Richmond v. Ashcraft

• Decision Date: 23 March 1909
• Parties: RICHMOND v. ASHCRAFT.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

117 S.W. 689

137 Mo. App. 191

RICHMOND v. ASHCRAFT.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

March 23, 1909.

1. WORDS AND PHRASES—"GOOD FAITH" AND "NOTICE."

The terms "good faith" and "notice" are intimately related in jurisprudence, but are not of uniform meaning; the former retaining in some measure the popular sense of honest belief, but its technical significance depends largely on the doctrine of notice as developed in equity. Considered respecting and as influenced by notice, "good faith" has several legal meanings according to the subject-matter of the litigation in which it is used.

2. IMPROVEMENTS (§ 4)—GOOD FAITH—HOW IMPEACHABLE.

Constructive notice of adverse title afforded by records will not impeach the good faith of an occupant of land in making improvements, it being essential that he have actual notice of the successful title when the improvements were made; but he may be found to have had actual notice of the adverse title from proof that he knew other facts which, if followed up, would have led to notice.

3. NOTICE (§ 6)—EQUITY RULE.

In equity one who takes with notice of an adverse claim takes subject thereto, and to constitute such notice direct or positive information is unnecessary; anything tending to put a prudent man on the alert being sufficient.

4. IMPROVEMENTS (§ 4)—GOOD FAITH.

Notice of a title adversely held is incompatible with the good faith required of an occupant to sustain his claim for improvements, regardless of his opinion concerning the validity of such title.

5. IMPROVEMENTS (§ 4)—GOOD FAITH.

Rev. St. 1899, § 3080 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 1768), permitting one who claims land in another's possession to bar the occupant from compensation for betterments by notifying him in writing of the claim and its nature, does not make an exception in favor of an occupant who believes the hostile title to be bad and makes betterments regardless of such notice.

6. IMPROVEMENTS (§ 4)—GOOD FAITH.

An occupant's claim for betterments is not defeated merely because his title proves to be bad.

7. IMPROVEMENTS (§ 4)—PROCEEDING TO RECOVER FOR—INSTRUCTIONS.

An instruction that, if an ousted occupant of land made improvements in good faith believing he owned the land, he could recover therefor, was erroneous for ignoring the effect of notice of defendant's claims, which he deemed inferior to him.

8. IMPROVEMENTS (§ 4)—GOOD FAITH—ESTOPPEL.

One is not estopped to dispute an ousted occupant's claim for betterments because the occupant offered to convey to him if he would pay what the occupant was out, nor because of an omission to sue for the land until the occupant sought to quiet his title; but an occupant who makes improvements in good faith, on assurances by the holder of an outstanding title that it will not be vitalized, can recover therefor on ouster.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Ripley County; J. C. Sheppard, Judge.

Action by E. T. Richmond against Elizabeth C. Ashcraft. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff instituted an action against defendant to quiet the title to a tract of land, containing 160 acres, in Ripley county. The answer was an action of ejectment against plaintiff for possession of the land, which action culminated in a judgment declaring the title in fee simple to be in defendant, awarding her possession and $200 damages, and assessing the value of the yearly rents and profits of the land at $35. Thereafter plaintiff began this proceeding on the statute to recover compensation for betterments alleged to have been made by him on the land in good faith and without notice of defendant's title. The jury awarded plaintiff damages in the sum of $600, and thereupon the court rendered judgment that he have and recover said sum from defendant, less the amount of the judgment for damages recovered against him in the ejectment action, and the amount of the rents and profits which would accrue between the date of the judgment in said action and the date of payment to plaintiff of the assessed value of his improvements and enjoined defendant from taking possession meanwhile. The present appeal was prosecuted from the award of damages for the value of the betterments.

The facts which led up to the litigation between the parties are these: A. J. Ashcraft, who was defendant's husband, but is now dead, owned the land until October 17, 1893, when it was sold by the sheriff of Ripley county under an execution against him in favor of S. M. Chapman and conveyed to the latter by a sheriff's deed. Chapman afterwards either sold and conveyed to defendant, Mrs. Ashcraft, or arranged to do so; the facts regarding the transaction being in dispute and not really material in the present case, except as bearing on the good faith of plaintiff. She obtained possession of a deed executed by Chapman October 21, 1896, and filed it for record October 17, 1898, which deed purported to convey the land to her. Chapman testified he had agreed to sell her the land for $390, and, as he lived in another part of the country, sent the deed by mail to a man named Patterson, with an order to deliver it to Mrs. Ashcraft on payment of the purchase money, and that she obtained the deed without paying the price, either by purloining it or in some other unlawful mode. Mrs. Ashcraft had held the deed for some years prior to the circumstances to be related next, and was shown by the deed records of the county to be the owner of the land after October 17, 1898. While the title was in this condition, she rented the premises for two years to plaintiff, Richmond, who is her nephew. Richmond entered into occupancy as her tenant some time in 1900, perhaps in the fall of that year. Shortly afterwards, though just when we have been unable to ascertain from the record, he was evicted by the sheriff acting for Chapman, and was immediately put in possession again pursuant to a contract for the purchase of the land by him from Chapman. A month later, in April, there was an attempt to sell the property under a judgment for taxes against defendant and Chapman, and at the sale the latter was the buyer, but got no title because the tract was misdescribed in the proceedings. The record is obscure regarding the eviction of plaintiff. Chapman testified: He obtained judgment against Mrs. Ashcraft alone, or jointly with her husband. He did not say explicitly the judgment was for the unpaid purchase money defendant owed him under the contract to sell to her for $390, and pursuant to which he had put in escrow the deed dated October 21, 1896, that he testified was never delivered, or that the sheriff acted under any judgment in putting plaintiff, as tenant of Mrs. Ashcraft, out of possession. There is nothing to show whether the sheriff was executing a writ, or, if so, what it was, or on what judgment issued. Plaintiff himself testified the deed made by Chapman to Mrs. Ashcraft had not been set aside.

Whatever its form and foundation, this ouster occurred, we believe, in the early part of 1901, and on March 2d of said year Chapman conveyed the premises to plaintiff. The deed by which he did so is not in the record, nor is the nature or effect of it stated. Two days later, on March 4th, Mrs. Ashcraft signed and acknowledged a quitclaim deed to plaintiff for the recited consideration of $15, purporting to convey the land to him, and his testimony shows he intended, when he bought from Chapman, to obtain a deed from her also; but he said he undertook to buy from Mrs. Ashcraft, not because he believed she held any interest in or title to the land, but to prevent hard feelings between relatives and get the business settled satisfactorily to all parties. A brother of Mrs. Ashcraft, R. B. Rogers, claimed to own the tract at the same time; but on what his claim was based we do not know, except as indicated by his statement that Mrs. Ashcraft had been dispossessed of the land by Chapman, and he (Rogers) claimed title for Chapman. The evidence is very confused and incomplete along this part of the case and fails to show clearly the facts. Mrs. Ashcraft refused to deliver to plaintiff the quitclaim deed she had signed and acknowledged, plaintiff says, because Rogers told her the land was worth more than the $25 plaintiff testified he was to pay, though the deed recites $15. The upshot of the negotiation was the deed remained undelivered, and Mrs. Ashcraft still retained whatever title she owned. Plaintiff afterwards made the improvements for which he recovered the judgment appealed from, treating the land as his own, and believing, he says, his title was perfect, which belief he cherished until 1907, when he attempted to borrow some money on it and could not procure the loan because the deed from Chapman to Mrs. Ashcraft appeared to vest the title in her. Hence his disastrous suit to quiet the title. Plaintiff admitted he knew of the conveyance to Mrs. Ashcraft when he bought, but was told by Chapman, who is a lawyer, she never had paid for the land and was not entitled to the deed, and by her that she had not paid for it. By reason of these circumstances, a declaration made by defendant, and to be stated infra, and also because he supposed the sheriff's deed of April 3, 1901, based on the judgment for delinquent taxes against her and Chapman had passed the entire interest to Chapman, plaintiff considered his title good. He offered to turn the place over to defendant, who had received some pension money, if she would reimburse him what he had been out, whereupon, to quote him, she said: "She did not want it (i. e., the land) would not work it if she had it, did not work it when she did have it, and would not work it now." This occurred before plaintiff put on the improvements, and he testified he made them afterwards, believing his title was good, and that for six years he put all his labor and earnings into the betterments.

The court refused to instruct for a verdict for defendant, and submitted the...