Richmond & A. R. Co v. R. A. Patterson Tobacco Co

• Decision Date: 12 March 1896
• Citation: 24 S.E. 261,92 Va. 670
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: RICHMOND & A. R. CO. et al. v. R. A. PATTERSON TOBACCO CO.

24 S.E. 261

92 Va. 670

RICHMOND & A. R. CO. et al.

v.R. A. PATTERSON TOBACCO CO.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

March 12, 1896.

Constitutional Law—Regulation of Commerce.

Code, § 1295, providing that a common carrier accepting anything for transportation directed to a destination beyond its line shall be deemed to assume obligation for its safe carriage to such destination, unless, at the time of such acceptance, it be released from such liability by contract in writing, signed by the owner, is not a regulation of commerce, in violation of Const. U. S. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.

Appeal from circuit court of city of Richmond.

Petition by R. A. Patterson Tobacco Company against the Richmond & Alleghany Rail-road Company and others. Decree for petitioner. The railroad company appeals. Affirmed.

Judge Wm. J. Robertson and Henry Taylor, Jr., for appellant.

Courtney & Patterson, for appellee.

KEITH, P. The Patterson Tobacco Company filed its petition in the chancery causes styled "Terrell and Bocock, Trustees, v. Richmond and Alleghany Railroad Company and others, " and "Alexander and Ellyson, Trustees, v. Same, " pending in the circuit court for the city of Richmond, from which it appears that on August 1, 1888, the tobacco company delivered to the receivers of the Richmond & Alleghany Railroad Company, at Richmond, a lot of tobacco, consigned to Mann & Levy, at Bayou Sara, La., to be transported in accordance with the bill of lading filed with the petition. The bill of lading is in the usual form, and acknowledges the receipt of the several boxes and packages shipped, their weight and classification. Among other provisions, it sets out that it "is mutually agreed that if the ultimate destination of the packages received be beyond the point for which rates are named in the margin, they may, by the connecting carrier nearest to such ultimate destination, be delivered to any other carrier, to be transported to such ultimate point, and the carrier so selected shall be regarded exclusively as the agent of the owner or consignee. * * * It is mutually agreed that the liability of each carrier as to goods destined beyond its own route shall be terminated by proper delivery of them to the next succeeding carrier." From the agreed facts it appears "that the bill of lading is not signed by the shippers or their agent; that the tobacco in question was an interstate shipment; that it was delivered by the Richmond & Alleghany Railroad Company to the next succeeding carrier, and was lost after it had left the possession of the Richmond & Alleghany Railroad Company; that the sole question submitted to the court for decision was whether section 1295 of the Code was in conflict with article 1, § 8, el 3, of the constitution of the United States, it being agreed that, if said section was constitutional, the Richmond & Alleghany Railroad Company was responsible to the petitioner for the loss of the tobacco; but, if it was in conflict with the aforesaid clause of the constitution, then under the terms of the bill of lading filed with the petition, the railroad company was not responsible." By its decree the circuit court held that section 1295 was not in conflict with the constitution of the United States, and the prayer of the petition was granted, and a decree entered in favor of the petitioner for the sum of $299.71; and thereupon the railroad company obtained an appeal and supersedeas from this court.

Section 1295, above referred to, is as follows: "When a common carrier accepts for transportation any thing, to a point of desti nation beyond the terminus of his own line or route, he shall be deemed thereby to assume an obligation for its safe carriage to such point of destination, unless, at the time of such acceptance, such carrier be released or exempted from such liability by contract in writing signed by the owner or his agent; and, although there be such contract in writing, if such thing be lost or injured, such common carrier shall himself be liable therefor, unless, within a reasonable time after demand be made, he shall give satisfactory proof to the consignor that the loss or injury did not occur while the thing was in his charge." That congress has, under the constitution of the United States, the power to regulate commerce, is, of course, uncontroverted. That this power is, when exercised, exclusive in its character, and that the omission on the part of congress to exercise the power over commerce with which it is clothed, is, in those respects in which the subject is capable of being dealt with by general regulations, equivalent to a declaration of the will of congress that it shall remain free and uncontrolled, are propositions which seem to be thoroughly settled by the decisions of the supreme court of the United States. We need, therefore, only to inquire whether the statute just quoted is a regulation of commerce. If it be, we must declare it unconstitutional, as trenching upon a province beyond the domain of state authority, and over which congress is given exclusive jurisdiction. The supreme court has construed clause 3 of section 8 of article 1 in many cases. It has held that the power to regulate commerce among the states embraces the power to regulate all the various agencies by which that commerce is conducted. From these decisions it may be said that state laws which undertake to enforce a tax upon interstate or foreign commerce in any form, or any law of a state which imposes a burden or hindrance upon commerce, or which tends to embarrass commercial intercourse and transactions, or which under any disguise or in any manner seeks to give the citizens of one state any advantage over the citizens of other states engaged in interstate commerce, are regulations of commerce repugnant to the constitution, and void. But that court, with its accustomed conservatism, content to watch over and guard our system of government as time and occasion may render its intervention necessary, has wisely refrained from all effort at generalization, or any attempt at enumeration of subjects as being within or without the one jurisdiction or the...