Riddell v. California Portland Cement Company
Decision Date | 02 January 1962 |
Docket Number | No. 16438.,16438. |
Citation | 297 F.2d 345 |
Parties | R. A. RIDDELL, District Director of Internal Revenue, Los Angeles District, Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, Appellee. CALIFORNIA PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, Appellant, v. R. A. RIDDELL, District Director of Internal Revenue, Los Angeles District, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Howard A. Heffron, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Melva M. Graney, and James P. Turner, Attorneys, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Laughlin E. Waters, U. S. Atty., Edward R. McHale, and Eugene N. Sherman, Asst. U. S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for Riddell.
Musick, Peeler & Garrett, by Joseph D. Peeler and Stuart T. Peeler, Los Angeles, Cal., for Cal. Portland Cement Co.
Joseph T. Enright, Norman Elliott and Bill B. Betz, Los Angeles, Cal., for Monolith Portland Cement, amici curiae.
Before STEPHENS, BARNES and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges.
The District Director of Internal Revenue appeals from a judgment of the district court awarding taxpayer $1,073,612.46 in refund of income taxes previously paid for the taxable years 1951 and 1952. The taxpayer also appeals, as protective procedure, from the court's refusal to classify its product as chemical grade limestone, entitled to a fifteen per cent rate as a depletion allowance. We shall for convenience refer to the District Director of Internal Revenue as "appellant" or "government" and to California Portland Cement Company as "appellee" or "Company."
This is one of several "statutory percentage mining depletion allowance" appeals involving federal income tax payments, heard by this court within the past several years.1 All of them have involved to a greater or lesser degree, the issue finally passed upon by the Supreme Court in the Cannelton Sewer Pipe Company case (United States v. Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co., 1960, 364 U.S. 76, 80 S. Ct. 1581, 1582, 4 L.Ed.2d 1581), plus others peculiarly their own.
Jurisdiction was conferred below by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1340 and 1346. This court's jurisdiction on appeal rests upon § 1291 of Title 28 U.S.Code, as amended.
Appellee is a California corporation maintaining its principal place of business in Los Angeles, California. During the years in question it was engaged in mining rock from its Colton Quarry and Slover Mountain deposit at Colton, California. It processed such raw material to obtain finished cement, which it sold. There were also marketed small quantities of by-products.
The findings state that the appellee produced during the two years in question: (a) as its principal business, calcium carbonate rock for cement ( No. 4); (b) approximately 111,000 tons of crushed and screened calcium carbonate rock, sold for use as fluxstone for the production of steel ( No. 5); (c) approximately 119,000 tons of calcium carbonate rock, sold for use as glass sand, poultry grits, roofing grits, and clay pigeon filler ( No. 6); (d) approximately 20,600 tons of calcium carbonate rock which it used in its own plant to produce finished lime products (lump lime, ground quicklime, and hydrated lime; Finding No. 7); (e) approximately 1,240 tons of paving dust ( No. 8); (f) approximately 523,000 barrels of 376 pounds each of cement clinker, sold to Blue Diamond Corporation ( No. 9).
Items (b) to (f) above were found to be by-products, incident to the cement producing operation listed under (a) above. The aforesaid by-products supplied all the commercial market available to appellee, and each was found to be "the first commercially marketable mineral product derived by plaintiff from such portion of its calcium carbonate rock so used."
The trial court found that "mineral materials of shale, iron ore, quartzite, gypsum, Phillip's shale and various purchased nonmineral materials were added by plaintiff" to its calcium carbonate rock in the production of cement clinker and finished cement, and that this "was part of the application of the ordinary treatment processes normally applied by mine owners and operators in the cement industry." In so finding, and in making its conclusion of law based thereon, the trial court, of course, did not have the benefit of the later decision of the Supreme Court in Cannelton, supra.
After the Cannelton decision came down, we asked for additional briefs from each side, and permitted the filing of an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Monolith Portland Cement Company. We have had the benefit of copies of the government's opening and reply briefs (and the five hundred page Appendix) in Cannelton. We have also had the benefit of the following decisions rendered since Cannelton: Bookwalter v. Centropolis Crusher Co., 8 Cir., 1960, 281 F.2d 798, withdrawing its decision at 272 F. 2d 391; Great Bend Brick & Tile Co. v. United States, D.C.Kan.1961, 194 F.Supp. 309; Standard Realization Co. v. United States, 7 Cir., 1961, 289 F.2d 247; Commissioner v. Halquist, 7 Cir., 1961, 291 F.2d 49; United States v. Portland Cement Co. of Utah, 10 Cir., 1961, 293 F.2d 826.
The general issue presented by the appeals herein is the determination of a proper basis for computing mineral depletion allowances to be deducted from taxpayer's income because of the alleged exhaustion of capital assets arising from appellee's business. It becomes necessary to determine: (1) What is the product appellee is mining? (2) What percentage of depletion is applicable to that which is mined? (3) What is the proper "cut-off point" at which the percentage of depletion applies? (4) Whether either the cost of minerals added to any product during production, or the cost of sacking any product, can be added to the production costs incurred in producing the taxable product.
The first question as to what is being mined was answered by the court below as "calcium carbonate," (depleted at ten per cent) rather than "marble," (depletable at five per cent) within the meaning of § 114(b) (4) (A) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 114(b) (4) (A). The taxpayer urges that it is "chemical grade limestone" (with a fifteen per cent depletion rate).
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 provides in § 23 that certain deductions may be made from gross income. One of them is depletion. Subsection (m) of § 23 reads, in pertinent part:
* *"(26 U.S.C. § 23, 1952 ed.)
The same Code, § 114, "Basis for depreciation and depletion," under subsection (b), "Basis for depletion," and subparagraphs (4) (A) and (B), provides, in pertinent part:
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United States v. California Portland Cement Company
...occasions, this court considered questions arising out of that controversy, and our opinions are reported at Riddell v. California Portland Cement Co., 297 F.2d 345 (1962) and 330 F.2d 16 (1964). The several opinions of the district court are unofficially reported at 3 A.F.T.R.2d 438 (S.D.C......
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