Richardson v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.

• Docket Number: 21-CV-09202 (VEC)
• Decision Date: 26 August 2022
• Parties: LEOLA RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION d/b/a AMTRAK, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

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LEOLA RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION d/b/a AMTRAK, Defendant.

No. 21-CV-09202 (VEC)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

August 26, 2022

OPINION & ORDER

VALERIE CAPRONI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Leola Richardson (“Plaintiff”) sued National Railroad Passenger Corporation, d/b/a Amtrak (“Amtrak”), for negligence and various regulatory violations^[1] that allegedly caused her injuries while on board an Amtrak train en route from New York to South Carolina.^[2]Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and, in the alternative, to transfer the case to the District of South Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Plaintiff also moved to transfer the case to the District of South Carolina if the Court were to find that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Amtrak. For the reasons stated below, the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED; Defendant's motion to transfer is DENIED; and Plaintiff's motion to transfer is DENIED as moot.

BACKGROUND ^[3]

Leola Richardson, a New York resident, purchased a round-trip ticket in New York for round-trip passage via Amtrak from New York Penn Station to Charleston, South Carolina. Am. Compl Dkt. 13, ¶ 41. While en route, the train stopped at a train station in Kingstree, South Carolina, and Plaintiff stood up. Id. ¶¶ 43-45. The train suddenly jerked, id. ¶ 45, causing Plaintiff to be “thrown about” the train car, id. ¶ 46. Plaintiff alleges that the jerking was caused by an operational error and a mechanical defect that resulted from negligent maintenance of the train equipment while it was in Amtrak's New York rail yard. Id. ¶¶ 17, 26, 47. Plaintiff sought emergency medical care in South Carolina but has since received medical care in New York. Id. at ¶¶ 48-49; Pl. Resp., Dkt. 22 at 2.

DISCUSSION

I. The Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Over Amtrak

Amtrak which is incorporated in and has its principal place of business in Washington, D.C., has moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Def. Mem. of Law, Dkt 18 at 2, 6; see also 49 U.S.C. § 24301(b). When responding to a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. See MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725, 727 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). When the motion to dismiss is made at the pleadings stage, the plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists. See Porina v. Marward Shipping Co., 521 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

It is hornbook law that a federal court must have personal jurisdiction over a defendant before the court may adjudicate the merits of a case, see, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999), and that personal jurisdiction can be specific or general, Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 624 (2d Cir. 2016). General jurisdiction, or “all-purpose” jurisdiction, “permits a court to adjudicate any cause of action against [a] corporate defendant, wherever arising, and whoever the plaintiff,” id., so long as the corporate defendant can be deemed “at home” in the forum state, id. at 625. Specific jurisdiction, also called “case-linked” jurisdiction, “is available when the cause of action . . . arises out of the defendant's activities in a state,” even when the defendant is not “at home” in the forum. Id. at 624.

In federal question cases, both kinds of personal jurisdiction are governed by the law of the state in which the court sits and by the limits of due process. See Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the Court must engage in a “two-part analysis.” Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 784 (2d Cir. 1999). First, the Court looks to the relevant long-arm statute of the forum state, which, in this case, is New York. See Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 208 (2d Cir. 2001). If the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate under New York's long-arm statute, the Court must then decide whether such exercise would comport with due process. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014).

A. The Court Does Not Have General Jurisdiction over Amtrak

Pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301, a court in New York may exercise general jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if the defendant “engaged in ‘continuous, permanent, and substantial activity in New York.'” Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 226 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1990)). Despite the broad wording of § 301, the Second Circuit has consistently reaffirmed that Daimler limits a court's general jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation to “exceptional case[s]” in which the corporation's “contacts are so ‘continuous and systematic,' judged against the corporation's national and global activities, that it is ‘essentially at home' in [the forum].” Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. at 139).

Amtrak is incorporated and has its principal place of business in Washington D.C. Def. Mem. of Law at 2, 6; 49 U.S.C. § 24301(b). Plaintiff alleges that Amtrak does more than twice as much business at Penn Station than at its station in Washington, D.C., which is its second busiest station, Am. Compl. ¶ 37; it has offices in New York, id. ¶ 34; it maintains many employees in New York, id. ¶ 27; Pl. Resp. 1; and it accepts service of process in New York, Pl. Resp. at 6. But those facts collectively do not add up to Amtrak being “at home” in New York. See McConney v. Amtrak, No. 18-CV-05290, 2020 WL 435366, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2020) (finding no general jurisdiction over Amtrak in New York under similar facts).

Because Amtrak is not “at home” in New York, this Court does not have general jurisdiction over it.

B. This Court Has Specific Jurisdiction over Amtrak

Pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), a court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that, “in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the two requirements of § 302(a)(1) are satisfied: “(1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” Eades v. Kennedy, PC Law Offs., 799 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). A claim arises from business activity “if there is an articulable nexus, or a substantial relationship, between the claim asserted and the actions that occurred in New York.” Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 246 (2d Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). An “articulable nexus or substantial relationship exists ‘where at least one element [of the claim] arises from the New York contacts.'” D&R Glob. Selections, S.L. v. Bodega Olegario Falcon Pineiro, 29 N.Y.3d 292, 299 (2017) (quoting Licci v. Leb. Can. Bank, SAL, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 339, 341 (2012)). A merely coincidental connection or relationship between the New York transaction and the claim is not enough. Sole Resort, S.A. de C.V. v. Allure Resorts Mgmt., LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2006).

There is no dispute that Amtrak conducts business in New York. See Def. Reply, Dkt. 29 at 3. Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to support the conclusion that Plaintiff's claim that she was injured because of negligent handling of the train or because of a mechanical fault that should have been addressed during maintenance in New York, see Am. Compl. ¶ 47, arises from Amtrak's business activities in New York, to wit: selling Plaintiff in New York a ticket for train travel out of New York on a train that was serviced in New York, id. ¶¶ 13, 17, 41. “[W]here at least one element arises from the New York contacts, the relationship between the business transaction and the claim asserted supports specific jurisdiction under [§ 302(a)(1)].” Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 341; see also D&R Global Selections, S.L., 29 N.Y.3d at 299. Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case that at least two elements of her negligence claim arose in New York: duty and breach.

First Defendant's duty to exercise reasonable care in transporting Plaintiff arose in New York when Plaintiff boarded the train at Penn Station. See Bethel v. New York City Transit Auth., 92 N.Y.2d 348, 356 (1998) (stating common carriers have a duty to exercise reasonable care in transporting their passengers); Zito v. United Airlines, Inc., 523 F.Supp.3d 377, 385 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (a common carrier's duty of care arises upon a passenger's boarding). As one court in the Eastern District of New York observed, a “train crash . . . directly implicates Amtrak's ‘duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its passengers.'” McConney, 2020 WL 435366, at *3 n.3 (citing Voccia v. United States, No. 12-CV-5909, 2017 WL 1194652, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017)); see also Kerman v. Intercontinental Hotels Grp. Res. LLC, No. 20-CV-1085, 2021 WL 930253, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2021) (“In the case of a foreign tort, generally either the duty that was breached or the injury . . . must have originated in New York to satisfy § 302(a)(1).” (cleaned up)); but see Simmons v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., No. 19-CV-6986, 2020 WL 2904847, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2020) (disagreeing with dicta in McConney suggesting that New York courts may have personal jurisdiction over injuries caused by an...