Richardson v. Richardson

• Decision Date: 20 December 1904
• Citation: 78 P. 920,36 Wash. 272
• Parties: RICHARDSON v. RICHARDSON.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

78 P. 920

36 Wash. 272

RICHARDSON v. RICHARDSON.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 20, 1904

Appeal from Superior Court, Douglas County; C. Victor Martin, Judge.

Action by Tony F. Richardson against Lucy F. Richardson. From a decree in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. A motion to dismiss the appeal is overruled, and the decree affirmed in part, with instructions as to a division of community property between the parties on the taking of further testimony.

Merritt & Merritt, for appellant.

W. J Canton, for respondent.

DUNBAR J.

The motion to dismiss this appeal seems to be without merit. This action was commenced by appellant against respondent for a decree of divorce. The complaint alleged infidelity on the part of the wife, and adultery committed with the co-respondent, Thomas Madden, and divers and sundry other men not mentioned; pleaded a settlement of the community property interests between the appellant and respondent prior to the commencement of the action; asked that the community property, which was accorded to the appellant under the terms of the agreement, be decreed to be his, and asked to be awarded the care, custody, and control of Anna C., Lora L Ruby A., and David A. Richardson, children of appellant and respondent, and that the respondent be awarded the care and custody of Iva J. Richardson, the youngest child of the appellant and respondent. The respective ages of these children were: Anna C., fourteen years of age; David A nine; Lora L., seven; Ruby A., three; and Iva J., seven months of age--all five of said children being then living. The respondent answered, denying the allegations of adultery and misconduct on her part, alleging abuse on the part of the husband that became unbearable; that he was guilty of associating with disreputable women; that he habitually charged her with infidelity with every man who came about the premises; that he habitually cursed and damned her and called her harsh names, and finally drove her from her home; denied that she had made any settlement of property rights of any kind or character, except through fear and misunderstanding; and asked that the care and custody of the children be given to her, and that the court make a decree setting over to and giving respondent one-half of all the real and personal property belonging to the appellant and respondent.

These parties were married in December, 1885, and lived together on their ranch until about October, 1902, at which time, it is insisted by the appellant, on account of the intimacy of respondent with Thomas Madden, they had some trouble, and respondent went to live at the town of Wilson Creek, where Madden lived, and where the appellant visited her from time to time, generally going down Saturday nights and remaining over Sunday with her, until the 12th day of March succeeding being the 12th day of March, 1903. The court found that the allegations made in the appellant's complaint as to the commission of adultery by the respondent on the 17th day of March, 1903, had not been proven in the case, and that the most that could be said was that the respondent may have acted in an imprudent and indiscreet manner; that, during the longer portion of the married life of the parties, appellant had neglected the respondent, and had failed to show that treatment due a wife from her husband, and that a times his treatment had been as to force the respondent to the conclusion that he cared nothing for her; that he indulged in calling her many vile names, and cursing and swearing at her and his children; that he was addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors, and often used the same to excess; that respondent had been faithful in all of her household duties; that in the fall of 1902 appellant ordered the respondent, with their children, away from their home, whereupon they went from there to the town of Wilson Creek; that since said marriage the appellant and respondent have acquired, and now have, personal property of the value of $23,000, consisting of about 450 head of cattle, of the value of about $15,000, and 1,500 head of sheep, of the value of about $4,500, and horses and other property of a personal nature of the value of about $3,500, and have acquired real estate comprising 4,620 acres, together with certain lots and buildings in Coulee City, Douglas county, Wash., and Wilson Creek, Douglas county, Wash.; that all of said property was acquired by the said appellant and respondent since said marriage, and is community property; that about the time of the commencement of this action the appellant did, through unwarranted means, and without the respondent's being apprised of her rights and interest in the property (she being wholly ignorant of the law in the matter, or her rights under the law), secure a purported settlement or agreement, signed by respondent, in which she was to turn over to the appellant all the children, save one, and all of the property, for the paltry sum of $2,500; found that the agreement was unfair, procured by unwarranted and unfair means, and deemed to be so unconscionable that it was set aside; found that the respondent in this action was a fit and proper peerson to have the custody and care of the minor children, and, as a conclusion of law, that the bonds of matrimony be dissolved; that the respondent is entitled to one-half of all the personal and real property now owned by the appellant and respondent; that respondent is entitled to the custody of the minor children, they being of tender age, and that the appellant have the right to visit and help support them; and that the contract in relation to the settlement be set aside. A decree was entered in substantial compliance with said conclusions, awarding the custody of all the children to respondent, and requiring appellant to pay into court for the benefit of respondent the sum of $2,000, to be paid out only upon the order of the court, and within 60 days to pay in the further sum of $13,000, for the use and benefit of the respondent, as a balance due the respondent from the community property, to be paid out upon the order of the court only; making...