Ridgeway v. Jones

• Decision Date: 14 June 1920
• Docket Number: 21366
• Citation: 122 Miss. 624,84 So. 692
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: RIDGEWAY et al. v. JONES

84 So. 692

122 Miss. 624

RIDGEWAY et al. v. JONES

No. 21366

Supreme Court of Mississippi

June 14, 1920

March 1920

1. APPEAL AND ERROR. Assignee's right to prosecute suit in assignor's name includes right to appeal.

The right conferred by chapter 134, Laws 1916 (section 497 Hemingway's Code), on the assignee of any interest in a chose in action to begin, prosecute, and continue any suit or action thereon in the name of the assignor includes the right to appeal to the supreme court from a judgment in an action which was begun and prosecuted in the court below in the name of the assignor.

2. APPEAL AND ERROR. Assignee prosecuting action to judgment in name of assignor must appear in his name.

An assignee of an interest in a chose in action on which suit was prosecuted to judgment in the court below in the name of the assignor cannot appeal from the judgment in his own name but must prosecute the appeal in the name of the assignor.

3. APPEAL AND ERROR. Appeal by partners must be in their individual names.

Where persons composing a partnership have the right to appeal the appeal must be prosecuted in their individual names and not in the name of the partnersihp.

HON, G E. WILLIAMS, Chancellor.

APPEAL from chancery court of Bolivar County, HON. G. E. WILLIAMS, Chancellor.

Suit by Mollie Roach Ridgeway and others against F. J. Jones executor of Samuel Jones, deceased, to have defendant directed to distribute the estate. From a decree dismissing the petition, plaintiffs appeal. Motion to dismiss the appeal overruled.

Motion to dismiss the appeal overruled.

Dabney & Dabney and Somerville & Somerville, for appellants.

The attorneys have the right to prosecute their appeal; they were granted this right by the chancellor; they gave the required bond. Surely, this supreme court will not countenance such a fraud as this executor and the said Mollie Roach Ridgeway undertake to perpetrate; that is, to permit them to make a settlement between themselves on any terms they choose in the face of the knowledge of both that the attorneys had an interest in the matter, without regard to their rights and in the hope to defeat their rights and cover up their tracks by claiming we have no right to appeal.

Mollie Ridgway owned a one-fourth interest in her father's estate; she conveyed to Somerville & Somerville and Dabney & Dabney, her attorneys, a one-third interest in her part of the personalty and a home as a half interest in her part of the land. Therefore Mollie had left to her a two-thirds of her original interest in the personalty and a one-half of her original interest in the land. Thereafter she conveyed to Frank Jones, her brother and the executor, all her interest in her father's estate. This interest of course, was all that she had after the conveyance and assignment above-mentioned to her attorneys. Now just what the interest of Somerville & Somerville and Dabney & Dabney in said estate would amount to under their conveyance and assignment cannot be determined until it is first ascertained what Mollie's true interest was; and Mollie's interest cannot be determined until it is ascertained what was coming to her after the administration. To ascertain this is necessary to know what the assets of the estate were, what the liabilities were and that the accounts of the executor were correct. That is the purpose of this present controversy and the object of the taking of the testimony in this record. The handling of the estate by this negro Frank Jones seems to have been badly mixed up--he claimed credit for excessive expenditures for funeral expenses and tombstone, and for amounts paid on claims that had never been probated, and, amazingly enough, the chancellor approved his accounts. This is a matter for this honorable court to pass upon, and now because Mollie feels that she is satisfied with what Frank has paid her and is willing to quit the litigation, where do her attorneys stand in the matter? They have a right to continue this cause along to a final determination. Frank Jones, the executor, knew Mollie had given the conveyance and assignment to her attorneys; it was filed in the chancery court in which this cause was pending and was full and complete notice to him. As the matter stands Somerville & Somerville and Dabney & Dabney's one-third interest in the personalty and one-half interest in the land coming to Mollie Roach Ridgway has not been ascertained and cannot be until this honorable court passes on the remarkable administration of this estate. Those attorneys have given bond and are in this court for a determination of their rights. Because a client undertakes to dispose of her suit without the knowledge and consent of her attorneys does not preclude them from proceeding with the matter to have their rights determined and establish.

See Weeks et al v. Wayne Circuit Judges (Mich.), 41 N.W. , 269.

(Supreme Court of Michigan, Jan. 14, 1899.)

ATTORNEYS AND CLIENT: Lien: Compromise.

1. Where plaintiff, with defendants knowledge, agrees with his attorneys to pay them a reasonable compensation for their services and disbursements made in prosecuting a suit, from the proceeds of the judgment which should be obtained, and the parties settle without the knowledge or consent of the attorneys, or payment of their claims, it is improper for the court to vacate the judgment and dismiss the suit without securing the rights of the attorneys under their agreement.

2. The rule that courts look with favor upon a compromise and settlement made by the parties to a suit with the consent of all persons concerned to prevent the vexation and expense of further litigation, applies only where the rights and interests of all parties concerned, both legal and equitable, have been respected and good faith observed, and that attorneys have no rights, cannot be assumed without inquiry. . . .

PER CURIAM. The relators were attorneys for George W. Myers, who obtained a judgment of two thousand five hundred dollars against the Detroit Free Press Company in an action for libel which they prosecuted for Ayres in the Wayne circuit court. Ayres was poor, and when he commenced his suit and retained his attorneys he made an agreement with them by which they were to be paid a reasonable compensation for their services and disbursements made in prosecuting the suit, from the proceeds of the judgment which should be obtained; and it is stated in the affidavits of the relators that this arrangement was known to the defendant, and which is not denied in any affidavit on the part of defendant accompanying the return of respondents. And it is further shown that the defendant in the libel suit, without the knowledge of the attorneys for either party and without the consent of relators, or they having received their pay for their services and disbursements...