Richland Irr. Dist. v. De Bow

• Decision Date: 03 October 1928
• Docket Number: 21239.
• Parties: RICHLAND IRR. DIST. v. DE BOW et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

270 P. 816

149 Wash. 242

RICHLAND IRR. DIST. v. DE BOW et al.

No. 21239.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 3, 1928

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Benton County; John Truax, Judge.

Action by the Richland Irrigation District, a municipal corporation against C. E. De Bow and others, Commissioners of Benton County, and Harry Forsyth, County Treasurer. From a judgment dismissing the action, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded, with direction.

M. M Moulton, of Kennewick, for appellant.

Geo. O Beardsley, of Prosser, for respondents.

John H. Dunbar and B. B. Adams, both of Olympia, amicus curiae.

MAIN, J.

The plaintiff, an irrigation district, brought this action to prohibit the subjecting of property which it owns within the district to general taxation. To the complaint a demurrer was interposed and sustained. The plaintiff refused to plead further and elected to stand upon its complaint. Judgment was entered dismissing the action, from which the plaintiff appeals.

This is a companion case to that of Columbia Irrigation District v. Benton County, 270 P. 813, just decided, so far as the questions involved in that case are concerned. There is however, in this case one additional question, and that is whether chapter 243 of the Laws of 1927 is constitutional.

The first objection to the constitutionality of this act is that it is in contravention of article 2, § 19, of the Constitution, which provides that 'no bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.' The act in question is entitled:

'An act relating to irrigation district assessments and tax exemptions and amending section 22 of the Laws of 1890, pages 683-684, as amended by section 10 of chapter 138 of the Laws of 1923.'

It is argued that irrigation district assessments and tax exemptions are separate and independent subjects which cannot be combined in one act. The argument is not persuasive, because the act does not purport to legislate upon the general subject of tax exemptions, but only as to such exemptions as they are applied to irrigation districts. In the act the only reference to tax exemptions is as applied to irrigation districts, and it cannot be said to be a matter entirely unrelated to such districts. The act provides that 'all lands owned by the district shall be exempt from general state and county taxes.'

In McQueen v. Kittitas County, 115 Wash. 672, 198 P. 394, it is said, with reference to the constitutional provision which provides that no act shall embrace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title:

'But this provision of the Constitution was intended to prevent the Legislature from embracing in one act wholly unrelated subjects; it was not intended to prevent the enactment of a complete law on a given subject, even though the provisions of the law may be numerous and varied. The question then always is, does the act contain unrelated matters?'

The exempting of property of irrigation districts from general taxation is not a matter which is wholly unrelated to such districts.

The next contention is that the act offends against article 2, § 37, of the Constitution, which provides that----

'No act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length.'

It is said that this act is an attempt to amend section 11104, Rem. Comp. Stat., which covers the matter of tax exemptions generally. The only trouble with this argument is that it proceeds from a wrong premise. It assumes that chapter 243 attempts to amend section 11104, Rem. Comp. Stat., by reference when the face of the act will not sustain such assumption. Section 1 of the act provides:

'Section 1. That section 22 of the Laws of 1890, pages 683-684, as amended by section 10 of chapter 138 of the Laws of 1923, (section 7440 of Remington's Compiled Statutes, 1923 Supplement; section 3218 of Pierce's Code) be amended to read as follows:'

The following paragraph sets out the section of the law as amended, and contains the provision above quoted exempting property owned by irrigation districts from general state and county taxes. It is true that there is a conflict between this provision and the general statute on tax exemptions which is irreconcilable. In such a case the later act prevails and the prior act to the extent that the two are not harmonious is repealed by implication. Callvert v. Winsor, 26 Wash. 368, 67 P. 91; State ex rel. Arnold v. Mitchell, 55 Wash. 513, 104 P. 791.

The act does not come within that provision of the Constitution which provides that no act shall be revised or amended by a mere reference to its title.

The third question is whether the Legislature had the power under the Constitution to exempt the property of irrigation districts from general taxation. Section 2 of art. 7 of the Constitution, after stating that the Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation on all property in the state, provides:

'That the property of the United States, and of the state, counties, school districts, and other municipal corporations, and such other property as the Legislature may by general laws provide, shall be exempt from taxation.'

As above indicated, the act in question attempts to relieve all lands owned by irrigation districts from general state and county taxes. From the excerpt of the Constitution quoted it will be noted that the Legislature has the power by general laws to exempt 'other property' from taxation than that specified.

The first inquiry in this connection will be as to what is the proper meaning to be given to the language 'other property.' The answer to this will be found in State ex rel. Chamberlin v. Daniel, 17 Wash. 111, 49 P. 243, where it is held that the expression 'other property' in the proviso meant public property or property which was of a quasi public nature. It was there said:

'We do not think it necessary in this case to resort to imputation, but think a reasonable construction can be placed upon the enactment which will give intelligent force and effect to each separate provision of the law, viz., that the use of the expression, 'other property,' in the proviso was as a matter of caution, on the supposition that the special enumeration might not have embraced all public property, and that the changing conditions of society and of business, and changes of law, might create public property not then in existence. It is not unreasonable to conclude that in this connection they had also reference to property which is of quasi public nature and which it has been customary for legislatures to exempt from taxation, such as charitable institutions,

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