to proceed, since plaintiff alleges that they have discharged him wrongfully and that his failure to perform his own contract obligations is not attributable to him. Richardson v. Communications Workers of America, 267 F.Supp. 403 (D.Neb. 1967).

Thus plaintiff must be able to show first that the defendant union breached its duty of fair representation.

In this district some cases indicate that plaintiff must show that he has exhausted or attempted to exhaust his internal remedies against the union before he can proceed against it in court. In Harrington v. Chrysler Corporation, 303 F.Supp. 495 (E.D.Mich.1969, Kaess, J.), plaintiff failed to completely exhaust his contract grievance procedure and his intra-union appeal procedure set forth in Article 32 of the UAW Constitution. Judge Kaess stated:

". . . plaintiff . . . sought redress only by means of the grievance machinery set forth in the local collective bargaining agreement between Local Union No. 412 and Chrysler Corporation. He did not avail himself of the intra-union appeal procedures to challenge Local 412's alleged arbitrary action in refusing to represent the plaintiff with respect to the grievance. The UAW Const. requires the aggrieved member to submit his appeal in writing within a specified time period . . . and * * * all remedies and appeals . . . must be exhausted prior to resort to court.

"Thus, based upon plaintiff's . . failure to affirmatively show some action pursuant to the intra-union appellate procedures, this court is without authority to entertain the plaintiff's action." Supra at 497. (Emphasis added.)

See also Imbrunnone v. Chrysler...