Richardson v. State

• Decision Date: 02 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. S02G1698.,S02G1698.
• Citation: 581 S.E.2d 528,276 Ga. 639
• Parties: RICHARDSON v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

581 S.E.2d 528

276 Ga. 639

RICHARDSON v. The STATE.

No. S02G1698.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 2, 2003.

Gary P. Bunch, Atlanta, for appellant.

Peter J. Skandalakis, Dist. Atty., Anne C. Allen, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

CARLEY, Justice.

Terry Richardson was tried for rape and kidnapping with bodily injury. At trial, he admitted engaging in sexual intercourse with the victim, but claimed that it was consensual. On direct examination, the victim testified that she was walking to an ex-boy-friend's home to return his jacket when she accepted a ride from Richardson. According to her, he drove to a secluded area and assaulted her. During cross-examination, the defense sought to inquire further about the former boyfriend. The contention was that the victim wanted to rekindle a relationship with him, but his jacket became stained with blood and semen during the voluntary intercourse with Richardson. According to the defense, she then fabricated the rape charge to explain those stains and to prevent the act of consensual sex from hindering a possible reconciliation with her previous boyfriend. The trial court disallowed this cross-examination, finding that it was irrelevant and barred by the rape-shield law.

During the trial, Richardson also asked if he could stand behind the jury box. The basis for this request was his assertion that, while seated at the defense table, he was unable to see the witnesses as they testified. The trial court did not allow him to do as he requested.

The jury found Richardson guilty of both offenses. On appeal, he enumerated as error the trial court's rulings on cross-examination of the victim and the right to confront the witnesses. The Court of Appeals found no merit in either assertion, and affirmed the convictions. Richardson v. State, 256 Ga. App. 322, 323-326, 568 S.E.2d 548(1, 2) (2002). We granted certiorari to address the two issues.

1. A defendant in this state enjoys the right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination. OCGA § 24-9-64. However, this right is not unlimited. The trial court "may restrict the cross-examination to matters material to the issues. [Cit.]" Waller v. State, 213 Ga. 291, 294(5), 99 S.E.2d 113 (1957). Insofar as the permissible scope of cross-examination in a rape prosecution is concerned, OCGA § 24-2-3(a) provides, in relevant part, that evidence "relating to the past sexual behavior of the complaining witness shall not be admissible...." By its express terms, however, this provision only bars evidence regarding the sexual aspects of a prior relationship. The judiciary is not free to disregard this clear limitation on the evidence that is excludable under the statute.

Courts of last resort must frequently construe the language of a statute, but such courts may not substitute by judicial interpretation language of their own for the clear, unambiguous language of the statute, so as to change the meaning.

Frazier v. Southern R. Co., 200 Ga. 590, 593(2), 37 S.E.2d 774 (1946). Evidence merely that the victim has or had a romantic relationship with another man does not reflect on her character for sexual behavior. Therefore, so long as Richardson confined his questioning to the non-sexual nature of the victim's former relationships, the statute would not be a basis for curtailing his cross-examination of her. See Banks v. State, 185 Ga.App. 851, 853(2), 366 S.E.2d 228 (1988) (State's introduction of testimony that victim was "going steady" did not open door to introduction by defense of evidence of her past sexual experience). Compare Harris v. State, 257 Ga. 666(1), 362 S.E.2d 211 (1987) (evidence that victim was prostitute related to her sexual behavior and was inadmissible); Alford v. State, 243 Ga.App. 212, 215(5), 534 S.E.2d 81 (2000) (victim's mode of dress at time of rape was inadmissible); Burley v. State, 190 Ga.App. 75, 77(2), 378 S.E.2d 328 (1989) (victim's marital history implicates her sexual behavior and was inadmissible).

There is no indication that the defense intended to exceed that limitation and to pursue the inadmissible topic of the victim's sexual history with other men. The proposed inquiry was confined to the existence of a relationship with an ex-boyfriend and whether the desire to reestablish that relationship was a motive to make a false claim of rape. "The possibility that [the proposed questions] may have been construed as implicating past sexual conduct could have been eliminated with a corrective instruction to the jury." George v. State, 257 Ga. 176, 177(1), 356 S.E.2d 882 (1987). Therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in relying upon the rape-shield law to preclude Richardson from cross-examining the victim in this regard. George v. State, supra at 176(1), 356 S.E.2d 882; Villafranco v. State, 252 Ga. 188, 193(1), 313 S.E.2d 469 (1984).

The evidentiary ruling would be correct only if non-sexual questioning of the victim about her previous relationship was irrelevant to the motive that Richardson attributed to her. He did not contend that she was lying to protect an existing relationship. Compare Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 109 S.Ct. 480, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988). His position was that, because she desired to rekindle a relationship with her former boyfriend, she needed an explanation for the stained jacket when she returned it to him and, thus, she fabricated the rape charge. As the trial court and the Court of Appeals observed, she was not compelled to return the stained jacket and had other options, such as cleaning it or claiming that it was lost, which would not threaten a possible reconciliation. The existence of other measures which, if pursued, would prevent the victim's former boyfriend from learning about the sexual encounter with Richardson is certainly a factor bearing on the viability of the defense's contention that she lied about engaging in consensual sex with him. However, such credibility determinations are properly left to the jury. On cross-examination, "`it is always permissible to sift the motives of the witness and to show, if possible, any reason other than a purpose to tell the truth which may consciously or unconsciously actuate him in his testimony. (Cit.)' [Cits.]" Arnold v. State, 163 Ga.App. 10, 13(4), 293 S.E.2d 501 (1982). Although a trial court has discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence, the long-standing rule in this state favors the admission of any relevant evidence, no matter how slight its probative value. Hudson v. State, 273 Ga. 124, 126(2), 538 S.E.2d 751 (2000). The trial court erroneously prevented Richardson from presenting for the jury's consideration all testimony relevant to his consent defense, and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming that ruling.

2. "The Confrontation Clause does not ... compel the witness to fix his eyes upon the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere...." Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019(II), 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988). See also Ortiz v. State, 188 Ga. App. 532, 533(2), 374 S.E.2d 92 (1988). However, that constitutional provision does "guarantee[] the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact. [Cit.]" Coy v. Iowa, supra at 1016(II), 108 S.Ct. 2798. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that "the right of confrontation does not require that the defendant be able to see witnesses as they testify." Richardson v. State, supra at 325(2), 568 S.E.2d 548. Richardson could not insist that the witnesses look directly at him as they testified, but he was entitled to an unobstructed view of them while they were on the stand.

It is unclear from the record whether Richardson's constitutional right of confrontation was violated in this case. The record shows that the trial court offered to move the defense table, but that Richardson declined that alternative. According to the trial court, "[i]f he moved over there on the end kind of like [the prosecution's] table is, [then the witnesses would] be able to see him." If that is true, then Richardson waived his right by rejecting the trial court's offer. However, we need not decide whether there was a violation or a waiver. Richardson must be retried for the reason discussed in Division 1 and, at the retrial, the trial court will undoubtedly provide the face-to-face confrontation with witnesses that the Constitution guarantees.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except BENHAM and HUNSTEIN, JJ., who dissent.

BENHAM, Justice, dissenting.

I respectfully disagree with the majority's determination that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's grant of the State's motion in limine to exclude evidence about the victim's relationship with her former boyfriend. I agree with the Court of Appeals' assessment that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined the evidence the defendant wished to present was not relevant. I take issue with the majority's narrow construction of the coverage of the rape shield statute (OCGA § 24-2-3) and the result of the majority's conclusion—it encourages a defendant accused of rape to cry, "Motive to lie" and thereby win judicial approval to bypass the rape shield statute whenever the victim is a partner in a meaningful relationship, has recently ended a meaningful relationship, or might wish to be in a meaningful relationship. Instead, I believe a rape defendant has a right to cross-examine a victim in order to expose a motive to fabricate a rape charge but that right is limited to relevant and probative evidence, and a rape victim's relationship with one person is relevant and probative of the victim's motive to lie about being raped by another only if the defendant can make a proffer of facts, not a statement of theory, from which the jury can immediately discern a motive to lie. Under that standard, the Court of Appeals did not err when it determined the trial court did not abuse its...