Riddle v. Dow

• Decision Date: 13 April 1896
• Citation: 66 N.W. 1066,98 Iowa 7
• Parties: RIDDLE v. DOW ET AL. (DICKEY, INTERVENER). THOMPSON NAT. BANK v. DOW ET AL. (DICKEY, INTERVENER).
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

98 Iowa 7

66 N.W. 1066

RIDDLE

v.DOW ET AL. (DICKEY, INTERVENER).

THOMPSON NAT. BANK

v.DOW ET AL. (DICKEY, INTERVENER).

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 13, 1896.

Appeal from district court, Crawford county; Charles D. Goldsmith, Judge.

Proceedings by garnishment to appropriate shares of crops grown on leased premises which were to be paid as rent in satisfaction of judgments against the landlord. A creditor of the landlord intervened, claiming the shares specified under a mortgage executed by his debtor. The two causes were tried together by the court. A judgment was rendered in each in favor of the intervener, and the plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.Nash & Phelps, W. R. Green, and Theo. F. Myers, for appellants.

J. P. Conner, for intervener, appellees.

ROBINSON, J.

The two cases are submitted together. The controlling facts are the same in both, and the district court was authorized to find the facts to be substantially as follows: In the year 1891 the plaintiffs recovered judgments against the defendant S. E. Dow, which are still unpaid. The defendant Dow rented to J. H. Griffin and J. R. Griffin by verbal agreements certain land for the year 1892, and was to receive from them as rent one-third of the crops which should be raised on the leased premises, to be delivered in Dow City, about three miles distant from the land. The tenants occupied the premises, and proceeded to raise crops thereon. On the 2d day of September, 1892, Dow made to the interveners W. C. Dickey & Co. a promissory note for the sum of $400, payable on the 1st day of the next November, and to secure its payment executed a chattel mortgage upon the property, described as follows: “My undivided one-third interest in all the crops of every kind and description grown during the season of 1892” on land which was fully described, and which was that leased to the Griffins as stated. At that time no division of the crops grown had been made. The small grain, consisting of wheat and oats, was in stack, and the corn was in the field, and all were in the possession of the tenants. After the mortgage was given, but on the same day, the tenants were garnished under executions issued on the judgments, and their answers were taken. The answers admitted that the garnishees were under obligations to deliver a share of the crops raised by them, but showed that no division had been made. Subsequently nearly 120 bushels of wheat, 320 of oats, and more than 2,000 bushels of corn were delivered by the tenants to the sheriff under the garnishments. A stipulation was then made under which the grain so delivered was sold, and the proceeds of the sale were paid into the court, to be appropriated by the judgments which should be rendered in the cases. The district court adjudged that the lien of the mortgage was paramount to the rights acquired by the garnishment proceedings, and awarded the proceeds of the grain to the interveners.

1. It may fairly be inferred from the record before us that the lease made by Dow gave to the tenants the sole possession of the leased premises during the terms of the lease, the exclusive right to possess and hold the crops which should be grown until they should be divided, and the right to make the division. The division of the crops actually made by the tenants and the delivery of a share thereof to the sheriff were voluntary on the part of the tenants in fulfillment of the requirements of their lease. No question as to notice of the rights of any party is involved in this case. The question we are required to determine is whether the mortgage given by the landlord to the interveners was effectual to create an interest in the crops grown upon the leased premises superior to the rights acquired by the judgment creditors of the landlord by virtue of the garnishments. It is earnestly contended that the landlord had no interest in the crops until they were divided and his share was delivered; that he could not mortgage a share of them until it was set apart to him; and that, as the tenants were garnished before that was done, the judgment creditors acquired rights which were paramount to those created by the mortgage. It is undoubtedly true that the authorities generally hold that, where a tenant on shares has exclusive possession of the leased premises, the legal title to the entire crop grown thereon and the right to possess it are vested in him until the share which is to be delivered as rent is separated from the remainder of the crop, and some authorities hold that such ownership is exclusive. It will be found, however, that in most cases of that character the landlord or person claiming through him was endeavoring to assert a right of possession as against the tenant before a division of the crops had been made, or that there had been a conveyance of the land before a maturity of the crops, and a claim made that the landlord's share did not pass by the conveyance. But the rules which control in such cases are not applicable to this case. To ascertain the fair scope and intent of a decision, and the force which should be given it, attention must be paid to the very questions which required determination. The case of Rees v. Baker, 4 G. Greene, 461, may properly be regarded as the leading one in this state for the doctrine that the exclusive ownership of growing crops, of which a share is to be delivered as rent, is in the tenant, but no question of that kind was involved in the case. The landlord had leased to the tenant land on shares. The tenant plowed and cultivated it, and sowed fall wheat upon it. The wheat was frozen out during the winter, and, in the spring following, the landlord, without the permission of the tenant, took possession of the land, and sowed it with spring wheat. The court held that the landlord was a trespasser, and that the tenant could recover the value of his labor in preparing the ground for a crop. What was said in regard to the ownership of a crop, had one been raised by the tenant, was not relevant to any issue in the case. The facts involved in Townsend v. Isenberger, 45 Iowa, 670,--the next case decided by this court,--which is alleged to support the doctrine in question, were substantially as follows: The owner of land leased it to a tenant, who was to deliver for its use one-third of the grain he should raise upon it. Before the crops were planted, a creditor of the landlord levied a writ of attachment upon the land. A judgment in the action was afterwards obtained, and before the crops matured the land was sold without redemption, and a sheriff's deed therefor executed. After the attachment was effected, but before the crops were planted, and before the judgment was rendered, the landlord assigned the lease, and the controversy in the case was in regard to the ownership of the share of the crop which was set apart by the tenant as rent. What was said in regard to the ownership of the tenant was designed to show that the rent had not accrued and was not payable until after the purchaser at the sheriff's sale had acquired title to the land; hence that the case was controlled by the rules that rent reserved by lease, and not accrued, passes by a conveyance of the land, and that a purchaser under execution sale is entitled to the rent accruing or falling due after the execution of the sheriff's deed. It is clear that those rules have no application in this case. The cases of Rees v. Baker and Townsend v. Isenberger were referred to in Atkins v. Womeldorf, 53 Iowa, 150, 4 N. W. 905, where it was said that, although it be true that the right of property in a crop grown on shares was, as between the landlord and tenant, in the latter until it was divided, yet that it was “the property of the tenant in the sense that the landlord may not enter upon the premises and take possession of the crops without consent of the tenant.” The case of Howard Co. v. Kyte, 69 Iowa, 307, 28 N. W. 609, merely decided that a writ of attachment against the property of a landlord cannot be levied on growing crops of which he is to have a share as rent, for the reason that the officer has no right to take possession of the crop, and the proper method of reaching the right of the landlord to the rent is by garnishment. It was said that: “The rent reserved being a share of the crop, is the same as when the rent is reserved in money, so far as the rights of the landlord or his creditors to take possession are involved, and the tenant is in no manner in default until he refuses to deliver the share of grain in compliance with his contract.” But it was not said that the interest of the landlord in the crops raised was no more than it would have been had the rent been payable in money. In no case which has been called to our attention has a share of the crop to be delivered as rent been treated in all respects as though it were money rent. That it should not be is clear on principle. When rent is to be paid in money, the obligation of the tenant is discharged by the payment of the specified amount of money from whatever source obtained; and if a share of the crop to be grown, or its equivalent, is to be paid as rent, the requirements of the lease will be satisfied by the delivery of the share itself or by delivering an equivalent, as crops of a kind and quality equal to the share designated. But when the rent is to be paid by the delivery of a share of the crop raised on the leased premises, and no option is given to deliver an equivalent, the obligation of the tenant can be satisfied only by a delivery of the specified share of the crops grown on the leased premises. Nor can he be compelled to pay anything but the stipulated share, unless he fails to deliver it according to the terms of his contract. Johnson v. Shank, 67 Iowa, 116, 24 N. W. 749.

In a proper case a specific performance by the tenant of his contract to deliver a share of the crops as rent would be compelled by a court of equity. Whether it would be...