Richardson v. Duckworth
| Decision Date | 04 December 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-1008,86-1008 |
| Citation | 834 F.2d 1366 |
| Parties | Solomon RICHARDSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jack R. DUCKWORTH, Warden, and Indiana Attorney General, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Donald V. Morano, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner-appellant.
David A. Arthur, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., for respondents-appellees.
Before WOOD, COFFEY, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
The petitioner, Richardson, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
Solomon Richardson, petitioner-appellant, was tried in an Indiana state court and on Richardson was arrested for an armed robbery 2 at approximately 6:30 a.m. on April 8, 1976; a Gary, Indiana police officer advised him of his rights, and he was conveyed to the Lake County Jail. Later that morning, Richardson was questioned by Detectives Carroll and Malizzo of the Lake County Sheriff's Department. At a pre-trial suppression hearing, Detective Carroll testified that, before questioning Richardson, at approximately 11:10 a.m., he advised the petitioner of his rights, reading the following warning from a Miranda card:
Detective Malizzo who was present during the first part of Richardson's questioning testified that Richardson was asked after each sentence in the Miranda warning whether he understood his rights. He further testified that Richardson responded affirmatively to each of the questions asked, answering "yes" after each question. After advising the defendant of his Miranda rights, a detective in the presence of his partner inquired of the petitioner whether he wished to make a statement. Richardson replied he did, and in Detective Malizzo's words, the petitioner "started volunteering information as to what happened and who did what" in the robbery.
After confessing to his involvement in the robbery, Richardson asked Detective Carroll about an attorney and a conversation ensued. At the pre-trial suppression hearing Detective Carroll described the conversation as follows: 3
Record of Proceedings in the Supreme Court of Indiana at 41-42.
At approximately 11:20 a.m., following their conversation, Detective Carroll, with Detective Malizzo again present, asked Richardson if he would like to put his statement in writing; once again the petitioner responded in the affirmative. But before transcribing Richardson's statement, Detective Carroll again informed the petitioner of his rights, reading a waiver and statement form, which provided:
I, [Solomon Richardson ], am [20 ] years old. My date of birth is [9/23/55 ]. I live at [1985 Washington Gary, Indiana ]. The person to whom I give the following voluntary statement, [Det. Carroll ] having identified and made himself known as a [Detective ] of the [Lake County ] Police Department, DULY WARNED AND ADVISED ME, AND I KNOW:
1. Before making this statement, I was advised that I have the right to remain silent and that anything I might say, may or will be used against me in a court of law.
2. That I have the right to consult with an attorney of my own choice before saying anything, and that an attorney may be present while I am making any statement or throughout the course of any conversation with any police officer if I so choose.
3. That I can stop and request an attorney at any time during the course of the taking of any statement or during the course of any such conversation.
4. That in the course of any conversation, I can refuse to answer any further questions, and remain silent, thereby terminating the conversation.
5. That if I cannot hire an attorney, one will be provided for me.
I have read the foregoing statement of my rights, and I am fully aware of the said rights. I do not desire the services of any attorney at this time, and before proceeding with the making of any statements, or during the course of any conversation with any police officer and hereby waive said right. No promises or threats have been made to me, and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me to procure any statement or induce any conversation. That the statement that I am about to give is the truth, and that I give it of my own free will.
Date [April 8, 1976 ] Time [11:25 A.M. ]
[SOLOMON D. RICHARDSON ]
I have read each page of this statement and waiver, consisting of [4 ] pages, each page of which bears my signature, and corrections, if any, bear my initials, and I certify that the facts contained herein are true and correct.
This statement was completed [1:15 P.M.], on the [8th ] day of [April ] 19[76 ].
[SOLOMON D. RICHARDSON ]
[ROGER CARROLL]
CERTIFICATIONI hereby certify that the foregoing warning and waiver was explained, and read to me by the above signatory, and that he also read it, and has affixed his signature hereto in my presence, and that I will so testify in court.
[SOLOMON D. RICHARDSON ]
[ROGER CARROLL]"
Detective Carroll's testimony established that Richardson, a student at Ivy Tech, 4 a local-vocational school, was then observed reading the waiver and statement form. Detective Carroll further testified that he specifically asked the petitioner if he understood the waiver form and Richardson responded, answering yes. 5
At approximately 11:25 a.m. Detective Carroll began typing the statement as Richardson reiterated his confession, again fully admitting his involvement in the robbery, and the officer completed the task at 1:15 p.m. The petitioner then proceeded to read and sign each page of the four-page statement, acknowledging that the statement was given knowingly and voluntarily. At his trial the state introduced and the trial court received Richardson's confession in evidence.
The petitioner claims that Detective Carroll's recitation of the Miranda warnings confused him in that he was advised that counsel would not be appointed until arraignment contradicting the earlier warning read from the Miranda card, as well as the warning on the waiver form. 6 The petitioner asserts that App.Br. at 13. The petitioner argues that the state trial judge erred in receiving the statement into evidence. Richardson also claims that his waiver of counsel was involuntary because Detective Carroll and Detective Malizzo induced and coerced him to confess, hinting that his co-defendants, two brothers (Littlejohn Faulkner and James Faulkner), would collaborate to the detriment of Richardson's defense; and suggested that things "would go easier for me [Richardson] if I gave one" (a statement).
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