Riddick v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 02 June 2020
• Docket Number: Record No. 1059-19-1
• Citation: 72 Va.App. 132,842 S.E.2d 419
• Parties: Shelton Legrand RIDDICK v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

72 Va.App. 132

842 S.E.2d 419

Shelton Legrand RIDDICK

v.COMMONWEALTH of Virginia

Record No. 1059-19-1

Court of Appeals of Virginia.

JUNE 2, 2020

Kathleen A. Ortiz, Public Defender, for appellant.

Lauren C. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Beales and Russell

OPINION BY JUDGE WESLEY G. RUSSELL, JR.

Shelton Legrand Riddick was convicted in the Chesapeake General District Court of multiple driving offenses. He appealed those convictions to the Chesapeake Circuit Court, seeking a trial de novo. The circuit court, in a subsequent bench trial, convicted Riddick of the following offenses: driving under the influence of alcohol, driving with a suspended operator's license third offense, reckless driving (twenty miles per hour over the posted speed limit), refusal to submit to a breath test, and having an open container of alcohol in his vehicle. Although he raised no such objection in the circuit court, Riddick argues on appeal to this Court that his convictions are void because the circuit court "lacked subject matter jurisdiction" when it tried him without a jury. Because we conclude that it possessed subject matter jurisdiction, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND¹

Having been convicted of multiple offenses in the general district court, Riddick noted an appeal to the circuit court, seeking a trial de novo on the charges. After Riddick's appeal had been docketed in the circuit court, the matter was set to be tried in the circuit court on February 15, 2019.

On January 31, 2019, the circuit court entered an order continuing the trial from February 15, 2019, to April 16, 2019, because Riddick's trial counsel was "not available" for a trial on February 15, 2019.² The order indicates that Riddick's attorney moved for the "matter [to] be heard by the [c]ourt[.]" The order further provides that the "[d]efendant fully understands and agrees that if these cases are set for trial without a jury and the [d]efendant does not request a jury at least 30 days prior to the trial date set above, then the defendant waives his/her right to trial by jury." Riddick's counsel endorsed the order, indicating "I ask for this[.]"

Subsequently, the Commonwealth requested a continuance of the April 16, 2019 trial date because of a scheduling problem with a witness. On February 11, 2019, the circuit court granted the motion and entered an agreed order continuing the trial to June 20, 2019. As with the prior order, the February 11, 2019 order indicates that the matter, when tried, "will be heard by the [c]ourt[.]" The order also again provides that the "[d]efendant fully understands and agrees that if these cases are set for trial without a jury and the [d]efendant does not request a jury at least 30 days prior to the trial date set above, then the defendant waives his/her right to trial by jury." Riddick's counsel endorsed the order, indicating that it was "seen and agreed[.]"

As scheduled, the circuit court held a bench trial on the charges on June 20, 2019. The circuit court found Riddick guilty of all charges and imposed sentence on July 16, 2019. At no point while the matter was pending in the circuit court did Riddick or his counsel object to the matter being tried without a jury or otherwise indicate that Riddick wanted a jury trial.

Riddick now appeals. Riddick asserts that the circuit "court erred by trying" him "when it lacked subject matter jurisdiction." He reasons that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try him because the record does not reflect that he "entered a knowing and intelligent waiver of trial by jury" as required by Article I, § 8 of the Virginia Constitution and Code § 19.2-258. Acknowledging that he did not raise this argument in the circuit court, Riddick argues that the matter is properly before us because a lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. In response, the Commonwealth argues that the circuit court possessed subject matter jurisdiction, any argument that Riddick may have had is procedurally defaulted, and, in any event, the record establishes that Riddick consented to a bench trial.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of review

Riddick's jurisdictional challenge raises a question of law that "we review de novo. " Richardson v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 436, 442, 796 S.E.2d 854 (2017). The basis for Riddick's jurisdictional challenge and whether it is properly before us turn on interpretations of the Virginia Constitution, Code § 19.2-258, and the Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court. As such, these underlying issues also represent questions of law subject to de novo review. Minor v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 728, 738, 791 S.E.2d 757 (2016).

II. Jury trial right

Article I, § 8 of the Virginia Constitution provides, in part, that a criminal defendant "enjoys the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty" and that

[i]n criminal cases ... [i]f the accused plead not guilty, he may, with his consent and the concurrence of the Commonwealth's Attorney and of the court entered of record, be tried by a smaller number of jurors, or waive a jury. In case of such waiver ..., the court shall try the case.^{[3 ]}

To ensure implementation of the constitutional guarantee, the Supreme Court has adopted Rule 3A:13(b), which provides that, before a circuit court can try an accused without a jury, it must "determine ... that the accused's consent was voluntarily and intelligently given, and his consent and the concurrence of the court and the Commonwealth's attorney shall be entered of record."

The accused's right to insist on a jury trial extends to cases involving misdemeanor convictions that are appealed to circuit court. Code § 16.1-136 provides that, in such cases, "the accused shall be entitled to trial by a jury in the same manner as if he had been indicted for the offense in the circuit court." See also Code § 19.2-258 (providing that "[i]f the accused plead not guilty ... the court, in its discretion, with the concurrence of the accused and the attorney for the Commonwealth, may hear and determine the case without the intervention of a jury" (emphasis added)).

Taken together, these provisions establish that a trial by jury was the "default" method for adjudicating the charges against Riddick in circuit court. Richardson, 67 Va. App. at 442, 796 S.E.2d 854. The circuit court could deviate from this default method and conduct a bench trial only if Riddick knowingly and intelligently "consented either to a waiver of his jury trial rights or to a bench trial," id. at 447, 796 S.E.2d 854, and such consent, along with the concurrence of the Commonwealth and the circuit court, was "entered of record," Cunningham v. Smith, 205 Va. 205, 207, 135 S.E.2d 770 (1964).

III. Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction has been described as "a word of many, too many, meanings." Smith v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 464, 467, 706 S.E.2d 889 (2011) (quoting Ghameshlouy v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 379, 388, 689 S.E.2d 698 (2010) ). "[I]t encompasses a variety of separate and distinct legal concepts[,]" and, as a result, "can engender much confusion[.]" Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 228, 661 S.E.2d 415 (2008). To resolve both any potential confusion and Riddick's appeal, we must address the difference "between two very different but semantically similar concepts: subject matter jurisdiction and, for lack of a better expression, active jurisdiction." Cilwa v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 259, 266, 836 S.E.2d 378 (2019).

A. Subject matter jurisdiction

Subject matter jurisdiction "refers to a court's power to adjudicate a class of cases or controversies[.]" Id. (quoting In re Commonwealth, 278 Va. 1, 11, 677 S.E.2d 236 (2009) ). It "is the authority granted through constitution or statute to adjudicate a class of cases or controversies[.]" Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 169, 387 S.E.2d 753 (1990). Subject matter jurisdiction "can only be acquired by virtue of the Constitution or of some statute. Neither the consent of the parties, nor waiver, nor acquiescence can confer" subject matter jurisdiction. Pure Presbyterian Church of Washington v. Grace of God Presbyterian Church, 296 Va. 42, 49, 817 S.E.2d 547 (2018), cert. dismissed, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 942, 203 L.Ed.2d 128 (2019) (quoting Humphreys v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 765, 772, 43 S.E.2d 890 (1947) ).

Absent subject matter jurisdiction, a "court cannot proceed at all in any cause." Id. at 50, 817 S.E.2d 547 (quoting Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1869) ). "Once a court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, ‘the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’ " Id. (quoting Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514 ). Any other order issued by a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction "is null and void[,]" id. (quoting Morrison, 239 Va. at 170, 387 S.E.2d 753 ), and thus, in essence, is "no order at all," Cilwa, 298 Va. at 266, 836 S.E.2d 378.

Because a court order entered in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction is void from the time of its entry, many of the normal rules regarding challenging orders, such as the contemporaneous objection rule, do not apply. An order entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction "may be ‘impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, anywhere, at any time, or in any manner.’ " Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 52, 541 S.E.2d 549 (2001) (quoting Barnes v. Am. Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 705, 130 S.E. 902 (1925) ). As a result, a challenge asserting a circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. Pure Presbyterian, 296 Va. at 50, 817 S.E.2d 547.

B. Active jurisdiction

Although subject matter jurisdiction is necessary for a court to adjudicate a cause, it is not sufficient because other jurisdictional...