Ridden v. Thrall

• Decision Date: 24 February 1891
• Citation: 26 N.E. 627,125 N.Y. 572
• Parties: RIDDEN v. THRALL et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

125 N.Y. 572

26 N.E. 627

RIDDEN

v.THRALL et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 24, 1891.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, second department.

Action by James N. Ridden against James H. Thrall, as administrator, etc., of Charles H. Edwards, deceased, and another, to determine the validity of an alleged gift causa mortis made to plaintiff by defendant's decedent. From a judgment affirming a judgment in plaintiff's favor, defendant appeals.

Carlisle Norwood, Jr., for appellants.

John H. Corwin and Wm. D. Veeder, for respondent.

EARL, J.

On the 1st day of October, 1888, Charles H. Edwards had money on deposit in savings banks, and kept the savings banks books in a tin box, and on that day he delivered the tin box to the plaintiff, informing him that he was about to go to St. Luke's hospital in the city of New York to have an operation performed for hernia, and that he was apprehensive he might die from the results of the operation, and said to him that if he did not return he gave him the box and its contents. He went to the hospital on the next day, and on the 5th day of October an operation was there performed for inguinal hernia. The operation was not dangerous, and was apparently successful. But on the 16th day of October he suddenly died from heart disease, with which he was afflicted when he went to the hospital. He had not returned from the hospital, and had not recovered from the disease for which the operation was performed, nor from the results of the operation. The defendants claim that the circumstances were such that a valid gift was not made, mainly because Edwards did not die from the disease on account of which he went to the hospital, and from which he apprehended death might ensue. The case is novel in some of its features, and interesting. I have carefully considered the able argument submitted on behalf of the appellants, and am satisfied that the judgments of the courts below upholding the gift are right.

The gift was sufficiently proved. The facts which took place at the time of the gift on the 1st day of October were testified to by the plaintiff's wife. There were 16 bank-books, and they represented about $40,000 of deposits. Such a gift should be proved by very plain and satisfactory evidence, and, if the case depended upon the evidence of the wife alone, any court might well hesitate to uphold the gift. But on the previous day (September 30th) Edwards wrote the following letter addressed to the plaintiff: ‘Friend Jim: Should I not survive from the effects of the operation about to be performed on me at St. Luke's Hospital, this is my last will and request, that you will take charge of my body, and have it placed in my family plot in Greenwood Cemetery; and also that you will take full charge of all my personal effects of every kind, and to have and hold the same unto yourself, your heirs and assigns, forever. You will find my papers and all my accounts in the box. C. H. EDWARDS.’ This was inclosed in an unsealed envelope, addressed to the plaintiff, and placed by Edwards in the bureau in the room occupied by him in plaintiff's house, where it was found about a week after his burial by plaintiff's wife and his aunt, both of whom proved the handwriting to be that of the donor. The genuineness of this letter was not disputed upon the trial. While, standing alone, it would not have been sufficient to establish the gift, it furnishes strong confirmation of the evidence of plaintiff's wife as to the gift, and leaves no reason to doubt that it was made as she testified. It was competent as corroborating evidence, just as the oral or written declarations of the donor previously made would have been, showing the intention to give, and thus corroborating the evidence as to the actual gift subsequently made. I have found no authority condemning such evidence. In all cases where probate of a will is contested on the ground of undue influence, fraud, incompetency, or forgery, the previous declarations or statements, in any form, of the testator, showing an intention in harmony with the instrument offered for probate, have always been held competent, not as sufficient, standing alone, but as corroborating the other evidence offered by the proponent.

The gift was consummated by the delivery of the books, and no other formality was needed to constitute the actual delivery of the bank deposits needful to vest the possession and title in the donee. In savings banks in this state such deposit books are issued as evidence of the indebtedness of the banks. Withdrawals of deposits are entered in the same books, so that the deposit book always, with the addition of any interest, shows the actual state of the accounts between the depositor and the bank, and the whole indebtedness of the bank. It answers the same purpose in the case of a savings bank that is answered by a certificate of deposit in the case of other banks. The decisions are not entirely harmonious as to the sufficiency of the mere delivery of such deposit books to constitute a valid gift, either inter vivos or causa mortis. But the general rule in England and in this country, and particularly in this state, is that any delivery of property which transfers to the donee either the legal or equitable title is sufficient to effectuate a gift; and hence it has been held that the mere delivery of non-negotiable notes, bonds, mortgages, or certificates of stock is sufficient to effectuate a gift. 2 Redf. Wills, 312; Westerlo v. De Witt, 36 N. Y. 340;Champney v. Blanchard, 39 N. Y. 111; Penfield v. Thayer, 2 E. D. Smith, 305; Walsh v. Sexton, 55 Barb. 251; Johnson v. Spies, 5 Hun, 468; Allerton v. Lang, 10 Bosw. 362; Camp's Appeal, 36 Conn. 88; Bates v. Kempton, 7 Gray, 382;Chase v. Redding, 13 Gray, 418;Pierce v. Bank, 129 Mass. 425; Tillinghast v. Wheaton, 8 R. I. 536; In re Mead, 15 Ch. Div. 651; Moore v. Moore, L. R. 18 Eq. 474.

But the learned counsel for the appellants calls our attention to one of the bylaws of the bank printed in the deposit book in question in this action, and claims that the delivery was not effectual without the written order of the donor. The by-law is as follows: ‘Drafts may be made personally or by the order, in writing, of the depositor, if the bank have the signature of the party on their signature book, or by letters of attorney duly authenticated; but no person shall have the right to demand any part of the principal or interest without producing the passbook, that such payments may be entered therein. If the person giving the order or power of attorney cannot write, he or sh...