Richardson v. North Carolina Dept. of Correction

• Decision Date: 06 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 250A95,250A95
• Citation: 345 N.C. 128,478 S.E.2d 501
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Percell RICHARDSON v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION.

Page 501

478 S.E.2d 501

345 N.C. 128

Percell RICHARDSON v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION.

No. 250A95.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 6, 1996.

N.C. Prisoner Legal Services, Inc. by Linda B. Weisel and Kathryn L. VandenBerg, Raleigh; and J. Henry Banks, Henderson, for plaintiff-appellant.

Michael F. Easley, Attorney General by Don Wright, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant-appellee.

Patterson, Harkavy & Lawrence by Martha A. Geer, Raleigh, on behalf of The American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, amicus curiae.

LAKE, Justice.

Plaintiff appeals a decision of the Court of Appeals upholding an order of the Industrial Commission dismissing plaintiff's claim under the Tort Claims Act. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that plaintiff's exclusive source of remedy is through the Workers' Compensation Act, and thus plaintiff's claim under the Tort Claims Act is barred. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals.

On 13 September 1991, the plaintiff, an inmate at the Caledonia Correctional Institution, was operating a tractor with an attached silage harvesting machine at the prison farm. The farm superintendent directed plaintiff to operate the harvester. During the operation, plaintiff's legs were caught in the silage cutter. His right leg was almost completely severed and had to be amputated below the knee. His left leg was permanently and severely injured.

On 23 September 1991, plaintiff filed a claim against the Department of Correction with the North Carolina Industrial Commission under the Tort Claims Act, N.C.G.S. §§ 143-291 to -300.1. The plaintiff alleged defendant's negligence, due to inadequate training and supervision, as the cause of his injury. In its answer, defendant Department of Correction denied plaintiff's tort claim and alleged contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff as the cause of the injury. Defendant subsequently submitted an amended answer that included a motion to dismiss plaintiff's tort claim on the ground that workers' compensation was plaintiff's exclusive remedy.

When the case was called for hearing before Deputy Commissioner Jan N. Pittman, the parties requested a ruling on the motion to dismiss. No evidence was presented at the hearing. By order filed 6 January 1993, Deputy Commissioner Pittman granted defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission, which, by order filed 31 March 1994, affirmed the decision of the deputy commissioner. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Full Commission.

The sole issue on appeal is whether workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for prisoners injured while working on prison jobs. In its opinion, the majority of the Court of Appeals found that sections 97-13(c) and 97-10.1 of the Workers' Compensation Act operate to prevent plaintiff from pursuing his claim under the Tort Claims Act. We agree with the majority's reasoning and affirm the Court of Appeals.

A thorough examination of the applicable provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act establishes that working prisoners are excluded from suing in tort for work-related injuries. N.C.G.S. § 97-13(c) sets forth the circumstances under which prisoners may be eligible for workers' compensation benefits and provides in relevant part:

This Article shall not apply to prisoners being worked by the State or any subdivision thereof, except to the following extent: Whenever any prisoner assigned to the State Department of Correction shall suffer accidental injury ... arising out of and in the course of the employment to which he had been assigned, ... if the results of such injury continue until after the date of the lawful discharge of such prisoner to such an extent as to amount to a disability as defined in this Article, then such discharged prisoner ... may have the benefit of this Article by applying to the Industrial Commission as any other employee; provided, such application is made within 12 months from the date of the discharge; and provided further that the maximum compensation to any prisoner ... shall not exceed thirty dollars ($30.00) per week and the period of compensation shall relate to the date of his discharge rather than the date of the accident.... The provisions of G.S. 97-10.1 and 97-10.2 shall apply to prisoners and discharged prisoners entitled to compensation under this subsection and to the State in the same manner as said section applies to employees and employers.

N.C.G.S. § 97-13(c) (1991). N.C.G.S. § 97-10.1 defines the effect that coverage under workers' compensation has on other rights and remedies of the prisoner:

If the employee and the employer are subject to and have complied with the provisions of this Article, then the rights and remedies herein granted to the employee ... shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee ... as against the employer at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death.

N.C.G.S. § 97-10.1 (1991).

The effect of N.C.G.S. § 97-13(c) is that a working prisoner whose injuries arise out of and in the course of his work may get workers' compensation benefits by applying to the Industrial Commission within twelve months after discharge, as long as the prisoner is still disabled from the injury at the time of discharge. Section 97-13(c) further provides that a prisoner who is entitled to such compensation is subject to section 97-10.1 to the same extent as any other employee or employer. Section 97-10.1 establishes that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for injured workers. Thus, the language of the statute establishes that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for prisoners injured while working for the State.

In the instant case, plaintiff was severely and permanently injured while working as a prisoner. If and when plaintiff is released from prison, he can apply to the Industrial Commission for workers' compensation benefits. There is little doubt under the circumstances of this case that plaintiff will be found disabled and that his injury will be found compensable.

Plaintiff cites several cases in support of his argument that statutes and case law give prisoners the right to file claims under the Tort Claims Act for injuries suffered on prison jobs. Ivey v. N.C. Prison Dep't, 252 N.C. 615, 114 S.E.2d 812 (1960) (burial expenses did not constitute compensation, and plaintiff could pursue Tort Claims Act suit); Lawson v. N.C. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 248 N.C. 276, 280, 103 S.E.2d 366, 369 (1958) (Tort Claims Act "did not except any prisoners from its provisions"); Gould v. N.C. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 245 N.C. 350, 95 S.E.2d 910 (1957) (representative of nonworking prisoner who was killed entitled to recover under Tort Claims Act). Plaintiff also cites precedent for the assertion that the Industrial Commission and courts have adjudicated prisoner tort claims for more than thirty years without distinguishing between prisoners negligently injured on prison jobs and other prisoners negligently injured. Brewington v. N.C. Dep't of Correction, 111 N.C.App. 833, 433 S.E.2d 798, disc. rev. denied, 335 N.C. 552, 439 S.E.2d 142 (1993); Baker v. N.C. Dep't of Correction, 85 N.C.App. 345, 354 S.E.2d 733 (1987). We find these cases inapplicable to the case at hand.

The case of Gould is distinguishable because it dealt with the death of a nonworking prisoner and did not address workers' compensation. The essence of the Gould decision was that nonworking prisoners could sue under the Tort Claims Act. That ruling is still good law, but it has no application to the case of a working prisoner injured at work.

The next case in time cited by plaintiff is Lawson. Lawson also involved the death of a prisoner, but this time while working for the State. There the Court noted that section 97-13(c) conferred workers' compensation benefits upon the special class of prisoners who were injured while working for the Department of Transportation but not other prisoners. Lawson, 248 N.C. at 280, 103 S.E.2d at 369. The Lawson Court went on to say, "In Gould ..., this Court held that a prisoner not in said special classification was entitled to recover under the Tort Claims Act." Id. At that time, however, section 97-13(c) did not grant compensation to prisoners killed on the job. Neither did the exclusivity provisions of section 97-10 apply to prisoners in the same manner as other employees. Id. (applicable portion of section 97-13(c) added by 1957 General Assembly). Thus, Lawson's next of kin were permitted to seek recovery under the Tort Claims Act. Id. at 280-81, 103 S.E.2d 366.

Ivey is similarly distinguishable. Section 97-13(c) was amended in 1971 to provide full workers' compensation benefits for injured and killed prisoners. Ivey was a pre-1971 amendment case of a prisoner killed while working. At that time, section 97-13(c) applied to both injured and killed prisoners, but provided only burial expenses for those who died. Ivey, 252 N.C. at 618, 114 S.E.2d at 814. The Court in Ivey held that burial expenses did not meet the applicable definition of compensation. Id. at 620, 114 S.E.2d at 815. Because only prisoners "entitled to compensation" were barred by section 97-13(c) and former section 97-10, the statute did not bar tort claims arising from the death of a prisoner. Id. We agree with the Court of Appeals that, "[s]ince Ivey was a pre-1971 amendment death case in which the dead prisoner was not entitled to workers' compensation, its holding does not apply to plaintiff who is an injured employee who may elect to pursue compensation under the present version of the Workers' Compensation Act." Richardson v. N.C. Dep't of Correction, 118 N.C.App. 704, 706, 457 S.E.2d 325, 327 (1995).

The cases of Brewington and Baker are similarly inapposite. Neither of these cases addressed directly the issue of whether a working prisoner was precluded from filing a tort...