Richardson v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 26 February 2008 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:06-CV-2862-TWT. |
| Citation | 545 F.Supp.2d 1318 |
| Parties | Bennie RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. Alphonso R. JACKSON, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Bennie Richardson, East Point, GA, pro se.
Melaine A. Williams, Office of United States Attorney, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.
This is an employment discrimination action. It is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation [Doc. 28] of the Magistrate Judge recommending granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 18] and denying the Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 22]. The Court approves and adopts the Report and Recommendation as the judgment of the Court. The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 18] is GRANTED. The Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 22] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ORDER
Attached is the report and recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge in this action in accordance with 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1) and this Court's Civil Local Rule 72.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party may file written objections, if any, to the report and recommendation within ten (10) days of service of this Order. Should objections be filed, they shall specify with particularity the alleged error or errors made (including reference by page number to the transcript if applicable) and shall be served upon the opposing party. The party filing objections will be responsible for obtaining and filing the transcript of any evidentiary hearing for review by the District Court. If no objections are filed, the report and recommendation may be adopted as the opinion and order of the District Court and any appellate review of factual findings will be limited to a plain error review. United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093 (11th Cir.1983).
The Clerk is directed to submit the report and recommendation with objections, if any, to the District Court after expiration of the above time period.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Plaintiff filed the above-styled civil action pro se on November 13, 2006. He claims that Defendant discriminated against him on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.
The action is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [18] and Plaintiffs "Motion to Dismiss Summary Judgment" [22] (Plaintiffs brief in response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment). For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [18] be GRANTED, that Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Summary Judgment [22] be DENIED, and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant on all counts of Plaintiffs Complaint.
Unless otherwise indicated, the Court draws the undisputed facts from "Defendant's Statement of Material Facts as to which There is No Genuine Issue to Be Tried" ("SMF"). Although Plaintiff has filed a separate Statement of Material Facts ("Pl.SMF"), he has failed to respond to the numbered facts presented by Defendant, as required by Local Rule 56.1B(2). Because Plaintiff has not specifically controverted any of Defendant's facts, the Court must accept those facts as admitted. LR 56.1B(2), NDGa. The Court nevertheless views these facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as required on a defendant's motion for summary judgment. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1560 (11th Cir. 1994); Reynolds v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 989 F.2d 465, 469 (11th Cir.1993).
During the relevant time period in this action, Plaintiff was a Community and Planning Development ("CPD") Representative in the New Orleans office of the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). SMF at ¶ 1. At that time, Defendant Alphonso R. Jackson was the Secretary of HUD. See Compl. at ¶ 1.
In March of 2004, Plaintiff submitted a request to his supervisor, Gregory Hamilton, for a hardship transfer to the Atlanta office. SMF at ¶ 2. Plaintiff indicated that he needed to the transfer to care for his ailing mother who was living in Dermott, Arkansas, and raising his three minor nephews. SMF at ¶ 3. Although Plaintiffs mother was living in Dermott, Arkansas, Plaintiff wanted a transfer to Atlanta because he claimed that his mother would receive better medical care if she moved to Atlanta. SMF at ¶ 5.
Plaintiffs transfer request was submitted to CPD headquarters and considered but it was not approved because the Atlanta office was fully staffed and there was no need for additional CPD staffing. SMF at ¶ 6. Because CPD was unable to approve Plaintiffs request for a transfer to Atlanta, the office suggested that he seek assistance from the Employee Assistance Program ("EAP") which coordinates hardship transfers department wide. SMF at ¶ 7. EAP was unable to negotiate a reassignment for Plaintiff in other non-CPD HUD offices in Atlanta. SMF at ¶ 8.
In mid-July of 2004, Plaintiff requested to be transferred to Little Rock, Arkansas. SMF at ¶ 9. Before the transfer was finalized, Plaintiff sent an e-mail on July 30, 2004, requesting to be transferred to Jacksonville, Florida, instead. SMF at ¶ 10. In early August of 2004, Plaintiff met with Ronald Herbert, Director of CPD's Office of Field Management and Plaintiffs second-line supervisor, who informed Plaintiff that he could not transfer to the CPD office in Jacksonville. SMF at ¶ 11. The Jacksonville office was unavailable because there was only one possible opening in that office and a request for reassignment to that office was under consideration that had preceded the request of the Plaintiff. SMF at ¶ 12. The employee whose request for transfer to Jacksonville had preceded that of Plaintiff was Nayana Schwertze, a female employee from the New Jersey office, but her request was also ultimately denied on the ground that there was no opening available. SMF at ¶ 13, 14.
In light of the unavailability of a position in Jacksonville, Herbert suggested that Plaintiff consider other CPD offices that could accommodate additional staff, including Little Rock, Arkansas; Greensboro, North Carolina; Columbia, South Carolina; Knoxville, Tennessee, and Baltimore, Maryland. SMF at ¶ 15. Plaintiff rejected all of these suggestions for various reasons and later informed Herbert that he would accept any reassignment in Orlando, Miami, Jacksonville, or any place in Georgia. SMF at ¶ 16. Plaintiff was again advised that Jacksonville, Miami, and Atlanta were not available, and that CPD does not have any staff in Orlando. SMF at ¶ 17.
On August 20, 2004, Plaintiff informed William Eargle, Jr., CPD's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations and Herbert's supervisor, that he wanted to be transferred to Little Rock before October 3, 2004, because his mother was being admitted into the hospital for surgery. SMF at ¶ 18. Three days later, Plaintiff was advised that his request for reassignment to Little Rock was on hold pending the outcome of the Agency's response to a Congressional inquiry. SMF at ¶ 20.
In Plaintiffs "Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Is No Genuine Issue to Be Tried" ("Pl.SMF"), Plaintiff alleges that Herbert told him that, in order to be granted a transfer for hardship reasons, an employee must be transferring to be a caregiver for another person. PI. SMF at ¶ 2. According to Plaintiff, there were two women who were transferred for reasons other than the fact that they were going to care for another person. PI. SMF at ¶ 3.
Plaintiff alleges that he filed a timely charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and further alleges that he received a right to sue notice from the EEOC on September 17, 2006, and timely filed this action within ninety (90) days thereafter. See Compl. at ¶¶ 10,11.
Because many of the Court's findings of fact are intertwined with its analysis of whether the parties have met their respective evidentiary burdens, the remaining relevant facts are set forth in the Discussion below.
Summary judgment is authorized when all "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 175, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Bingham, Ltd. v. United States, 724 F.2d 921, 924 (11th Cir.1984). The movant carries this burden by showing the court that there is "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In making its determination, the court must view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Once the moving party has adequately supported its motion, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts that demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 588 (1986). The nonmoving party is required "to go beyond the pleadings" and to present competent evidence designating "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Generally, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" supporting the nonmoving party's case is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty...
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