Rickels v. State
| Decision Date | 27 September 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. PD-0631-05.,PD-0631-05. |
| Citation | 202 S.W.3d 759 |
| Parties | TERRY N. RICKELS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
OPINION
In December 1992, a jury convicted appellant of indecency with a child by touching and indecency with a child by exposure. On January 21, 1993, appellant was placed on ten years probation. On February 24, 2000, the trial court amended appellant's probation conditions by adding several new ones. One of these amended probation conditions prohibited appellant from going "within three hundred (300) feet of any premises where children 17 years or younger congregate or gather." The trial court revoked appellant's probation based on its finding that appellant violated this probation condition by "intentionally and knowingly" going "within 300 feet of a premise where children 17 years or younger congregate or gather, to wit: [a specifically named elementary school]." The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred to decide that the trial court did not abuse its discretion to find by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant violated this probation condition.
After the trial court added the new probation condition prohibiting appellant from going within 300 feet of a premises where children 17 years or younger congregate or gather, appellant leased a home that was near an elementary school in the summer of 2000. We understand the record to reflect that part of appellant's property-his front yard and the front door of his home—was within 300 feet of the school's property line. Evidence was presented that the school was not visible from anywhere on appellant's property. The evidence, however, also showed that a large school-zone sign with a flashing yellow light was clearly visible from appellant's front yard and his front door.1 We understand the parties' exhibits to show that appellant's entire property was within 300 feet of this school-zone sign. (Emphasis added). No direct evidence was presented that anyone ever saw appellant in his front yard or going through his front door.
A Dallas County Probation Department field officer (Rickets), with an average of 135 sex-offenders to monitor, testified that he made several field visits to appellant's home and that he did not see the school or the school-zone sign until a little over a month after appellant had moved into the home.2 Rickets testified that appellant was always inside his home during the field visits. Rickets testified that the route he took to appellant's home did not take him by the school.
In closing arguments to the trial court, the defense argued that there was no evidence that appellant "intentionally and knowingly" moved within 300 feet of the school since there was no evidence that appellant "even knew the school was there."
There is no mention by [Rickets] that he saw the school before he was informed of the school. This is a man who is trained to look for these things. This is a man who has worked that area for quite some time. His sole purpose is to look for these things.
He went there several times, as a matter of fact, the middle of the day supposedly, when school would have been in session.
There is no testimony at all whatsoever that [appellant] even knew the school was there. So there is no evidence that he intentionally and knowingly moved within the 300 feet which is a requirement to find him guilty if we figure out how to measure the 300 feet.
There is evidence, though, that you could not see the school because of a hill. Everybody describes a big hill. Everybody describes a distance. Everybody describes the trees and the shrubs, and they are talking about this in broad daylight.
The State argued that the evidence showed that "there is no question that [appellant] knew he was moving near a school."
In rebuttal to the argument of the Defense attorney, there is no question that [appellant] knew he was moving near a school. He moved in on or about that date that is alleged in the petition. He was there for at least a month. He never advised the probation officer, the field officer, that
Whether the school is in or out of session, either way it concerns me because he is moving in. Say, it's during the summer months. How perfect. What a better time than to move close to an elementary school, get all settled in, have a field officer come by and not see any kids come around. Board up my windows so nobody can see in or what I'm doing. Put a padlock on the front door.
All of those things are extremely telling of his intent. His intent can be inferred by the fact that he moved right down the street from an elementary school, Your Honor.
In the original case he is alleged to have molested a three-year-old, and there were some other children involved in that jury trial.
Why a jury out of this county put him on probation, I don't know, but he was put on probation. And he was specifically told a number of times by his probation officer out of Dallas County that what his-what this 300-foot zone meant and that he had to stay away from all children. He couldn't even go to garage sales or to flea markets much less live down the street from a school.
So he knew full well what his zone was and he violated that when he moved in. And the fact that [Rickets] didn't catch it right away is just a problem with too many cases. I think [Rickets] said he had over 200 cases on his docket, maybe closer to 400 that he had to watch.
The Court of Appeals initially decided on direct appeal that the 300-foot probation condition was too vague to be enforced because it did not specify how the child safety zone was to be measured from appellant's property to the school. See Rickels v. State, 69 S.W.3d 775, 778 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. granted). This Court reversed this decision on discretionary review and decided that "[t]he only measurement that is at issue is from [appellant's] body to premises where children congregate" and that "[w]hat matters is whether [appellant] himself went within 300 feet of [the school]." See Rickels v. State, 108 S.W.3d 900, 902-03 (Tex.Cr.App. 2003). This Court also decided that "the property line of the school is . . . the proper boundary from which to measure" and that "[t]here is nothing vague about a measurement from [appellant's] body to the boundary line of the school." See id. We remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to consider appellant's remaining points of error. See id.
On remand, the Court of Appeals decided that the trial court did not abuse its discretion to revoke appellant's probation because "the facts adduced at the [probation revocation] hearing lend support to the trial court's finding that [appellant] went within 300 feet of the elementary school." See Rickels v. State, No. 13-01-00042-CR slip op. at 5 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi, delivered March 10, 2005) (not designated for publication). The Court of Appeals stated:
The trial court found that [appellant] "intentionally and knowingly [went] within three hundred (300) feet of a premise where children 17 years or younger congregate or gather, to wit: Sidney Lanier Elementary School." The evidence at the revocation hearing demonstrated that [appellant] moved into a home around the corner from an elementary school. A special speed-limit sign noting the presence of a school zone and equipped with a flashing yellow light was visible from the front door of [appellant's] home. The distance from [appellant's] front door to the child safety zone (i.e., the property line of the school) (footnote omitted) was within the 300 feet limitation imposed by the conditions of his probation. Although...
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