Richardson v. Wright Wright v. Richardson 8212 161, 70 8212 5211

• Decision Date: 24 February 1972
• Docket Number: Nos. 70,s. 70
• Citation: 92 S.Ct. 788,31 L.Ed.2d 151,405 U.S. 208
• Parties: Elliot L. RICHARDSON, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Appellant, v. Radie WRIGHT et al. Radie WRIGHT et al., Appellants, v. Elliot L. RICHARDSON et al. —161, 70—5211
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

405 U.S. 208

92 S.Ct. 788

31 L.Ed.2d 151

Elliot L. RICHARDSON, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Appellant,

v Radie WRIGHT et al.

Radie WRIGHT et al., Appellants,

v. Elliot L. RICHARDSON et al.

Nos. 70—161, 70—5211.

Argued Jan. 13, 1972.

Decided Feb. 24, 1972.

Rehearings Denied March 27, 1972.

See 405 U.S. 1033, 92 S.Ct. 1274, 1296.

L. Patrick Gray, III, Washington, D.C., for Elliot L. Richardson.

Robert N. Sayler, Washington, D.C., for Radie Wright and others.

PER CURIAM.

We noted probable jurisdiction of these appeals, 404 U.S. 819, 92 S.Ct. 51, 30 L.Ed.2d 47 (1971), to consider the applicability of Gold- berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), to the suspension and termination of disability benefit payments pursuant to § 225 of the Social Security Act, 70 Stat. 817, 42 U.S.C. § 425, and implementing regulations of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Shortly before oral argument, we were advised that the Secretary had adopted new regulations, effective December 27, 1971, governing the procedures to be followed by the Social Security Administration in determing whether to suspend or terminate disability benefits. These procedures include the requirement that a recipient of benefits be given notice of a proposed suspension and the reasons therefor, plus an opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence. In light of that development, we believe that the appropriate course is to withhold judicial action pending reprocessing, under the new regulations, of the determinations here in dispute. If that process results in a determination of entitlements to disability benefits, there will be no need to consider the constitutional claim that claimants are entitled to an opportunity to make an oral presentation. In the context of a comprehensive complex administrative program, the administrative process must have a reasonable opportunity to evolve procedures to meet needs as they arise. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the District Court for the District of Columbia, Wright v. Finch, 321 F.Supp. 383 (1971), with direction to that court to remand the cause to the Secretary and to retain jurisdiction for such further proceedings, if any, as may be necessary upon completion of the administrative procedure.

Vacated and remanded.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.

While I join Mr. Justice BRENNAN who reaches the merits, I add a word about the unwisdom of the policy pursued by the Court.

A three-judge district court held § 225 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 425, unconstitutional, insofar as it purported to authorize the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to suspend the payment of social security disability benefits without giving prior notice and 'an opportunity to participate' to the disability beneficiary. 321 F.Supp. 383, 386. The court remanded the cause to the Secretary for the formulation of new procedures consistent with its opinion. Judge Matthews, troubled by an implication in the majority's opinion that participation merely by way of written submissions might satisfy the majority's notions of due process, dissented 'from so much of the opinion as seems to suggest that the procedural requirements of due process may be satisfied with something less than the 'opportunity' (to participate) specified in (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287).' Id., at 388. We noted probable jurisdiction in these cross-appeals to evaluate the opinion below in light of Goldberg. 404 U.S. 819, 92 S.Ct. 51, 30 L.Ed.2d 47.

Now, however, it is suggested that the Secretary has so far complied with the instructions of the District Court to formulate new procedures that we should remand the cases to the District Court for further proceedings in light of these new requirements. Such a course, I submit, would be a perversion of the philosophy of due process that we expressed in Goldberg.

Judge Matthews, below, captured the essence of Goldberg in her brief partial dissent:

'In Goldberg the Supreme Court held that a welfare recipient, in addition to timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination of benefits, must have 'an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally." 321 F.Supp., at 387—388.

It cannot seriously be argued that the Secretary's 'new rules' comport with Goldberg. They may cure the notice defect, but they make no provision whatsoever for the presentation of oral testimony or the confrontation of witnesses.¹ We noted probable jurisdiction, I thought, to determine if the difference between 'welfare' payments and 'disability' payments is sufficient to say that one's Fifth Amendment right to be heard may be satisfied by an opportunity to make written submissions in the latter case, although not in the former.² We heard oral argument on this basis. Because of the inadequacy of the new rules, in light of Goldberg, the question will remain regardless of the outcome of a remand.

I think it unseemly, needlessly to shuttle any litigant, especially an indigent, back and forth from court to court, hoping that his exhaustion of newly created remedies will somehow or other make his problem disappear and relieve us of an obligation. No concession promising justice to the claimants has been made. The issue of due process was properly raised and is here for decision; and all the requirements of case or controversy within the meaning of Art. III of the Constitution have been satisfied.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The Court justifies today's sua sponte action on the ground that if reprocessing under the Secretary's new regulations 'results in a determination of entitlement to disability benefits, there will be no need to consider the constitutional claim that claimants are entitled to an opportunity to make an oral presentation.' (Emphasis by the Court.) Avoidance of unnecessary constitutional decisions is certainly a preferred practice when appropriate. But that course is inappropriate, indeed irresponsible, in this instance. We will not avoid the necessity of deciding the important constitutional question presented by claimants even should they prevail upon the Secretary's reconsideration. The question is being pressed all over the country. The Secretary's brief lists no less than seven cases presenting it with respect to disability benefits and 10 cases presenting it with respect to nondisability benefits.¹ The Secretary's new regulations permit discontinuance of disability benefits without affording beneficiaries procedural due process either in the form mandated by Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.id 287 (1970), or in the form mandated by the District Court, 321 F.Supp. 383 (DC 1971). The regulations require only that the beneficiary be informed of the proposed suspension or termination and the information upon which it is based and be given an opportunity to submit a written response before benefits are cut off.² This procedure does not afford the beneficiary, as Goldberg requires for welfare and old-age recipients, an evidentiary hearing at which he may personally appear to offer oral evidence and confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Nor does the procedure satisfy the requirements of due process as determined by the District Court. That court held that the beneficiary must be given not only notice but also, before he responds, a 'reasonable opportunity to examine the documentary evidence' upon which the Secretary relies and, in case of conflict in the evidence, a decision by an impartial decision-maker. The court said, however, that an evidentiary hearing and opportunity to confront adverse witnesses were not necessary, although 'a hearing could be held' if the beneficiary 'submitted some evidence that contradicts that possessed by the Administration.' 321 F.Supp., at 387. Thus, under both Goldberg and the District Court's decision, the omissions in the Secretary's new regulations are fatal to the constitutional adequacy of the procedures. Because we may imminently be confronted with another case presenting the question, and because its resolution is vitally essential to the administration of an important Government program, today's action in avoiding decision of the constitutional question is not a responsible exercise of that practice. We gain a brief respite for ourselves while the Secretary, state agencies, and beneficiaries continue confused and uncertain. Moreover, the question has been thoroughly and ably argued and briefed on both sides, and we have the benefit of thoughtful and well-considered majority and dissenting opinions in the District Court. Today's disposition results in an unjustified waste, not only of our own all too sparse time and energies, but also of the time and energies of the three judges of the District Court who must again suspend their own heavy calendars to assemble for what can only be an empty exercise. I cannot join in the Court's abdication of our responsibility to decide this case.

Both the beneficiaries and the Secretary appeal from the District Court's judgment. The beneficiaries contend that the District Court erred in not holding that the procedure must afford an evidentiary hearing as in Goldberg. The Secretary contends that procedural due process requirements are satisfied by the 'paper' hearing afforded by his new regulations. I agree with the beneficiaries and would therefore vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand with direction to enter a new judgment requiring the procedures held in Goldberg to be requisite with respect to discontinuance of welfare and old-age benefits. See Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 90 S.Ct. 1026, 25 L.Ed.2d 307 (1970).

Section 225 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 425, provides that '(i)f the Secretary, on the...