Riddle v. Frankl
| Decision Date | 14 March 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. 41702.,41702. |
| Citation | 247 N.W. 493,215 Iowa 1083 |
| Parties | RIDDLE v. FRANKL ET UX. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Kossuth County; F. C. Davidson, Judge.
Action at law to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from the alleged negligent operation by the defendant of an automobile. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendants appeal.
Affirmed.D. M. Kelleher, of Fort Dodge, and Sullivan, McMahon & Linnan, of Algona, for appellants.
Quarton & Miller, of Algona, for appellee.
The major proposition relied upon for reversal is the alleged contributory negligence of the appellee. A brief recital of the record will make clear the claims of the respective parties. It would be difficult to imagine a case in which the evidence is in more direct conflict. Wayne Riddle, appellee, who was fifteen years of age, attended the Bryant High School in Algona. Immediately after school closed for the day on April 30, 1931, appellee, according to the testimony introduced in his behalf, was struck by an automobile driven by the wife of the owner, knocked to the pavement, and severely injured. North street, on which the accident occurred, extends east and west immediately south of the Bryant schoolhouse and grounds. There is a walk leading from the center of the building south to the sidewalk and to the parking on the north side of North street. There is a driveway leading into the school grounds fifty-three feet east of the sidewalk. The evidence shows without dispute that Wayne Riddle, pursued by a fellow student, ran from the school grounds to the north side of the street. According to the testimony introduced on his behalf, he went upon the street from the driveway and proceeded in a southerly and southwesterly direction to a point about six feet north of the south side of the street and a few feet east of the walk in front of the schoolhouse where he was struck. One witness testified that he had traveled about forty feet west and twenty-nine feet south from the driveway when he was struck by appellant's car. All of the witnesses for appellee testified that he was struck by the left fender of appellants' car, which was proceeding westward on the south side of the street. The testimony on behalf of appellants tended to show that appellee ran down the walk in front of the school building onto the street and against the right front fender of appellants' car.
[1] Mrs. Frankl testified that she saw Wayne coming from the north just as he struck the right fender of her automobile with his hands. There was ample testimony to sustain the contention of either party as to the facts. Testimony on behalf of appellants tended also to show that the car, when stopped, was north of the center of the pavement. The speed of the atuomobile, according to the testimony of appellee's witnesses, was from thirty to thirty-five miles per hour, and, according to the testimony of appellants, it did not exceed eight or ten miles per hour. Wayne testified that he stopped running before entering the street, that he looked both ways, and saw no automobile approaching.
According to the testimony of the driver of the automobile, about twelve feet of the north side of the street was occupied by cars parked at that place. Obviously, if the jury had accepted the testimony on behalf of appellants, a verdict must have been returned in their favor. On the other hand, if the testimony on behalf of appellee was believed, the jury must have found that the car was being operated at a rate of speed prohibited by law and on the wrong side of the street.
[2][3][4] It is insisted by appellants that contributory negligence on the part of Wayne Riddle is shown quite conclusively by the physical facts. It is true that some of the witnesses for appellee testified that they saw the car approaching about sixty feet from the east and that Wayne testified that he looked; that the street was unobstructed and that he did not see the automobile approaching. The automobile, according to appellee's testimony, was at least a block away. These are, of course, facts tending to show contributory negligence on the part of the injured boy, but they cannot be segregated from the rest of the testimony. If appellants' automobile was being driven on the right-hand side of the center of the pavement and Wayne reached a point forty feet west and twenty-nine feet south of the driveway, the accident could not have happened. This is true for the reason that he would necessarily have been in a place of perfect safety. He did not, upon his theory of the facts, attempt to enter the street immediately in front of appellants' automobile. Indeed, as stated, it is the claim of appellants that Wayne ran into the automobile and that he would not otherwise have been injured. If appellee's version of the facts is the correct one, then the fact that he looked and did not see the automobile, when he should have seen it, becomes only a link in the chain of evidence. The fact, if it be conceded that he entered the street in front of appellants' car, loses much of its significance if the jury could, under the evidence as a whole, have properly found that he was struck when six feet north of the south side thereof. He had passed a considerable distance to the south of the automobile if it were proceeding on the north side of the center of the pavement, as claimed by appellants. The left fender of appellants' car was at least...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
France v. Benter
...of confusion. What are the rights and duties of drivers attempting to enter a city street from a private driveway? In Riddle v. Frankl, 215 Iowa 1083, 247 N.W. 493, we considered a pedestrian's right to assume a vehicle would not be driven to extreme left-hand side of a city What happens to......
- Riddle v. Frankl