Richey v. Wells
| Decision Date | 17 March 1936 |
| Parties | RICHEY et al. v. WELLS. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Bill of complaint by C. Rogers Wells against W. H. Richey, etc., and others, From the decree, the defendants appeal.
Affirmed in part, and reversed in part.
TERRELL and BUFORD, JJ., dissenting. Appeal from Circuit Court, Lake County; H. C. B. Koonce, judge.
Duncan, Hamlin & Duncan, J. W. Hunter, and John S Lavin, all of Tavares, and Treadwell & Treadwell, of Arcadia for appellants.
Wells & Hall and C. Rogers Wells, all of Leesburg, for appellee.
The facts of the controversy are stated in the accompanying opinion prepared by Mr. Justice TERRELL.
It is settled law that under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States an unjust and illegal discrimination may arise out of the enactment of a legislative measure that makes such unjust and illegal discrimination possible, although it is not expressly required by the terms of the law itself as written.
Though a law be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet if it is applied and administered by public authority with an unequal hand, so as to practically make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Federal Constitution under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, while sovereignty is not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law, the fundamental rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are to be considered as individual possessions, secured as affirmed by the Declaration of Independence, which antedates both State and Federal Constitutions, and are therefore protected by both, because the Constitutions themselves so specifically declare.
This means that the state itself, in administering or exercising its acknowledged powers of lawmaking, must restrain its legislative acts within the bounds of those maxims of constitutional law which ordain that no man may be compelled to hold his life, his means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another acting under laws that are not just and equal in their intended application to every one similarly situated. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220.
I agree to the proposition that the Legislature may liquidate on any terms that it sees fit any tax certificated lands, the title to which it has acquired as the result of the enforcement of its tax laws, whether by operation of law, foreclosure sale, or otherwise. But that is not all that is attempted to be done by chapter 17406, Acts 1935, here brought in question. On the contrary, said chapter 17406, supra, undertakes to allow the compromise and adjustment of 'omitted subsequent taxes upon lands' at the discretion of a statutory board set up in the act, the only rule of conduct for which is comprehended within the vague and indefinite term 'within its sound discretion.'
What is such 'sound discretion' considered from the standpoint of that definiteness and certainty which must characterize all statutes, in order that the powers of government shall be administered as 'one of laws and not a government of men?' I have searched the statute in vain for a prescription of any such standard. Therefore, the statute is in terms nothing more than an unconstitutionally delegated power of legislation vested in certain named officers, whose sole limitation on the exercise of the powers vested is that of their own free will and choice, otherwise characterized in the act as 'sound discretion,' in so far as 'omitted subsequent taxes' are concerned. It is not enough to say that no actual abuse of such unbridled power is threatened or has occurred. It is sufficient to point out that no such power can be vested in the first instance, because whatever power the state has to remit taxes already duly assessed and levied is a purely legislative power, the exercise of which cannot be delegated to a statutory board to be indulged in at its mere 'discretion' whether 'sound' or otherwise. See Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 268, 108 S.W. 245.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that in so far as chapter 17406, Acts 1935, authorizes the compromise and adjustment of the amount required to be paid for the 'redemption' of 'omitted subsequent taxes' upon delinquent tax certificated lands at the mere 'discretion' of the county delinquent tax adjustment board created by the act, that such statute is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it sets up a system for the administration of the tax redemption laws of this state that is unequal in the scope of its application to taxpayers generally, and that such feature of the statute is further unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the county delinquent tax adjustment board, inasmuch as no definite and certain standard for the administration of the act in its tax remission feature is therein stated, laid down, or set forth.
The provision of section 3 that the authorized compromises must be only 'upon principles of fairness to the county and the owners and lienors of such lands' is fatally indefinite under the constitutional requirements of certainty in statutes of this character, and adds nothing to the statute not already comprehended within the words 'sound discretion' as previously used in the same section. Chenoweth v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Colo. 74, 141 P. 132, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 958, Ann.Cas.1915D, 1188.
'Omitted subsequent taxes' are current taxes and as such they may not be constitutionally compromised, adjusted, or remitted on any terms not likewise made available to all taxpayers alike that is to say, those who have already paid their current taxes due on lands not tax delinquent, nor certified to the state, nor held by the state subject to redemption at the option of the owner under circumstances permitting the owner and no...
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