Ricklefs v. Ricklefs
| Decision Date | 20 March 2001 |
| Citation | 39 S.W.3d 865 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. W.D. 2001) Robert L. Ricklefs, Appellant v. Mary J. Ricklefs, Respondents WD58109 0 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Jackson County, Hon. W. Stephen Nixon, Judge
Counsel for Appellant: Robert L. Ricklefs, pro se
Counsel for Respondent: Anita I. Rodarte
Opinion Summary: Robert L. Ricklefs appeals the judgment dissolving his marriage to Mary J. Ricklefs, awarding prospective and retroactive child support, awarding support for post-secondary educational expenses, and dividing the parties' marital and non-marital property.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
Division Four holds: 1) Under Point I, the husband claims specifically that, although the court indicated on its Form 14 Worksheet that the Line 11 Overnight Visitation Adjustment (OVA) multiplier was 10%, the court's PCSA calculation reflects that it actually applied a multiplier of 6%. This Court finds that the trial court rejected the Form 14s of the parties and calculated its own, finding the PCSA for three children to be $977 per month, which amount it did not rebut as being unjust or inappropriate, and which amount it accordingly awarded as prospective child support. As to the husband's claim, the record as to what the trial court actually found respecting the OVA in calculating its Form 14 PCSA is ambiguous and confusing at best. Given the confusion over the OVA, the record does not clearly indicate how the trial court arrived at its Form 14 PCSA amount. Thus, this Court is deprived of meaningful appellate review of the trial court's award of child support, and this Court must reverse the award and remand for the court to make the requisite Form 14 calculations and findings and enter its award in accordance therewith.
2) As to Point II, having already determined in Point I that the trial court did not rebut its Form 14 PCSA, there is no merit to the claims of error with respect to the court's purported rebuttal of its PCSA. As such, in this point this Court need only address the issue of whether the evidence supported the inclusion by the trial court of $25, as the wife's work-related child care costs, in its Form 14 calculation of the PCSA. This said, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the expense was to be reoccurring and, as such, the inclusion of the $25 of work related child care costs in the trial court's Form 14 was not supported by the evidence and was error.
3) As to Point III, the husband claims specifically that that the trial court's imputation to him of $5,000 in gross monthly income for purposes of Form 14 was error. There is some question from the record whether, in fact, the trial court "imputed" income to the husband in its Form 14 calculation of the PCSA. The trial court found that the husband had "under reported his income." Logically, "under reporting income" is not the same as being "unemployed" or "underemployed." Even assuming that this was a case of imputation based on the trial court's belief that the husband was unemployed or underemployed, as he contends, he cites no authority and this Court cannot find any to support his contention that the trial court was required to make an express finding for the record that he was unemployed or underemployed as a precursor to "imputing" income to him of $5,000. In addition, the record reflects that the husband did not make a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Rule 73.01(c). As such, whether the trial court here made an express finding for the record that he was unemployed or underemployed would not have any bearing on whether it erred in applying the law in "imputing" income in its Form 14 calculation of the PCSA. A trial court, in determining the amount of income to impute to a party in its Form 14 PCSA calculation, is not required in every instance to average the party's prior three years of income. In determining probable earnings, the trial court may rely on any time period as may be appropriate under the circumstances. 4) As to Point IV, absent special circumstances, the determination of an award of retroactive child support, pursuant to section 452.340, is contingent on the amount of the trial court's child support award for prospective child support. The trial court's award of retroactive support may have to be recalculated and amended on remand if the court's award of prospective support is ultimately amended. Hence, any review of the trial court's present award of retroactive support would be premature.
5) As to Point V, the court, in its discretion, may include post-secondary educational expenses in its calculation of the PCSA under Line 6e of its Form 14. A trial court is permitted to enter a separate order of support for post-secondary educational expenses in lieu of including them in the trial court's Form 14 calculation or rebutting the Form 14 PCSA. The trial court considered the husband's ability to pay in ordering him to pay 60% of the children's college expenses.
6) As to Point VI, the trial court erred in failing to include in its judgment a full legal description of the Raytown property awarded to the husband. On remand, the court is to include the same in its decree.
Robert L. Ricklefs appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County dissolving his marriage to the respondent, Mary J. Ricklefs, awarding prospective and retroactive child support; awarding support for post-secondary educational expenses; and dividing the parties' marital and non-marital property.
The appellant raises six points on appeal. In Points I-III, he claims that the trial court erred in awarding prospective child support for three children of $977 per month,1 beginning in January 2000, because in making its award it incorrectly calculated the requisite presumed child support amount (PCSA) pursuant to Missouri Civil Procedure Form No. 14 (Form 14).2 In Point IV, he claims that the trial court erred in awarding $7,190 in retroactive child support because the award was not supported by substantial evidence and the required record was not made by the court as to its calculation of the arrearage. In Point V, he claims that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay 60% of each child's post-secondary educational expenses because in doing so, the court failed to consider, as required, his ability to pay such an award and the actual educational expenses of the children. In Point VI, he claims that the trial court erred in entering its judgment because, pursuant to section 452.330.6,3 a full legal description of any real property awarded in a dissolution proceeding must be included in the judgment in that the court awarded the appellant the real property located at 6008 Laurel, Raytown, Missouri, but did not include in its judgment entry the legal description thereof.
We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.
On February 14, 1976, the parties were married in St. Joseph, Buchanan County, Missouri. There were four children born of the marriage: Joseph R. Ricklefs, born June 1, 1979, who was emancipated at the time of trial; Justin S. Ricklefs, born April 23, 1983; John V. Ricklefs, born July 13, 1987; and Jenessa M. Ricklefs, born June 20, 1989.
During the course of the marriage, except for a brief six-month period of time, the respondent worked full time in health care. She provided the primary financial support for the family from 1978 through 1990. The appellant was employed at the time of marriage at a chemical company, but quit sometime in 1978 or 1979 to pursue a career as a professional musician. He subsequently attended college and received a bachelor's degree. He then attended law school, received his degree, was licensed, and began practicing in 1987. At the time of trial, the appellant worked as a sole practitioner, sharing office space with several other lawyers. His practice consisted of mainly personal injury, workers' compensation, and bankruptcy cases.
In June of 1997, the parties separated. On July 7, 1997, the appellant filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri. The respondent filed her answer and counter-petition on July 24, 1997. Both parties requested, inter alia, that the court dissolve the marriage, award custody of the children, and divide the parties' property and debts. The respondent waived any claim to maintenance.
After the separation, the children remained in the custody of the respondent. The appellant exercised some visitation with them during the pendency of the dissolution. From July of 1997 through October of 1998, the appellant paid child support to the respondent in the amount of $840 per month. Thereafter, he reduced it to $620 a month from November of 1998 through the time of trial, April of 1999. It is unclear from the record whether he continued these payments for the period after trial until the judgment of dissolution was entered.
The case was heard on March 2, 1999, and April 22, 1999, after which the trial court took it under advisement. On December 29, 1999, the court entered its judgment dissolving the marriage. In its judgment, the court also awarded the parties joint physical and legal custody of the minor children, with child support to the respondent of $977 per month, commencing January 1, 2000. The trial court also ordered the appellant to pay retroactive child support in the amount of $7,190, after giving credit for the child support paid by the appellant during the pendency of the dissolution. The trial court further ordered the appellant to pay 60% of the minor children's post-secondary educational expenses and divided the parties' property and debts.
The respondent filed a motion to amend judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial. On February 2, 2000, the court entered its amended judgment. The amendment concerned a clarification of the trial court...
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