Richey v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 08 December 1916 |
| Docket Number | No. 19950[101].,19950[101]. |
| Citation | 160 N.W. 188,135 Minn. 54 |
| Parties | RICHEY v. MINNEAPOLIS ST. RY. CO. (two cases). |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; John H. Steele, Judge.
Actions by Charlotte M. Richey against the Minneapolis Street Railway Company, and by William C. Richey against the same defendant. From an order granting a new trial after verdict for defendant, it appels. Affirmed.
Where a street car company in the operation of one of its cars passes the regular stoping place for the acceptance and discharge of passengers, and brings it to a stop upon the private right of way of the company so that the gates at which persons enter the same open upon cattle guards, installed by the company to keep trespassers from its right of way, and which are covered with snow to such an extent as to render the place dangerous to one not familiar with the situation, the company owes to those it invites to enter the car at such place the high degree of care required by law of carriers for the protection of passengers.
An instruction of the court that the company in such a situation was bound only by the rule of ordinary care was error, for which a new trial was properly granted. John F. Dahl and W. Y. Smiley, both of Minneapolis (N. M. Thygeson, of Minneapolis, of counsel), for appellant.
Arthur M. Higgins, of Minneapolis, for respondent.
Plaintiff brought this action for injuries alleged to have been received while attempting to board a car of defendant which had stopped for the purpose of permitting her to take passage thereon. Defendant had a verdict, and upon plaintiff's motion a new trial was granted for an alleged error in the court's instructions to the jury. Defendant appealed.
Defendant operates its cars from Thirty-First street in the city of Minneapolis to Lake Harriet upon its own private right of way, and not along a public street. The line crosses intersecting streets, and to keep trespassers from the track, the same is fenced with cattle guards at the line of such intersecting streets. Plaintiff lives in this vicinity, and upon the occasion in question signaled a passing car that she desired to take passage thereon. The car was brought to a stop, but for some reason, not important, not at the usual stopping place, namely the cross-walk, but passed the same and came to a stop so that the gates were opposite one of the cattle guards. The gates were opened at that point, and plaintiff, whose approach was known to the car conductor, was in the act of reaching for the car when she stepped into the cattel guard and was injured. The cattle guard was covered with snow, and its dangerous character was thus concealed. Such was the case as made by the testimony of plaintiff.
[2] The court charged the jury that defendant was under obligation to exercise ordinary care...
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