Ridgeway v. Reese
Decision Date | 20 November 1930 |
Citation | 100 Fla. 1304,131 So. 136 |
Parties | RIDGEWAY et al. v. REESE. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Suit by Horace G. Reese, Jr., against Townsend Burns Ridgeway and others. From an adverse judgment, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
See also, 131 So. 140.
WHITFIELD J., dissenting in part. Appeal from Circuit Court, Pinellas County; O L. Dayton, judge.
Lucas & Twomey, of Tampa, for appellants.
Edwin Brobston, of Tampa, for appellee.
Fred H. Davis, Atty. Gen., and Albert B. Bernstein, of Miami, as amici curiae.
A tax sale certificate showing a sale of described lands for the nonpayment of state and county taxes for the year 1926 was issued to the state September 5, 1927, by the tax collector of Pinellas county. Under the statute the certificate is required to state that at public auction after due notice the tax collector did sell to the purchaser described land for a stated sum, being the amount due and unpaid for taxes, costs, and charges on the lands for a stated year; that the purchaser, or his assigns, will be entitled to a deed of conveyance of such lands in accordance with law unless the same shall be redeemed within two years.
On January 23, 1930, a portion of the certificate, in so far as it relates to a described part of the land included in the certificate, was, as authorized by statute, transferred by the state to Horace G. Reese, Jr., who brought proceedings under chapter 14572, Acts 1929 (Ex. Sess.), against the owners of the land to foreclose the portion of the tax certificate bought by him from the state.
The defendant owners of the land demurred to the bill of complaint upon grounds challenging the validity of chapter 14572 authorizing the foreclosure proceedings and also assailing the validity of the tax sale certificate as issued by the tax collector under the statute, section 766, Revised General Statutes 1920, section 981, Compiled General Laws 1927. The demurrer was overruled, and the defendants appealed. The title to chapter 14572, Acts 1929 (Ex. Sess.), is sufficient to cover the provisions of the act, and the title is not double or misleading.
The provision of section 14, article 4, Constitution, that 'all grants * * * shall be * * * signed by the Governor, and countersigned by the Secretary of State,' is not applicable to the execution of tax sale certificates or to transfers or assignments of such certificates or portions thereof by the state. Tax sale certificates are not 'grants' made by the state or by the executive department of the state government. Such certificates evidence the existence of liens for unpaid taxes that are past due. The statute creates a lien upon lands for taxes assessed thereon, and the certificate gives a right to a conveyance of the land, unless the certificate is duly redeemed by paying the taxes due with interest, costs, and charges. Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, § 1003, and § 985, Acts 1929 (Ex. Sess.), c. 14572, § 9. The lien evidenced by a tax sale certificate may be enforced as provided by law. One statutory remedy to individuals holding tax certificates is the issuing in the name of the state of a deed conveying the land to the certificate holder, upon due notice to the owner, if the certificate purchased at the tax sale or from the state is not redeemed. The state does not own the land except through the tax sale, and does not purport to convey it except as a means of enforcing the sovereign right to collect the taxes duly levied on the land. The transfer by the state of the certificate to complainant was made after the expiration of the two years allowed for redemption.
The remedy by foreclosure after the time for redemption has expired, given by chapter 14572, is expressly made 'cumulative and in addition to any and all other remedies provided by law.' Section 31. It is within the province of the legislative department to provide any and all adequate means to enforce the payment of taxes and to enforce the liens evidenced by tax sale certificates, after the period of redemption has expired; and the property owner is not injured by and cannot justly or legally resist statutory methods of enforcing such liens by foreclosure proceedings when due process is afforded and a reasonable opportunity is given to redeem before or during the enforcement suits.
The tax sale certificate in this case was under the statute and the terms of the certificate, subject to redemption within two years from its date, with a further statutory privilege of redemption at any time before a tax deed is duly issued upon the certificate after two years from its date. The cumulative remedy by foreclosure under chapter 14572 is applicable only after the two-year redemption period has expired, and it provides for tax certificates to be redeemed upon proper payments before sale under final decree, and upon redemption the foreclosure proceedings will be dismissed, section 21 the owners of the property or others interested therein being parties to the suit. This does not violate, but amply protects, the rights of those who own or have an interest in the property. When the tax certificate in this case was issued, and when it was transferred, section 2 of chapter 12409, approved June 6, 1927, section 1020, Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, was in force, and provided that 'any holder of a tax deed or of a tax certificate shall have a lien thereunder for the amount paid therefor upon the land described therein and such lien may be enforced and foreclosed by suit in equity as provided by law for the enforcement of statutory liens.' When the land became subject to a lien for the taxes and when the assessment was made in 1926, another statute authorized the tax lien to 'be enforced by suit in equity.' Section 896(696), Comp. Gen. Laws 1927. See, also, section 5034(3228), Comp. Gen. Laws 1927; Huff v. City of...
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