Richardson v. Md. Cas. Co
| Decision Date | 20 May 1930 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 19983, 19984.,s. 19983, 19984. |
| Citation | 153 S.E. 524,41 Ga.App. 520 |
| Parties | RICHARDSON. v. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. et al. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. et al. v. RICHARDSON. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
An employee whose wage was $25 per week and who sustained a compensable injury, which resulted in a 10 per cent. loss of use of a leg, was, under the terms of section 32 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, entitled to receive as compensation the equivalent of $1.25 per week for 175 weeks, less the time for which he had been compensated prior to the award, and was not entitled to $4 per week, as by the terms of section 30, for such period. In determining the entire amount of compensation to be awarded, the provisions of the former section and not of the latter were applicable.
But upon a construction of the provisions in both sections as to the manner or method of payment, the Industrial Commission should have proportioned the period of the weekly payments, rather than the amount of such payments, so as to provide compensation in the same weekly amounts, but for one-tenth the number of weeks, as for a total loss of the leg.
Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; John D. Humphries, Judge.
Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by B. T. Richardson, employee and claimant, opposed by the Etowah Monument Company, employer, and the Maryland Casualty Company, insurance carrier. Award of Industrial Commission raising weekly payments of sole commissioner was reversed by the Superior Court, and judgment rendered in accordance with sole commissioner's award, and both employee and employer and insurance carrier bring error.
Affirmed as to employee, and reversed as to employer and insurance carrier.
P. J. Riordan and E. L. Fowler, both of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
Underwood, Haas & Gambrell, of Atlanta, for defendants in error.
This is a workmen's compensation case. B. T. Richardson, whose wage was $25 per week, sustained injury to a leg, and, after he had been paid compensation for a certain period, a controversy arose between him and his employer, Etowah Monument Company, as to further payments. Commissioner Land found a permanent partial loss of use of the leg, amounting to 10 per cent., and awarded compensation at the rate of $1.25 per week for 167 weeks. This award was affirmed by the full commission, except that the weekly payments were raised to $4. On appeal by the employer and the insurance carrier, the superior court reversed the award of the full commission as to the amount of the payments and made a judgment in accordance with the award of the sole commissioner. The employee on the one side and the employer and the insurance carrier on the other brought respective bills of exceptions to this court. The questions for decision are as to the amount of the compensation to be awarded, and as to the manner of its payment.
Relying upon the latter clause as to maximum and minimum payments, the employee contends that, although the proportionate diminution in his earning capacity was less than $4 per week, yet, since he had received a weekly wage of a larger sum, he is entitled to compensation at the rate of $4 per week for the remaining period of 167 weeks, section 30, Laws 1922, p. 190, § 3, providing that compensation shall not be "less than four dollars per week, except when the weekly wage is below four dollars."
The employer and the insurance carrier insist that, since the weekly wage here was more than $4, section 30 cannot have application so as to increase the aggregate amount to which the employee would otherwise be entitled, notwithstanding, under the particular facts, the amount of the weekly payments, so long as they are to be made, should be determined thereunder, because of the provisions in the latter clause of section 32 with reference to "maximum and minimum" payments. We agree with the position taken by the employer and the insurance carrier on both propositions.
The material portion of section 30 is as follows: "That when the incapacity from work resulting from an injury is total, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid as hereinafter provided for the employee during such total incapacity, a weekly compensation equal to one-half of his average wages, but not more than fifteen dollars per week or less than four dollars per week, except when the weekly wage is below four dollars, then the regular wages on the date of the accident shall be the weekly amount paid." It is clearly apparent that this section was intended to apply only to cases of total incapacity, and this was not such a case. The employee is therefore not entitled to claim the amount of $4 a week for the full period of 167 weeks. As to the aggregate amount of compensation to be allowed, his case is governed by the provisions of section 32, to the effect that the compensation for the loss of a leg shall be 50 per cent of the average weekly wages during 175 weeks, and that the compensation for the partial loss of a member, or the partial loss of the use of a member, shall be such proportion of the payments prescribed for total loss as such partial loss bears to such total loss. Hence, the employee in this case is entitled only to a proportionate compensation for his specific disability.
The provision in section 32 that the payments therein referred to shall be subject to the same limitations as to maximum and minimum as set out in section 30 was not intended to increase the entire amount of the compensation to be paid for a partial handicap falling under the terms of section 32;" that is to say, this clause was not intended to prescribe the minimum total amount of compensation to be paid, but had the purpose of providing the manner and terms of payment, so as to prevent the spreading of the total amount over long periods by small installments, except when necessary to do so because the wage itself was small—below $4 per week.
Any other interpretation would render sections 30 and 32 inconsistent, and would practically nullify the rule of proportion for partial incapacity as contained in section 32; whereas these sections and every part of each must be construed together and be given such a meaning that the language of both will, if possible, be reconciled.
Let us suppose that two men are each receiving wages at the rate of $8 per week, one of whom loses a leg, while the other sustains a 10 per cent. loss of use of a leg. Was it the intention of the law that each of these men should receive the same compensation, that is, $4 per week for 175 weeks, or was their compensation to be proportioned according to the comparative handicap of each? Common sense will suggest the proportional compensation. Again, if each of such employees was working for a wage of?4 per week, then each, according to the contention of the claimant in the instant case, would be entitled to the full equivalent of his wages for 175 weeks, which as to the one who had suffered the total loss of a leg would probably be entirely just but which as to the other who had suffered only a 10 per cent. loss of use of a leg would contain a patent inequality as regards both the employer and other employees, since in the latter case the employee would receive a sum equal to his entire wages, although he had sustained only a slight incapacity and could earn practically as much as he did before the accident. The combined income of this employee, from wages and compensation, could easily be greater than before the accident, thus making the Injury profitable, and, at the same time, would likely exceed the total Income of the employee who was the more seriously disabled and who therefore had sustained a larger actual diminution in wages.
An award of $4 per week in the instant case, as by an application of section 30, would amount to a proportional compensation formore than 30 per cent. impairment; whereas, under the facts as found by the commission, there exists only a 10 per cent. impairment, and we cannot agree that the Legislature intended the inequalities which would result from the construction contended for by the claimant.
An examination of the compensation statutes of a number of other states will disclose provisions more or less similar to those here under consideration, and it seems to be the general scheme of the acts to reduce the number, and not the amount, of the payments for the partial loss or loss of use, of a member.
For instance, the Kentucky statute provides that for partial disability the compensation "shall be 65% of the average weekly earnings of the employee, but not less than $5 nor more than $12, multiplied by the percentage of disability caused by the injury, for such period as the board may determine, not exceeding 335 weeks nor a maximum sum of $4,000"; but that "whenever the weekly payments under this paragraph would be less than $3 per week, the period may be shortened and the payments correspondingly...
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General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Beatty
... ... v. McNair, and the ... cases of South v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 39 Ga.App. 47, ... 146 S.E. 45, and Richardson" v. Maryland Casualty ... Co., 41 Ga.App. 520, 153 S.E. 524, including the ... dissenting opinion of Judge Jenkins in the latter case ... \xC2" ... ...