Ridgeway v. Lanphear

• Decision Date: 25 November 1884
• Docket Number: 8519
• Citation: 99 Ind. 251
• Parties: Ridgeway et al. v. Lanphear et al
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

99 Ind. 251

Ridgeway et al. v. Lanphear et al

No. 8519

Supreme Court of Indiana

November 25, 1884

Petition for a Rehearing Overruled Jan. 27, 1885.

From the Vanderburgh Circuit Court.

Judgment affirmed.

J. M Warren, P. Maier and G. Palmer, for appellants.

A. L Robinson, for appellees.

OPINION

Elliott, J.

The contest in this case is upon the construction of the clause in the will of Mabrina Lanphear, which reads thus:

"Item 3d. I devise and bequeath unto my said son DeWitt H. Lanphear all my real estate, whatsoever, including lot seventeen (17), block two (2), in the Eastern Enlargement to the city of Evansville, Indiana, during his natural life, and at his death to his children, if he have any; and if he have no children, or if there be no heirs of his body, then the real estate to his other heirs of his own blood equally; and if the said DeWitt H. Lanphear die leaving a wife, his said wife to have a life-estate in said real property, said estate to terminate at her death or marriage after his death, and said real estate to be vested as above described."

DeWitt H. Lanphear was unmarried and childless at the time of the testator's death.

The contention of the appellees is that the will gives to DeWitt H. Lanphear a life-estate and no more, and that if he should marry and have children, the remainder in fee would vest in them. The position of the appellants is that the will devises the fee to DeWitt H. Lanphear.

The authorities agree that the great purpose in construing wills is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the testator. In opposition to this fundamental principle, all technical rules give way. Cooper v. Hayes, 96 Ind. 386, vide opinion 395; Downie v. Buennagel, 94 Ind. 228; South v. South, 91 Ind. 221 (46 Am. R. 591). It is true that wills are to be construed by technical rules, when purely technical terms are used, and there is nothing in the language with which they are associated showing that the testator intended them to have any other meaning; but where it clearly and distinctly appears that the testator did not intend to employ the terms in their technical sense, then the courts will not give them that meaning; on the contrary, they will search for and affix to the terms employed the meaning which the testator intended they should receive.

The rule in Shelley's Case, 1 Colo. 88, is the law of this State, and, in all cases where the facts make it applicable, we must enforce it, although we may think there was not much reason for it at the time of its adoption, and none at all under the existing system of tenures and conveyances. But, in accepting the rule, we take it as construed and enforced by the courts which formulated and proclaimed it. Pressed by the evils wrought by the rule, and shocked by the great number of instances in which it operated to utterly overthrow the intention of the testator, these courts, centuries ago, affirmed that there existed an important difference between wills and deeds, and that the rule should not be so strictly enforced in the case of a will as in the case of a deed. It has long stood as the law that there is a material distinction between wills and deeds, and that the rule in Shelley's Case will not be allowed to override the manifest and clearly expressed intention of the testator, but that the intention will always be carried into effect if it can be ascertained. It is true that where the words used are such as bring the case within the rule, it will be given full force and effect, but where the context clearly shows that the testator annexed a different meaning, that meaning will be adopted, and the rule will not be allowed to frustrate his intention. The reason for applying a different principle to wills from that applied to deeds is given by a learned English author, who says: "In construing wills, courts have always borne in mind that a testator may not have had the same opportunity of legal advice in drawing his will as he would have had in executing a deed. And the first great maxim of construction accordingly is, that the intention of the testator ought to be observed." Williams Real Prop. (5th ed.) 212. In speaking of the course of the courts in averting the operation of the technical rule, the same author says: "But, in such cases, the courts, conscious of the pure technicality of the rule, were continually striving to avert the hardship of its effect, by laying hold of the most minute variations of phrase, as matter of exception." It is the right of a testator to assign his own meaning to the words he employs, and where this meaning clearly appears it will overcome the technical meaning usually affixed to the words. While the use of mere negativing or limiting words can not control the force of the term "heirs," still the testator has a right to assign to it a meaning different from its technical one, and to make it mean children, grandchildren, or any kinsmen. 3 Jarman Wills, 115; Fearne Remainders, 188. This court has, in many cases, recognized the doctrine that there is a difference between wills and deeds, and that the rule in Shelley's Case is not so rigorously applied to wills.

In Cleveland v. Spilman, 25 Ind. 95, it was said: "But less strictness was required in the disposition of real estate by will, for the reason that when this mode of alienation was introduced, the rigor of feudal times was greatly worn out, and hence more liberality prevailed. * * * Upon the ground that a testator may often be without that professional assistance of which a party to a deed can always have time to avail himself, it was long ago held that the intention of the testator, as it could be collected from the whole will, more than from the exact legal import of the words employed, should be regarded. Cowp. 352."

In the early case of Lutz v. Lutz, 2 Blackf. 72 the court said, in speaking of a will: "This is not an instrument in which the intention of the maker must yield to any rigid principle of law. The intention of the testator, in such cases as the present, must prevail." The court, in Doe v. Jackman, 5 Ind. 283, while conceding, as we have done, that the rule in Shelley's Case is the law of Indiana, said: "But the term 'heirs' is one of limitation. It has a fixed and legal meaning, and a mere presumed intention will not control its signification. It can not be held a word of purchase, unless the testator's intent so to use it appears manifest." We have made these extracts from our cases, not for the purpose...