Ricketts v. Vill. of Miami Shores, 3D16–2212
Decision Date | 01 November 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 3D16–2212,3D16–2212 |
Citation | 232 So.3d 1095 |
Parties | Hermine RICKETTS and Laurence Carroll, Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF MIAMI SHORES, Florida, et al., Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Institute for Justice and Ari Bargil and Allison Daniel and Michael Bindas (Bellevue, WA), for appellants.
Genovese Joblove & Battista and Richard Sarafan and Nina Greene, for appellees.
Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and SALTER and LUCK, JJ.
As the initial brief in this appeal frames the issue:
Though these claims seem compelling, the trial court's well-reasoned, ten-page final order rejecting the appellants' claims correctly acknowledged the difficult procedural posture confronting the appellants and dutifully applied controlling precedent. We affirm that final order in all respects.2
The appellants' circuit court lawsuit attacking the constitutionality of the applicable zoning ordinance followed an earlier, unsuccessful administrative proceeding in which the appellants contested a notice of violation pertaining to their front-yard vegetable garden. That notice (which followed a written courtesy notice issued four weeks earlier requesting removal of the vegetable garden from the front yard) was issued by a code inspector with the Village's code enforcement department.
The appellants ultimately appeared at two hearings before the code enforcement board, presenting testimony and evidence regarding their objections. The objections did not include constitutional challenges. The Village code enforcement board issued a written notice of disposition sustaining the violation, authorizing a fine of $50.00 per day for non-compliance, allowing another month within which the appellants could comply, and notifying them of their rights to appeal the ruling to the circuit court.
The appellants then appealed to the appellate division of the circuit court. Subsequently, the appellants removed the vegetable garden and voluntarily dismissed their appeal. The Village did not impose any fines regarding the violation.
Less than a month after the circuit court's dismissal of that case, however, the appellants (then represented by their current counsel rather than pro se) filed a new circuit court lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of the design standard in section 536(e) of the Village's zoning code, "Vegetable gardens are permitted in rear yards only."3
The significance of the earlier proceeding is that, for purposes of judicial review by this Court in the present case, that first proceeding conclusively determined that a violation occurred based on the evidentiary record presented to the Village's code enforcement board. Any attempt to present an "as-applied" constitutional challenge to the statute, as opposed to a "facial" constitutional challenge, is barred as a matter of res judicata and waiver.
Kirby v. City of Archer, 790 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) ; Charles v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 199 So.3d 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) ( ); Holiday Isle Resort &Marina Ass'n v. Monroe County, 582 So.2d 721 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) ( ).4
A facial challenge to legislation, as in the case of the ordinance and this second proceeding, "is more difficult than an ‘as applied’ challenge because the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid." Cashatt v. State, 873 So.2d 430, 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ; Ogborn v. Zingale, 988 So.2d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).
Recognizing that more difficult hurdle facing the appellants in this second proceeding—attacking the statute on the grounds that it cannot be validly enforced under any set of circumstances—we turn next to the level of constitutional scrutiny. The appellants claim that the ordinance must survive the more stringent test, "strict scrutiny," rather than the less stringent "rational basis" level of scrutiny.
The trial court correctly determined that the ordinance did not infringe upon the appellants' fundamental rights and that strict scrutiny is not required. The appellants first posit a fundamental right to use their front yard to grow food for their own consumption, based on article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution's Declaration of Rights (the right "to acquire, possess and protect property"), based on such cases as Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So.2d 64, 67 (Fla. 1990) ( ).
The Florida Supreme Court said more in Zrillic, however—"even constitutionally protected property rights are not absolute, and ‘are held subject to the fair exercise of the power inherent in the State to promote the general welfare of the people through regulations that are necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, [and] general welfare.’ " Id. at 68 (quoting Golden v. McCarty, 337 So.2d 388, 390 (Fla. 1976) ). And the ordinance challenged below and here only prohibits vegetable gardens in a front yard, not anywhere or everywhere on a residential lot.5
The appellants' second claim that the ordinance violates a fundamental right and should thus be subjected to strict scrutiny also fails. Article I, section 23, of the Florida Constitution provides a right of privacy ("to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life"), and it was relied upon by the Florida Supreme Court in one case involving a "choice concerning food," as the appellants suggest. In that case, In re Browning, 568 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1990), the issue presented was the withdrawal of nutrition from an 86–year-old, incompetent, incurably ill person in accordance with a previously-signed living will.
The patient's right of self-determination under consideration in In re Browning is not akin to the "choices concerning food" sought to be invoked as a fundamental right by the appellants in this case. It takes a leap of the imagination to suggest that the right of privacy applies to all choices concerning food. Zoning and design ordinances prohibiting chicken coops or turkeys in the front yard may relate to sustenance and food choices, but no Florida case suggests that such a prohibition runs afoul of the right of privacy.
Having correctly determined that strict scrutiny was not warranted, the trial court considered the constitutionality of the ordinance under the rational basis level of scrutiny. The trial court correctly applied this Court's decisions in Membreno & Florida Ass'n of Vendors, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 188 So.3d 13 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), and Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, 62 So.3d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).
In Membreno, we detailed the heavy burden borne by a party challenging the constitutionality of a legislative enactment under the rational basis test:
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