D.G. v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 10 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. 15–20079.,15–20079.
• Citation: 806 F.3d 310
• Parties: D.G., by and through his mother and Next Friend, LaNISHA T., Plaintiff–Appellant v. NEW CANEY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

806 F.3d 310

D.G., by and through his mother and Next Friend, LaNISHA T., Plaintiff–Appellant

v.NEW CANEY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 15–20079.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 10, 2015.

Robert Boyd Padgett, Leasor Crass, P.C., Mansfield, TX, Constance Russell Wannamaker(argued), El Paso, TX, Colleen Marie Elbe, Esq., Lubbock, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Joe Ruben Tanguma, II, Esq. (argued), Leasor Crass, P.C., Austin, TX, Christie Lynn Hobbs, Leasor Crass, P.C., Mansfield, TX, for Defendant–Appellee.

Selene Ann Almazan–Altobelli, Council of Parent Attorneys & Advocates, Incorporated, Towson, MD, Catherine Merino Reisman, Reisman Carolla Gran, L.L.P., Haddonfield, NJ, for Amicus Curiae.

Opinion

STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:

In this case, a mother proved in an administrative hearing that a school district had violated her child's right to a free appropriate public education by repeatedly placing him in isolation during school hours. Congress has provided that the prevailing party in such a hearing may file an action in federal court to recover reasonable attorneys' fees. This appeal asks us to decide how quickly that action must be filed. For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE the district court's determination that a party who prevails in an administrative hearing under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the “IDEA” or “Act”) must seek attorneys' fees no later than ninety days after the hearing officer's decision.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The IDEA

The IDEA “is a Spending Clause statute that seeks to ensure that ‘all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education.’ ” Schaffer v. Weast,546 U.S. 49, 51, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005)(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)). To receive federal funding under the Act, each state must comply with certain conditions, including procedural safeguards set forth in § 1415. See20 U.S.C. § 1412(a), (a)(6)(A). One of these conditions is that each state must allow “any party to present a complaint ... with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of [a] child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.”Id.§ 1415(b)(6)(A). If the matter cannot be resolved through an informal meeting, complaining parents have a right to an “impartial due process hearing” conducted by a state or local educational agency, as provided by state law. Id.§ 1415(f)(1)(A), (f)(B)(ii). If a local agency conducts that hearing, “any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered ... may appeal such findings and decision to the State educational agency.” Id.§ 1415(g)(1).

After that appeal, or if the forum state has only one level of administrative review, “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision made” at the highest level of administrative review may “bring a civil action” in state or federal court “with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to [§ 1415] ... without regard to the amount in controversy.” Id.§ 1415(i)(2)(A). In 2004, Congress amended the IDEA to add current subparagraph (i)(2)(B), which reads: “The party bringing the action shall have 90 days from the date of the decision of the hearing officer to bring such an action, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for bringing such action under this subchapter, in such time as the State law allows.” Id.§ 1415(i)(2)(B). Prior to that amendment, the Act did not specify any limitations period for the filing of a civil action by an aggrieved party, and courts borrowed statutes of limitations from state law. See, e.g., Scokin v. Texas,723 F.2d 432, 436–38 (5th Cir.1984); Adler v. Educ. Dep't,760 F.2d 454, 456–60 (2d Cir.1985).

In 1984, the Supreme Court held that attorneys' fees were not recoverable in actions brought to secure rights under the IDEA's predecessor, the Education of the Handicapped Act. Smith v. Robinson,468 U.S. 992, 1009–13, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984). In response, Congress enacted the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, which effectively overruled Smithby authorizing courts to award attorneys' fees to prevailing parents or guardians of handicapped children. Counsel v. Dow,849 F.2d 731, 734 (2d Cir.1988). This provision was made retroactive to permit recovery of fees for actions pending at the time of, or brought after, Smith. SeeHandicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99–372, § 5, 100 Stat. 796 (1986); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,514 U.S. 211, 235, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995).

The IDEA as codified includes a paragraph titled “Jurisdiction of district courts; attorneys' fees.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3). That paragraph provides that federal district courts “shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this section without regard to the amount in controversy.” Id.§ 1415(i)(3)(A). It also states: “In any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs ... to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” Id.§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).¹In this context, “a prevailing party is one that attains a remedy that both (1) alters the legal relationship between the school district and the handicapped child and (2) fosters the purposes of the IDEA.” El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Richard R.,591 F.3d 417, 421–22 (5th Cir.2009)(citation omitted). “An administrative hearing officer's order provides the requisite ‘judicial imprimatur’ for a party to be considered a ‘prevailing party’ for attorney's fee purposes, despite the fact that the administrative hearing officer does not have the authority to award attorney's fees.”Id.at 422 n. 4.

B. Facts and Proceedings Below

When his administrative complaint was filed, “D.G.” was a thirteen-year-old student who received special education services from New Caney Independent School District (“NCISD”) because of his Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorderand learning disability. On March 2, 2012, D.G. filed a request for a due process hearing with the Texas Educational Agency, alleging that NCISD had violated his right to a free appropriate public education by, among other things, repeatedly isolating and physically restraining him for no valid educational purpose. In May 2012, a special education hearing officer conducted a due process hearing, at which D.G. was represented by counsel.

On July 3, 2012, the hearing officer issued a thirty-three-page decision finding that NCISD's practice of isolating and restraining D.G. for extended periods of time was not based on peer-reviewed research, was not the least restrictive appropriate educational placement, did not afford D.G. sufficient interaction with non-disabled peers, and did not provide D.G. “the basic floor of opportunity” guaranteed by the IDEA. The hearing officer concluded that D.G. “was denied a free appropriate public education for the entire 2011–12 school year,” and ordered NCISD to create a new education plan for D.G. that would, among other goals, “reduc[e] or eliminat[e] isolation and restraint as punishers,” afford increased opportunities for social interaction, and provide adequate counseling services. NCISD did not seek judicial review of the hearing officer's decision.

D.G. sent a letter to NCISD requesting attorneys' fees on October 29, 2012. On October 31, 2012–120 days after the hearing officer's decision—D.G. filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking attorneys' fees under § 1415(i)(3)(B). On January 30, 2013, NCISD moved for summary judgment on the ground that D.G.'s complaint for attorneys' fees was time-barred. The district court granted that motion in a three-page opinion issued on January 8, 2015, and entered judgment against D.G. This appeal timely followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment “de novo, applying the same standard on appeal as that applied below.” Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs., L.L.C.,755 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir.2014). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(a). We review de novo jurisdictional issues including standing. Nat'l Fed. of the Blind of Tex., Inc. v. Abbott,647 F.3d 202, 208 (5th Cir.2011).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standing

We first address NCISD's argument—raised for the first time the weekend before oral argument—that D.G. lacks Article III standing to pursue attorneys' fees because his legal services were provided free of cost by Disability Rights Texas, a publicly funded advocacy organization. To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show that he suffered an injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant and will likely be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). NCISD does not at this stage contest that its conduct injured D.G. by failing to afford him a free appropriate public education, or deny that D.G.'s mother is a “prevailing party” authorized to seek fees in a civil action under the IDEA. See20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). Rather, NCISD argues that neither D.G. nor his mother has suffered an Article III injury-in-fact that could be redressed by an award of attorneys' fees because neither has paid or been billed for their attorneys' legal services.

This argument lacks merit. NCISD cites no case holding that a plaintiff lacked standing to seek attorneys' fees because the fees sought were not paid by or billed to the plaintiff, or because counsel works for a publicly funded organization.²To the contrary, courts including this one have allowed recovery of attorneys' fees “in situations where the client's attorney has received payment from a source other than the client.” Schafler v....