Ridgecrest School v. Sierra Sands School
| Decision Date | 29 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. F045114.,F045114. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | RIDGECREST CHARTER SCHOOL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SIERRA SANDS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent. |
The Charter Schools Act of 1992 (Ed. Code, § 47600 et seq. (the Act)),1 Proposition 39 in November of 2000, requires public school districts to make their educational facilities available to charter schools operating in the district. The facilities provided must be sufficient to accommodate all the charter school's in-district students under conditions "reasonably equivalent" to those the students would have if they were attending a noncharter school in the same district. (§ 47614, subd. (b).) The facilities must also be "contiguous," meaning they must be on or adjacent to a school site. (Ibid., Cal.Code Regs., tit. 5, § 11969.2, subd. (d).)2 However, if the charter school's students cannot be accommodated at a single site, "contiguous facilities" may include those "located at more than one site, provided that the school district shall minimize the number of sites assigned and shall consider student safety." (5 CCR, § 11969.2.)
In this case, the Ridgecrest Charter School (RCS) submitted a request to the Sierra Sands Unified School District (the District) to use the District's facilities for 223 students in kindergarten through eighth grade (K-8). The District offered to give RCS the use of 9.5 classrooms at five different school sites separated by a total of 65 miles. RCS claimed it was entitled to a single site inasmuch as there were several sites in the District capable of accommodating all 223 students. The District disagreed, and refused to modify the offer. RCS then filed a petition for writ of mandate directing the District to provide it with facilities at a single location. The court denied the petition, and RCS has appealed. We will reverse.
The Act was adopted in 1992 "to provide opportunities for teachers, parents, pupils, and community members to establish and maintain schools that operate independently from the existing school district structure. . . ." (§ 47601.) Charter schools were identified as a means to (1) improve student learning; (2) increase learning opportunities, especially for low-achieving students; (3) encourage the use of innovative teaching methods; (4) create new professional opportunities for teachers; (5) offer parents and students more choices within the public school system; and (6) give schools a way to change from a rule-based to a performance-based accountability system. (Id., subds. (a)-(f).)3
A person or entity wishing to establish a charter school within a particular school district was required to submit a petition to the district's governing board, signed by a specified percentage of the district's teachers, and providing detailed information about the school's proposed operations. (§ 47605.)4 In the present case, the District denied RCS's initial petition in 1999, a second petition in 2000, and its renewal petition in 2003. The 2000 petition, and the 2003 renewal, were later approved on an appeal to the State Board. (See §§ 47605, subd. (j); 47607.5.)5
The 1992 enactment provided a mechanism for state support of a charter school's operational costs, similar to that provided to school districts based on their average daily attendance (ADA), but it made no specific provision for the charter school's facilities. (§ 47612.)
In 1998, AB 544 added section 47613.5, which provided in subdivision (a) that, subject to certain exceptions, "charter school operational funding shall be equal to the total funding that would be available to a similar school district serving a similar pupil population." "Operational funding" was defined to mean "all funding other than capital funding." (Stats.1999, ch. 78, §§ 32.5, 32.8.)
AB 544 also added section 47614, which then provided:
"A school district in which a charter school operates shall permit a charter school to use, at no charge, facilities not currently being used by the school district for instructional or administrative purposes, or that have not been historically used for rental purposes provided the charter school shall be responsible for reasonable maintenance of those facilities." (Stats.1998, ch. 34, § 15.)
Proposition 39, also known as the "Smaller Classes, Safer Schools, and Financial Accountability Act," made two significant changes in the law affecting charter schools. First, and most important, it amended the state Constitution to create an exception to the 1 percent limit on ad valorem taxes on real property, and to reduce from two-thirds to 55 percent the number of voters required to approve any bonded indebtedness proposed to be incurred by a school district for the "construction, reconstruction, rehabilitation, or replacement of school facilities." (Prop. 39, § 4, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2000).)
Second, Proposition 39 amended section 47614 to read in part as follows:
The State Board subsequently adopted regulations governing the provision of facilities by school districts to charter schools pursuant to section 47614. (5 CCR, §§ 11969.1-11969.9, operative Aug. 29, 2002.)7 They define "contiguous" as follows:
(5 CCR, § 11969.2, subd. (d).)
The California Department of Education (State Department), in its final statement of reasons for the proposed regulation (Gov.Code, § 11346.2), stated: "The main purpose of subdivision (d) is to provide guidance in the situation where no single school site operated by a school district is large enough to accommodate the charter school." (Italics added.)
The State Board also adopted a regulation setting out the provisions for determining whether facilities provided a charter school are "reasonably equivalent" to those charter school students would have if they were attending a district-run school. (5 CCR, § 11969.3.)
In a letter to the District dated September 26, 2002, RCS made a Proposition 39 request for District facilities — both classroom and nonteaching space (5 CCR, § 11969.3, subd. (b)) — sufficient to accommodate 223 in-district, K-8 students for the 2003-2004 school year.8
At a meeting on February 20, 2003, the District's governing board approved a recommendation by the superintendent that it make available, beginning November 1, 2003,9 a total of eight classrooms at four different elementary (K-5) schools, and one and one-half classrooms at one of its two middle (6-8) schools. In addition, RCS would be entitled to the shared use of other space at the schools (e.g., computer lab, library, kitchen, office space, multi-purpose room, and playground) on a prorated basis: 6.51 percent of the day at the elementary schools, and 5.73 percent of the day at the middle school. The board, at least implicitly, rejected alternatives of buying or leasing portable classrooms; of redrawing school attendance boundaries and increasing class size; of discontinuing the reduction of kindergarten class size; and of changing to a year-round multi-track school calendar.10
The District sent this "preliminary response" to RCS in a letter dated February 24, 2003. RCS responded with an alternative proposal that it be permitted to use a particular site (Vieweg) then being used primarily for nonacademic purposes. The District rejected that proposal as unfeasible. And, in a letter dated March 25, 2003, it reiterated the same proposal it had made earlier, this time in the form of a "final facilities offer." The final offer stated in part:
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