Ridge v. Norfolk Southern R. Co.
Decision Date | 16 December 1914 |
Docket Number | 489. |
Citation | 83 S.E. 762,167 N.C. 510 |
Parties | RIDGE v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Randolph County; Adams, Judge.
Action by Grady H. Ridge against the Norfolk Southern Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur held applicable to the case of an employee injured while on the top of a box car caused by the roof being blown off so that the question of negligence must be submitted to the jury.
Where the accident is such as in the ordinary course would not have happened if those having control used proper care, there is evidence, in the absence of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose from want of proper care.
This is an action to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence. The testimony of the plaintiff in his own behalf will sufficiently show the nature of the case and enable us to understand the exceptions. He is 23 years old. Had lived in Ashboro for about 17 years, and had worked for the Norfolk Southern Railroad Company, beginning on the 4th day of August, 1913. Started as flagman; did not have any special run, but was a new man and was put anywhere on the road when they had a vacancy. Didn't remember how many days he had worked from August 4th until October 20th. In August he drew $31 as his wages, and they paid him anywhere from $1.65 to $2 a day. After September his wages were right at $30, and in October $30. On the 20th of October he started out with a fellow Brown on a baggage run. Brown was showing him how to handle baggage on a passenger train from Fayetteville to Raleigh, on a Norfolk Southern train. Brown had held the baggageman's position, and was teaching the witness how to be a baggageman. They went to Raleigh, and on arriving they set off the passenger coaches and picked up a string of box cars and started back to Fayetteville. There was one passenger car on the train, and the conductor was Fred Jones. Witness was in the passenger coach when the train left Raleigh. Fred Jones, L. P. Brown, and a colored fellow, a brakeman, were in there with him. He did not remember the colored fellow's name. He went out of the passenger coach to a station or two along the road to help unload some stuff and set off some cars. Plaintiff was then asked the following question:
Plaintiff testified further:
Plaintiff then stated the extent of his injuries, which were quite severe. He further testified that he had never been over that road before, and was being broken into the service as a beginner. It was a level country where the injury occurred. It was not blowing very hard, not so hard that it blew him nearly off the car. The wind was blowing to some extent. It had been blowing all day, but just a little now and then, and not steadily. He did not know whether the wind increased in velocity after he went out of the coach.
F. H. Jones, the conductor, testified in behalf of defendant:
There was much evidence pro and con in regard to the velocity of the wind and the condition of the car's top. R. H. Jones, defendant's witness, testified that the car returned to Raleigh "with the left-hand side blown off and one-half of the roof was gone," and there was evidence that the other cars, 15 freight cars in all, were not injured. The car in question was loaded with hay.
The court, in its charge, stated the contentions of the parties: The plaintiff's, that the top of the car was defectively constructed or out of repair, and by reason thereof the wind lifted it and threw it and him violently to the ground; and the defendant's that the car was not defective, but the wind was high and blew plaintiff off, and that it had carefully inspected the car. The court then drew the attention of the jury to federal Employers' Liability Act, reading section 1 to them, and charged them to inquire, under the issues, whether defendant had been guilty of negligence in any of the respects mentioned in that section, if they found that it was, at the time, engaged in interstate commerce, and that plaintiff, at the same time, was employed in such commerce, and particularly to inquire if defendant had exercised ordinary care (defining and explaining it) to see that the car was in reasonably safe condition, for the use of its hands, if they found that the car was defective and that it was the proximate cause of the injury. If the car was in a defective condition and defendant had not made a reasonable inspection of it, whereas, if it had, the defect would have been discovered, and that by reason of the defect, the top was blown off and against the plaintiff, so that he was thrown to the ground and injured, and that the negligence of the defendant in the particulars mentioned was the proximate cause of the said injury, they would answer the first issue, "Yes"; otherwise, "No." The court then fully stated and explained the defendant's evidence and contentions, and then gave this instruction, among others:
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