Riddle v. Artis
| Decision Date | 21 March 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 161,161 |
| Citation | 243 N.C. 668,91 S.E.2d 894 |
| Parties | Eugene RIDDLE v. Percy James ARTIS, Harry Lee Morris, Jr., Mrs. Harry Lee Morris and Raymond McMillan. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Allsbrook & Benton, Roanoke Rapids, for plaintiff, appellant.
Kelly Jenkins, Roanoke Rapids, and Eric Norfleet, Jackson, for defendants Mrs. Harry Lee Morris and Harry Lee Morris, Jr.
Does it affirmatively appear upon the face of the complaint, as contended by the defendants Morris, that the negligence alleged against them by the plaintiff was superseded and completely insulated by the intervening negligence of the defendant Artis? We think not. This works a reversal of the judgment below.
It is elemental that there may be two or more proximate causes of an injury. These may originate from separate and distinct sources or agencies operating independently of each other; yet if they join and concur in producing the result complained of, the author of each cause may be held liable for the injuries inflicted, and an action may be maintained against any one of the wrongdoers or against all of them as joint tort-feasors. Tillman v. Bellamy, 242 N.C. 201, 87 S.E.2d 253.
The doctrine of intervening negligence is well established in our law. Its essential elements and governing principles are well defined and elaborately explained in former decisions of this Court. Further elaboration here is unnecessary. Balcum v. Johnson, 177 N.C. 213, 98 S.E. 532; Kiser v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 216 N.C. 698, 6 S.E.2d 713; Hall v. Coble Dairies, 234 N.C. 206, 67 S.E.2d 63, 29 A.L.R.2d 682. These decisions emphasize the principle that an intervening cause which will relieve the original wrongdoer of liability must be a new cause intervening between the original negligent act or omission and the injury ultimately suffered, which breaks the chain of causation set in motion by the original wrongdoer and becomes itself solely responsible for the injuries. It must be an independent force which turns aside the natural sequence of events set in motion by the original wrongdoer 'and produces a result which would not otherwise have followed, and which could not have been reasonably anticipated. ' Hall v. Coble Dairies, supra, 234 N.C. at page 211, 67 S.E.2d at page 67.
It is immaterial how many new events or forces have been introduced if the ouiginal cause remains operative and in force. In order for the conduct of the intervening agent to break the sequence of events and stay the operative force of the negligence of the original wrongdoer, the intervening conduct must be of such nature and kind that the oringnal wrongdoer had no reasonable ground to anticipate it. Balcum v. Johnson, supra.
'The test by which the negligent conduct of one is to be insulated as a matter of law by the independent negligent act of another, is reasonable unforeseeability on the part of the original actor of the subsequent intervening act and resultant injury. ' Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C. 82, 6 S.E.2d 808, 812. See also Beach v. Patton, 208 N.C. 134, 179 S.E. 446.
In 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, Sec. 67, pp. 722 and 723, the principle is stated this way: 'In order to be effective as a cause superseding prior negligence, the new, independent, intervening cause must be one not produced by the wrongful act or omission, but independent of it, and adequate to bring about the injurious result; a cause which interrupts the natural sequence of events, turns aside their course, prevents the natural and probable result of the original act or omission, and produces a different result, that reasonably might not have been anticipated.'
'If the intervening cause is in reality only a condition on or through which the negligence of the defendant operates to produce an injurious result, it does not break the line of causation so as to relieve the original wrongdoer from responsibility for the injury. 38 A.J. 723. A superseding cause cannot be predicated on acts which do not affect the final result of negligence otherwise than to divert the...
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