Richardson v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-7139,97-7139
• Parties: (10th Cir. 1999) ERNEST RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a railroad corporation d/b/a Union Pacific Railroad Company, Defendant-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1273

186 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 1999)

ERNEST RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a railroad corporation d/b/a Union Pacific Railroad Company, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 97-7139

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

August 9,1999

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA. D.C. No. 96-CV-617-B

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Edward J. Kionka, Carbondale, Illinois, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jeannie C. Henry (Tom L. Armstrong and Catherine M. Doud, with her on the brief), of Tom L. Armstrong & Associates, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Ernest Richardson brought this action against Defendant-Appellee, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company d/b/a Union Pacific Railroad Company ("Union Pacific"), under the Boiler Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 20701-03 ("BIA"), formerly 45 U.S.C. § 23. Violations of this statute are brought under FELA; the purpose of these provisions is to protect railroad employees by imposing "'an absolute and continuing duty' to provide safe equipment." Richardson v Consolidated Rail Corp., 17 F.3d 213, 216 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 188 (1949)). On April 30, 1996, Plaintiff, a locomotive engineer employed by Defendant, injured his back and neck when the operator's seat upon which he was seated collapsed over a rough crossing in Oologah, Oklahoma. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant violated the BIA by failing to provide him with "an adequate seat upon which [he] could place himself to perform the locomotive engineer operations required by his employment." Aplt. App. at 2. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment entered on the jury verdict in favor of the Defendant, claiming that the district court erred in: (1) admitting evidence of his prior injury claim, prior settlement, settlement amount, and the 1988 release relating to this prior injury; (2) denying his motion for a mistrial based on defense counsel's comments during opening statements; and (3) misinstructing the jury on the elements of the BIA. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.

Background

In December 1986, Plaintiff sustained injuries while serving as an engineer for Union Pacific when he slipped on oil and fell while holding a seventy-five pound "knuckle." See Aplt. App. at 240. As a result of this injury, he experienced back problems and had to miss work for over a year. See Aplt. App. at 240-41. He filed suit against Union Pacific in 1987, seeking compensation for this injury, including future damages. The jury rendered a general verdict in his favor, awarding damages of $283,400.00. After the verdict, Plaintiff executed a release and settled the matter for $280,000.

Ten years later, in December 1996, Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit against Union Pacific. On July 16, 1997, he filed a motion in limine requesting that the district court prohibit the admission of any evidence of his previous lawsuit against Defendant, the results of that lawsuit, the size of the verdict, or payment of the verdict. The district court granted the motion in limine in part and denied it in part. To avoid the impression that Plaintiff was litigious, the court determined that evidence of the prior action could not be introduced; however, that did not bar evidence regarding the existence of Plaintiff's prior injury, the extent of that injury, the fact that Defendant paid compensation to Plaintiff for that injury, the amount of compensation, and evidence of release. See Aplt. App. at 47. The district court permitted the introduction of the amount paid to Plaintiff in the prior lawsuit without reference to the action itself or the fact that a judgment was entered, ostensibly to prevent Plaintiff from obtaining an impermissible double recovery for the earlier injury. See Aplt. App. at 104. On August 8, 1997, Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, requesting the court admit the pretrial order and verdict form from the prior lawsuit to reduce the prejudicial impact of the Court's ruling on the motion in limine. See Aplt. App. at 54-55. While still disagreeing with the district court's ruling, Plaintiff thought it best to add these items so that the jury would know that Defendant litigated the prior claim, rather than settling with the Plaintiff for chivalrous motives. See Aplt. App. at 55. The district court granted this request on August 15, 1997. See Aplt. App. at 57.

Discussion

A. Admission of Evidence of Personal Injury Action, Settlement Amount, and Release

Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude evidence of the prior injury claim, prior settlement, the amount of such settlement, and the 1988 release regarding the prior injury. Defendant contends that Plaintiff waived this argument by failing to object to the evidence when it was actually admitted by the trial court, and also by urging the court to admit evidence of the prior lawsuit and verdict form. We review the district court's admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion, not disturbing the "court's decision unless we ha[ve] a definite and firm conviction that the [trial] court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances." United States v. Talamante, 981 F.2d 1153, 1155 (10th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted).

We first consider defendant's contentions that Plaintiff failed to object to the admission of this evidence at trial or urged admission of some of it, thereby waiving the issue. A pretrial motion in limine may preserve the issue for appeal when the issue: (1) was adequately presented to the district court; (2) is the type that can be finally decided in a pretrial hearing; and (3) is definitively ruled upon by the district court. See United States v. Mejia-Alarcon, 995 F.2d 982, 986-87 (10th Cir. 1993). All three conditions must be present. See United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1265 (10th Cir. 1999).

Here, both parties argued for a pretrial ruling on the issue, primarily on legal grounds. The issue was adequately presented to the district court. The district court resolved the parties' contentions concerning relevance, see Fed. R. Evid. 402, but also weighed the probative value of the evidence sought to be excluded against the danger of unfair prejudice, see Fed. R. Evid. 403. Normally, such weighing should be done against a backdrop of the actual evidence at trial, making a final decision in a pretrial hearing highly unlikely. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1200 n.24 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1148 (1999). However, "some evidentiary issues are akin to questions of law, and the decision to admit such evidence is not dependent upon the character of the other evidence admitted at trial." See Mejia-Alarcon, 995 F.2d at 987. Given the parties' presentations, the district court's ruling rested primarily on relevance grounds. The court also concluded that the type of unfair prejudice identified was of a very general nature, specifically litigiousness. It is not always easy to determine when a district court's "yes" or "no" ruling on a pretrial evidentiary matter means "maybe," necessitating an appropriate proffer or objection at trial.¹ Still, we conclude that the district court could and did make a definitive ruling on the evidence in these circumstances. The issues in the case were straightforward and both the proffered evidence and the facts upon which admissibility depended were fairly certain and unlikely to change given the character of the evidence admitted at trial.

Thus, although the best practice is to renew any objection at trial when evidence of a prior injury claim, prior settlement, settlement amount, and release is presented, Plaintiff preserved his objection to this evidence on all grounds adequately presented in his motion in limine. We reject Defendant's contention that Plaintiff waived all of his objections because he successfully urged the admission of evidence of the prior lawsuit and the verdict form once his motion in limine had been decided. The "invited error" doctrine is equitable in nature and precludes a party from inducing action by the district court and then later arguing on appeal that the action was reversible error. See Meredith v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 18 F.3d 890, 895-96 (10th Cir. 1994). It does not apply here. Plaintiff's motion to reconsider plainly stated that the objection to the court's ruling remained, and the purpose of the two additional items was to counter the inference that Defendant had voluntarily settled with the Plaintiff in the prior lawsuit. See Aplt. App. at 54, 271. Moreover, the district court's ruling on the motion in limine made it clear that the amount of the settlement and the release would come in quite apart from the other items.

Next we consider whether the district court abused its discretion in ruling admissible evidence of Plaintiff's prior lawsuit, settlement, settlement amount, and release. Evidence of Plaintiff's prior injury and the extent of that injury has probative value to the case. However, admitting the fact of the previous lawsuit, the amount of compensation paid, that Defendant compensated Plaintiff in satisfaction for the prior injury, and evidence of release simply was not relevant to the issues in the case.

Only evidence relevant to a claim or defense is admissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Defendant asserts that evidence of Plaintiff's prior lawsuit and settlement, including the settlement amount, the fact of the settlement, and evidence of release is relevant to its defense of release and accord and satisfaction. However, the defense of release and accord and satisfaction has no application to the issues in this case. Accord and satisfaction is defined as:

a method of discharging a claim whereby the parties agree to give and accept...