Rider v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 58564
| Decision Date | 25 June 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 58564,58564 |
| Parties | RIDER v. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Ben F. Smith, Thomas J. Browning, Marietta, for appellant.
Frederick E. Link, Williston C. White, J. Kirk Quillian, Atlanta, for appellees.
Appellant brought suit, as beneficiary of her deceased husband, to recover under a group occupational travel accident insurance policy provided by the appellee-Westinghouse to its employees and underwritten by the appellee-Insurance Company of North America (INA). Summary judgment was granted to Westinghouse and INA and in our original opinion in this case, appearing at 152 Ga.App. 805, 264 S.E.2d 276 (1979), we affirmed the grant of summary judgment to INA and reversed the grant of summary judgment to Westinghouse. In reversing the grant of summary judgment to Westinghouse, we relied upon this court's decision in Hercules, Inc. v. Adams, 150 Ga.App. 223, 257 S.E.2d 289 (1979), wherein it was held that a company handbook delivered to a new employee, which furnished incomplete information concerning the company's voluntary compensation plan contained in the master employment agreement, would bind the company if it did not contain adequate notice that the employee should consult the master agreement. It was then held that the issue of adequacy of the notice in the Hercules, Inc. handbook of the existence of a master agreement remained in the case as an issue of fact for the jury, precluding the grant of summary judgment. Subsequent to our original decision in the instant case, this court's decision in Hercules, Inc. was reversed by the Supreme Court which held that whether the handbook fairly put employees on notice of the existence of and the need to examine the master agreement was a matter of law to be determined by the court and not a question of fact for the jury. The Supreme Court determined that such notice in the Hercules, Inc. handbook was adequate as a matter of law. Adams v. Hercules, Inc., 245 Ga. 464, 265 S.E.2d 781 (1980).
On certiorari our original opinion in this case has been vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Adams v. Hercules, Inc., supra. Since we relied on this court's decision in Hercules, Inc. in our original opinion in the instant case, we must now reexamine the grant of summary judgment to Westinghouse and to INA to determine whether the Supreme Court's subsequent reversal of Hercules, Inc. requires a different disposition of this case. The facts are fully set forth in 152 Ga.App. 805, 264 S.E.2d 276 and will not be repeated here except as necessary to this reexamination.
1. With regard to the grant of summary judgment to INA, the insurer, we affirm. While the Supreme Court's order vacating and remanding this case does not specifically limit itself to that portion of our original decision dealing with the grant of summary judgment to the employer, Westinghouse, study of the Supreme Court's decision in Adams v. Hercules, Inc. convinces us that it has potential application to only that limited portion of our original decision-Division 2-and has no application whatsoever to the propriety of the grant of summary judgment to INA. Accordingly, we readopt Division 1 of our original decision at 152 Ga.App. 805, 264 S.E.2d 276 and hold that, for the reasons therein discussed, the grant of summary judgment to INA was proper.
2. We, therefore, turn to the issue of the grant of summary judgment to Westinghouse and the applicability of the Supreme Court's decision in Adams v. Hercules, Inc. to that question. As we interpret that decision, resolution of the instant issue involves a determination of whether, as a matter of law, the material furnished to appellant's deceased by his employer, Westinghouse, fairly put him on notice of the existence of the master policy of group insurance containing the exclusionary provision and that the master policy should be examined to determine the extent of coverage afforded to him thereunder. Adams v. Hercules, Inc., 245 Ga. at 465, 265 S.E.2d 781. To this end, we must examine the materials provided to appellant's husband by Westinghouse and determine whether the language employed therein "would put the ordinarily prudent person on notice that the complete details were absent from this presentation, and that at least one other source should be consulted for 'full details.' " Adams v. Hercules, Inc., supra.
For the years 1974 and 1975 appellant's husband received a computer printout statement from Westinghouse which purported to inform him and his family of the benefits which had accrued to him by virtue of his employment-the "full extent of what (he had) in the benefits 'bank' and what (he could) count on if the need arises." He was informed by the statements that he and his family had in his Westinghouse "bank" and could "count on" various benefits, including payment to his beneficiary of $25,000 in travel accident insurance in the event that his death should result from an accident while traveling on company business. This was the sum total of Westinghouse's specific representation to appellant's husband as to his eligibility for this benefit-that the $25,000 "would ALSO be paid" if he died as the result of an accident while traveling on company related business travel. There was no specific notice that the representation that such benefits "would ALSO be paid" was merely a "brief" statement of eligibility, the specifics of which were based upon Westinghouse's group policy with INA or that appellant's husband had a right to inspect that policy.
The statements, however, also contained the following general provision, located in a part of the text separate from the representations concerning the "benefit" here in issue: "In all cases, your eligibility...
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Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rider, 66354
...twice by this court. See Rider v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 152 Ga.App. 805, 264 S.E.2d 276 (1979) and Rider v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 155 Ga.App. 61, 270 S.E.2d 288 (1980). The facts of the case are fully set forth in our previous opinions and will not be repeated here. In Rider, 155 Ga......
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