Rickman v. Com.
Citation | 33 Va. App. 550,535 S.E.2d 187 |
Decision Date | 10 October 2000 |
Docket Number | Record No. 2265-99-3. |
Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Parties | James Edward RICKMAN, v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. |
Thomas P. Lloyd, Roanoke, for appellant.
Shelly R. James, Assistant Attorney General, (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: COLEMAN, WILLIS and ELDER, JJ.
James Edward Rickman (appellant) appeals from his bench trial conviction for assault and battery against a family or household member in violation of Code § 18.2-57.2, his third such conviction within ten years, making it punishable as a Class 6 felony. On appeal, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish the woman he was convicted of assaulting and battering was a "family or household member" within the meaning of the statute. We hold the evidence was sufficient to bring appellant's victim within the statutory definition, and we affirm his conviction.
On March 13, 1999, appellant "hit" and "smacked" Yvonne Brickey, "jerked [her] shirt," and pushed her to the ground.
According to Brickey, appellant was residing with her on the date of the offense, and they had resided together for "a couple months." Appellant repeatedly told one of the officers who responded to the scene that he and Brickey "had lived together for about three months." Appellant worked out of town on an intermittent basis and stayed with Brickey "off and on, when [he] would come into town." Although Brickey testified that appellant sometimes stayed with her and sometimes stayed with his ex-wife, appellant testified that he and his wife were not "living together" during March 1999 and that some of his furniture was in storage. Brickey said she and appellant started living together in this "off and on" fashion "a long time ago."
Other evidence established that when appellant was in Brickey's home, she and appellant were "boyfriend and girlfriend," slept in the same bed and had sexual relations. Although Brickey would not take money appellant offered her for living expenses, appellant bought food and "tried to just help out." While appellant was at Brickey's, he stored clothes and other items of personal property there. Brickey's mother, who lived next door to Brickey, washed appellant's clothes for him, and appellant used the telephone at Brickey's mother's home because Brickey did not have a phone.
Appellant admitted to staying with Brickey "off and on" but said he did not reside there. He considered the trailer he and his wife owned as his residence during that time but admitted he was not actually living there. He said that most of the time he was in town, he stayed with his cousin Wanda, but he admitted that both his wife and Brickey also would come to Wanda's to stay. He denied having a contemporaneous sexual relationship with Brickey but admitted the March 13 altercation arose because Brickey became jealous when her daughter told her appellant had been out with a younger woman. Appellant said Brickey's daughter, a minor, became angry with him when he asked her and her friends not to consume alcohol or use illegal drugs in the house.
Appellant moved to strike at the close of the Commonwealth's evidence and again at the close of all the evidence. In denying the motions, the trial court made the following observations:
The court found, in addition, the evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant assaulted and battered Brickey, a household member, and that he had two previous convictions for the same offense. It convicted him of a Class 6 felony pursuant to Code § 18.2-57.2(B).
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va.App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987)
. The fact finder is not required to believe all aspects of a witness' testimony; it may accept some parts as believable and reject other parts as implausible. See Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 82, 92, 428 S.E.2d 16, 24 (1993).
The version of Code § 18.2-57.2 applicable to these proceedings provided as follows:
Code § 18.2-57.2 (1995 Repl.Vol. (version effective July 1, 1997)) (emphasis added). What constitutes cohabiting under Code § 18.2-57.2 is a question of first impression in Virginia. "[W]e construe a statute to promote the end for which it was enacted, if such an interpretation can reasonably be made from the language used." Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 840, 847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 533 (1994). "The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always preferred to any curious, narrow or strained construction." Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 836, 839, 419 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992). "Although penal laws are to be construed strictly [against the Commonwealth], they `ought not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intent of the legislature.'" Willis v. Commonwealth, 10 Va.App. 430, 441, 393 S.E.2d 405, 411 (1990) (citation omitted).
Our prior consideration of the meaning of the term "cohabitation" has been limited mainly to the civil arena in the context of divorce and spousal support. Interpreting a property settlement agreement in Schweider v. Schweider, 243 Va. 245, 415 S.E.2d 135 (1992), the Virginia Supreme Court noted that, " Id. at 248, 415 S.E.2d at 137 (quoting Petachenko v. Petachenko, 232 Va. 296, 299, 350 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1986)).
We revisited this issue in Frey v. Frey, 14 Va.App. 270, 416 S.E.2d 40 (1992), noting that financial support is "a factor which tends to prove the assumption of duties or obligations attendant to marriage" but that "other factors exclusive of support may be sufficient to establish that a relationship is analogous to marriage." Id. at 275, 416 S.E.2d at 43. We acknowledged the holding of the Supreme Court in Schweider that phrases such as "cohabitation, analogous to marriage," have been "consistently interpreted... as encompassing both a permanency or continuity and an assumption of marital duties." Id.
Appellant contends these principles are applicable to his conviction for domestic assault and battery and preclude a finding that he cohabited with Brickey because the evidence failed to establish the necessary permanence or any other characteristics of a marital relationship or common law marriage. Although we find Schweider and Frey instructive, we disagree that they control our interpretation of Code § 18.2-57.2. While we look to these interpretations for guidance, we are not bound by them because "`cohabitation' takes on different meanings in different contexts." State v. Yaden, 118 Ohio App.3d 410, 692 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (1997); see also Elizabeth Trainor, Annotation, "Cohabitation" For Purposes of Domestic Violence Statutes, 71 A.L.R.5th 285, 294 (1999). Compare Colley v. Colley, 204 Va. 225, 228-29, 129 S.E.2d 630, 632-33 (1963)
(, with )Tarr v. Tarr, 184 Va. 443, 448, 35 S.E.2d 401, 403-04 (1945) ( ).
We also seek guidance from the interpretations other courts have given "cohabitation" in the domestic abuse context. These courts acknowledge the obvious conclusion of their legislatures that "assault involving a family or household member deserves further protection than assault on a stranger." See, e.g. State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 459, 683 N.E.2d 1126, 1129 (1997). In Virginia, the legislature also has concluded that assault on a family or household member is more serious than assault on a stranger. See Code §§ 18.2-57, 18.2-57.2.1
In surveying the varying definitions of cohabitation in this context, the Ohio Supreme Court noted the prevailing view that "domestic violence arises out of the nature of the relationship itself, rather than the exact living circumstances of the victim and perpetrator." Williams, 683 N.E.2d at 1129.
[T]he essential elements of "cohabitation" are (1) sharing of familial or financial responsibilities and (2) consortium. Possible factors establishing shared familial or financial responsibilities might include provisions for shelter, food, clothing, utilities, and/or commingled assets. Factors that might establish consortium...
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...with Mr. Morris, appellant relies heavily on this Court's construction of the term "cohabitant" set forth in Rickman v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 550, 555, 535 S.E.2d 187 (2000). In that case, this Court analyzed whether two individuals were cohabitating for purposes of a domestic violence ......
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...is a fact-based inquiry, requiring examination of all the circumstances before the court. Cf. Rickman v. Commonwealth, 33 Va.App. 550, 557-58, 535 S.E.2d 187, 191 (2000) (discussing the factors a court should consider to determine whether two people are cohabiting for purposes of Code § Hus......