Richardson v. Richardson

• Citation: 80 Me. 585,16 A. 250
• Parties: RICHARDSON v. RICHARDSON et al.
• Decision Date: 19 November 1888
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

16 A. 250

80 Me. 585

RICHARDSON

v. RICHARDSON et al.¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

November 19, 1888.

Case reported from supreme judicial court, Hancock county.

Bill in equity, brought to determine the construction of a will.

Wiswell, King & Peters, for complainant. Hale & Hamlin, Deasy & Higgins, and Geo. P. Dutton, for respondents.

PETERS, C. J. The questions presented for decision call for a construction of these clauses in Amos Richardson's will: "Third. I give and bequeath to my beloved wife, Bethiah Richardson, all the rest, residue, and remainder of my property, both personal and real, of what kind and nature soever, I may die possessed of, to her use and behoof and dispose of for her maintenance during her natural life. Fourth. I also devise that whatever property of my estate which may remain at the decease of my wife, Bethiah, may be divided equally between my daughter, Sarah R. Richardson, and my granddaughter, Ida M. Ash, provided, that if either of the above-named persons shall die without children, then this legacy shall go to the other, and, if both die childless, then the same shall be distributed equally among my grandchildren then living." The will is dated in December, 1876. The testator died in January, 1877. Bethiah, his wife, died in June, 1888. She, in 1884, conveyed by absolute deed the homestead left by the testator—his principal property—to Sarah R. Richardson, another devisee in the will, for the consideration of a life support, to be furnished her by the grantee. A bond was given by the grantee for the deed. The deed contains a condition that if the grantee die before the grantor, the conveyance shall become thereby void.

The first question is whether the transaction of deed and bond, the grantee surviving the grantor, was valid or void. If the parties acted in good faith, —and such must be the presumption, as nothing on the face of the transaction indicates the contrary,—we think it must be pronounced to be valid. A power to thus convey the property was conferred on the wife by the will. The mode and manner of disposing of the property are not dictated to her. The purpose for which it may be done is indicated. She could dispose of a portion or all. Nothing restricts her as to the quantum of interest to be disposed of. The testator does not provide a remainder, but only disposes of one should it exist. In one sense the widow literally followed the mandate of the will. She did "dispose of the estate for her maintenance during her life." Her judgment governs, even though she exercises poor judgment. All rests in her own discretion. Counsel for some of the remainder-men raises objections to such an execution of the trust, but the objections apply more against such a kind of trust than against this mode of its execution. They were objections for the testator to have considered. He did consider, presumably, the same objections, and in his own mind overruled them. He requires no bond. He creates no trustee. He places all confidence in her, having all opportunity to judge of her capacities, both mental and moral. It is said she should and could sell only as her wants from time to time required. That might be the judgment of some persons, but it was not her judgment; and her judgment governs. But does it follow that her judgment was not prudently exercised? She knew her situation better than we know it. It might be that she could not effect a sale in any other way. Small and poor farms will not usually sell in parcels or nibbles. She carefully provides for herself, if she should survive the grantee. But it is contended that if she could sell the property as a whole, the consideration to be received should be absolute, and not contingent or conditional. "We think that argument makes rather against the expediency of the transaction than its legality. The value of the land has increased since the conveyance. It might perchance have decreased. It is not alleged that it was not a fair contract between parties, but it has not resulted favorably for those interested in a remainder after her death. It is said a fraud might easily be committed upon the remainder-man in such a transaction. The question of law is whether it was per se fraudulent. If the transaction were a fraudulent one in fact, both parties participating in the fraud, it could undoubtedly be avoided by other parties interested. The court could have been called upon to enjoin the conveyance or declare it void. It is further said in opposition to the scheme which the widow adopted, that she might be too simple-minded to be allowed to participate in so complicated and important a transaction, and that the husband could not possibly have anticipated such an unusual execution of the trust. The answer to that suggestion must be that in any extreme case the court would interfere to prevent injustice, if applied to. The power lies in the court, to be exercised in extreme cases, to take the execution of a discretionary trust from a life-tenant, and commit it to another, if the circumstances justify judicial interference. As to what might be an emergency demanding such action by the court will be found to have been fully stated by us in the case of Copeland v. Barron, 72 Me. 206, 211. It is also intimated in the argument of counsel that to defend any sale by a life-tenant, who has a power of disposal like this, it must appear that there was an emergency requiring a sale. That is impossible. If such were the rule, no man would buy at a fair price the whole or any part of the property. It would so cripple the practical use of the power to sell as to make it in very many cases worthless to its possessor. There is no doubt that, in small estates, devises of remainders like the present are scarcely ever beneficial to anybody, and testators ought to appreciate that fact when they make them. All the risks are avoidable by placing the trust in responsible and disinterested hands. Pertinent illustrations of the views expressed by us on the main point presented will be found in the following cases, in addition to the case cited: Shaw v. Hussey, 41 Me. 495; Warren v. Webb, 68 Me. 133; Starr v. McEwan, 69 Me. 334.

Then we come to another question, though we infer there cannot be much, if any, property that it can apply to, provided we have...