Richardson v. Orentreich

• Decision Date: 10 November 1983
• Parties: Susan RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Norman ORENTREICH, M.D., Victor J. Semanowitz, M.D. d/b/a Orentreich Medical Group and Orentreich Medical Group, Defendants, and Michael J. Kalman, M.D., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 336

468 N.Y.S.2d 336

97 A.D.2d 9

Susan RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Norman ORENTREICH, M.D., Victor J. Semanowitz, M.D. d/b/a Orentreich Medical Group and Orentreich Medical Group, Defendants and Michael J. Kalman, M.D., Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division First Department.

Nov. 10, 1983.

Sean F.X. Dugan, New York City, of counsel (Spencer L. Studwell, New York City, with him on brief; Martin, Clearwater & Bell, New York City, attys.), for defendant-appellant.

Alfred S. Julien, New York City, of counsel (David B. Turret, New York City, with him on brief; Julien, Schlesinger & Finz, P.C., New York City, attys.), for plaintiff-respondent.

Before KUPFERMAN, J.P., and SULLIVAN, SILVERMAN, BLOOM and ALEXANDER, JJ.

SILVERMAN, Justice:

This is an appeal by defendant Kalman from an order of the Supreme Court, Special Term, denying said defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of the statute of limitations.

Plaintiff in this medical malpractice action was treated by defendant-appellant physician. The treatments apparently included the injection of silicone into plaintiff's face. According to defendant, plaintiff first visited the office on January 15, 1973 and defendant "rendered periodic treatments to her through October 8, 1974." On October 8, 1974 she was given an appointment to return on December 4, 1974. Plaintiff failed to keep that appointment; she says she was sick and cancelled the appointment. Defendant did not render any further medical care or treatment to plaintiff.

This action was begun on November 30, 1977. It is governed by the law as it stood before the enactment of CPLR § 214-a, so that if the statute of limitations began to run on October 8, 1974, the action is untimely; if, however, the statute did not begin to run until some date after November 30, 1974, then the action is timely. The malpractice, if any, of course occurred on or before October 8, 1974. Whether the statute of limitations has run depends on the application of the continuous course of treatment exception ennunciated in Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 187 N.E.2d 777, in which the Court of Appeals said:

We hold that at least when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint, the "accrual" comes only at the end of treatment. (At 155, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 187 N.E.2d 777).

Little argument is needed to prove the proposition that the "continuous treatment" theory is the fairer one. It would be absurd to require a wronged patient to interrupt corrective efforts by serving a summons on the physician or hospital superintendent or by filing a notice of claim in the case of a city hospital. (At 156, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 187 N.E.2d 777)

The "continuous treatment" we mean is treatment for the same or related illnesses or injuries, continuing after the alleged acts of malpractice, not mere continuity of a general physician-patient relationship. (At 157, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 187 N.E.2d 777)

Further, at least until the enactment of CPLR § 214-a, it is not the last act of treatment or omission which governs. As the majority said in Fonda v. Paulsen, 46 A.D.2d 540, 544, 363 N.Y.S.2d 841:

[I]f at the time when the Statute of Limitations would have expired had it run from the last act of malpractice, a patient is still in a relationship of care or treatment with the defendant physician for the same or...