Richardson v. Doe
| Decision Date | 24 June 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 38306,38306 |
| Citation | 176 Ohio St. 370,199 N.E.2d 878 |
| Parties | , 8 A.L.R.3d 1331, 27 O.O.2d 345 RICHARDSON, Appellee, v. DOE et al.; Good Samaritan Hospital, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
A negligence action against a hospital based on the doctrine of respondeat superior for the negligence of a nurse is subject to the two-year statute of limitations for bodily-injury actions.
Plaintiff, Reva Sue Richardson, appellee herein and hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, entered Good Samaritan Hospital, herein referred to as appellant, on August 29, 1959, for delivery of an infant.
On August 21, 1961, plaintiff filed her petition in the Common Pleas Court, alleging that, after such delivery, defendants Jane Doe and Alice Roe, licensed nurses and employees of appellant, permitted her to hemorrhage for eight hours, after discovery, without notifying her physician. Plaintiff alleges further that due to the loss of blood it was necessary to transfuse her with whole blood. From the transfusion, plaintiff contracted a disease called serum jaundice or hepatitis.
Appellant demurred to the petition on two grounds, first, that the action was not brought within the time limited for commencement of such actions, and, second, that the petition does not state facts showing a cause of action against appellant.
The demurrer was sustained by the Common Pleas Court on the ground that the action was not brought in time, and judgment was entered for appellant. The court did not rule on the other ground.
The Court of Appeals, finding that the action was not governed by the law applicable to actions for malpractice, reversed the judgment of the Common Pleas Court and remanded the cause to that court for further proceeding according to law.
The cause is before this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
White & White and Freeman & Freeman, Norwalk, for appellee.
Buckingham, Holzapfel & Buckingham and B. G. Zeiher, Sandusky, for appellant.
It is appellant's position that the petition, which charges licensed nurses with neglect in the professional care of a patient, states a cause of action in malpractice which has a one-year statute of limitations. Since this statute of limitations, if applicable, would bar an action against the nurses, appellant claims that it is also effective to bar an action, under the theory of respondeat superior, against their hospital employer.
Thus, the issue is whether an action against nurses and their hospital employer for the alleged negligence of the nurses in caring for a hospital patient must be brought within one year under the statute of limitations for malpractice, Section 2305.11, Revised Code, or within two years under the statute of limitations for bodily injury, Section 2305.10, Revised Code. The ultimate question, then, is whether lack of due care by a nurse falls within that limited area of negligence known as malpractice.
Malpractice in relation to the care of the human body has been defined as the failure of a member of the medical profession, employed to treat a case professionally, to fulfill the duty, which the law implies from the employment, to exercise that degree of skill, care and diligence exercised by members of the same profession, practicing in the same or a similar locality, in the light of the present state of medical science. Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 365, 124 N.E. 238; Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865, paragraph one of the syllabus.
It is the misfortune of both physicians and lawyers that, in a very considerable proportion of their cases, they are unable to accomplish the purpose desired. The general public often fails to realize that circumstances over which these persons have no control may make it impossible for them to accomplish what they set out to do. Since physicians must often fail to fulfill expectations, they, along with lawyers, are peculiarly susceptible to the charge of failure in the performance of their professional duties.
With the passage of time it becomes more and more difficult for a physician to establish that he exercised due care in performing his services. If sufficient time elapses, it may be impossible to determine whether the present physical condition of a person is the result of a lack of care and skill in prior treatment or the result of factors unrelated to treatment.
Because of the possibility of unwarranted and fraudulent claims which would be difficult to disprove, the...
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