Richmond v. Bass

Decision Date06 October 1947
Docket Number36514.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
PartiesRICHMOND v. BASS et al.

Green & Green and A. M. Nelson, all of Jackson, for appellant.

Stennett & Stennett, of Jackson, for appellee.

McGEHEE, Justice.

This suit is brought by the appellant, I. G. Richmond, to quiet and confirm his title to a certain lot or parcel of land in the City of Jackson, which is described by metes and bounds in the bill of complaint herein. The lot was conveyed to the appellant by Kitty Lowe Smith the lots on Mitchell purported beneficiary of said lot in the last will and testament of Lizzie Edwards, deceased, according to the agreed statement of facts contained in the record. It is admitted therein that the testatrix owned the lot of land in fee simple when making the will and at the time of her death.

The question presented for decision is whether or not the language of this holographic will is sufficient to clearly bequeath this particular lot of land to the said Kitty Lowe Smith.

The pertinent paragraph of the will pertaining to the disposition of the real estate it as follows:

'My home at 936 Harding St. Jackson Miss I give to Emmie Lowe Wiley, and all interest I have in the house and lot where Hazel Lowe Smith is living I give to her. If I still own the lot adjoining her lot I give to Kitty Lowe Smith the lots on Mitchell St. one I give to Fayette Lowe and one to Bernie Lowe the lots I have in Oak Grove Subdivision I give to A. B. Lowe, * * *.' (Carets ours).

The agreed statement of facts further discloses that when the will was executed the testatrix lived at her home, 936 Harding Street, which she bequeathed to Emmie Lowe Wiley; and that she owned in fee simple the house and lot mentioned in the will where Hazel Lowe Smith was living when the will was executed and at the death of the testatrix; that the testatrix still owned at the time of her death also the lot (the one here in controversy) adjoining the house and lot where Hazel Lowe Smith lived; that she owned two lots on Mitchell Street at the time of the execution of the will, but had disposed of them prior to her death; and that she owned some lots in the Oak Grove Subdivision at the time of making the will, but the agreed statement of facts fails to disclose whether or not she owned these last mentioned lots at the time of her death.

It is further agreed that at the time of the execution of the will the testatrix was living separate and apart from her estranged husband, W. C. Edwards, to whom she bequeathed only her wedding ring. He was her sole heir at law, and died without having renounced the will. And it is contended by the appellees, who are the heirs at law of W. C. Edwards, that his wife, Lizzie Edwards, died intestate as to the lot adjoining the one where Hazel Lowe Smith lived. The trial court adopted this view and dismissed the appellant's bill of complaint.

We think it clear that the testatrix intended to bequeath her home at 936 Harding Street to Emmie Lowe Wiley; that she intended to bequeath the house and lot where Hazel Lowe Smith was then living to the said Hazel Lowe Smith that she intended to bequeath to Kittie Lowe Smith the lot here in controversy which joined the house and lot of the said Hazel Lowe Smith; that she intended to bequeath the two lots on Mitchell Street, one to Fayette Lowe and one to Bernie Lowe, but which she later disposed of; and that she intended to bequeath the lots in Oak Grove Subdivision to A B. Lowe. In other words, we think that manifestly the testatrix intended the disposition of her real estate to be the same as if she had said: 'My home at 936 Harding St Jackson, Miss., I give to Emmie Lowe Wiley, and all interest I have in the house and lot where Hazel Lowe Smith is living I give to her (Hazel Lowe Smith). If I still own the lot adjoining her lot (Hazel Lowe Smith) I give (it) to Kitty Lowe Smith. The lots on Mitchell St. one I give to Fayette Lowe and one to Bernie Lowe. The lots I have in Oak Grove Subdivision I give to A. B. Lowe, * * *.'

This construction would give to each of the beneficiaries named a share of the real estate mentioned.

Such a construction would give effect to each of the provisions of the will as to the intended disposition of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Tinnin v. First United Bank of Mississippi
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
    • February 11, 1987
    ...intestacy where that may reasonably be done, Cooper v. Simmons, 237 Miss. 630, 636, 116 So.2d 215, 218 (1959); Richmond v. Bass, 202 Miss. 386, 392, 32 So.2d 136, 137 (1947), which brings us to the first issue tendered by the Tinnins. That issue regards the extent and content of the judicia......
  • Hemphill v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 42348
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
    • October 8, 1962
    ...in the light of the converse rule, that a court will not make or rewrite a will under the guise of construction. Richmond v. Bass, 202 Miss. 386, 32 So.2d 136 (1947); 95 C.J.S. Wills Sec. 609. The criterion designated by Mr. Justice Holmes as 'the externality of the law' simply reflects tha......
  • LAST WILL & TESTAMENT OF LAWSON v. Lambert
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
    • August 23, 2001
    ...reasonably be done. Tinnin, 502 So.2d at 663; Cooper v. Simmons, 237 Miss. 630, 636, 116 So.2d 215, 218 (1959); Richmond v. Bass, 202 Miss. 386, 392, 32 So.2d 136, 137 (1947). ¶ 23. In the cases cited by Lange, the courts were not faced with the presumption of intestacy. Indeed, in Lauter, ......
  • Davis v. Gulf Refining Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
    • October 13, 1947
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT