Ridgeway v. State
Decision Date | 08 May 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 102,102 |
Citation | 797 A.2d 1287,369 Md. 165 |
Parties | Darrin Bernard RIDGEWAY v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Arthur A. DeLano, Jr., Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.
Shannon E. Avery, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Md., on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, and BATTAGLIA, JJ.
We are tasked to clarify the scope of authority that Maryland Rule 4-345 vests in the trial court to correct illegal sentences. The petitioner, convicted of two counts of first degree assault and three counts of reckless endangerment, was initially (and erroneously) sentenced for five counts of first degree assault. Having been advised of the error, the trial judge recalled the parties, vacated the sentences for three of the first-degree assault charges and imposed sentences for three reckless endangerment counts. The petitioner requests that this Court consider whether the actions taken by the trial court were legal pursuant to Rule 4-345.
At 4:00 a.m. on July 22, 1998, the petitioner, Darrin Bernard Ridgeway, discharged a twelve-gauge shotgun three times into a mobile home in Laurel, Maryland. Two individuals, Richard Morgan Kinney and Beth Hanning, were struck in the legs as they slept. Three young girls also were present in the trailer home at the time of the shooting; although terrified by the shotgun blasts, they were not injured in the attack.
The petitioner alleged that the shooting was in retaliation for a kidnaping and assault initiated a few weeks earlier by three men, known to him as Man, Shawn and Pete, who accused the petitioner of stealing Seven Thousand Dollars worth of crack cocaine from them. The petitioner reported the assault to the Howard County Police Department on July 11, 1998, and explained to the authorities that his assaulters were involved in a drug distribution organization. The petitioner also gave additional information about several other people involved in the selling of crack cocaine, including disclosing to police officials that one of the victims, Richard Morgan Kinney, often allowed the three men to use his trailer home and car for the distribution of drugs.
During the interim between the assault allegedly inflicted upon the petitioner and the petitioner's attacks on the trailer home and its occupants, the petitioner stayed with two friends who ultimately testified that he informed them of his intention to kill the men who had kidnaped and threatened him. The friends also testified that the petitioner came to them after the shootings of July 22, 1998 and informed them of his actions, specifically that the petitioner fired a shotgun through the front door of an apartment that he believed the three men used, and then went to Kinney's trailer and fired three times into it.
Among other related charges, the petitioner was indicted for five counts of first degree assault and five counts of reckless endangerment related to the two adults and three children in Kinney's trailer home. On October 27, 1999, following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Howard County, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of first degree assault (for the assault on Richard Morgan Kinney and Beth Hanning) and three counts of reckless endangerment (one for each girl in the vicinity of the shotgun blast).
At the subsequent sentencing hearing on April 20, 2000, the trial judge imposed consecutive sentences on five counts of first degree assault. The judge stated, in relevant part:
The petitioner appealed his sentences on the reckless endangerment counts to the Court of Special Appeals arguing that the new sentences amounted to an increase from zero years to five years for each count in violation of Rule 4-345. The Court of Special Appeals disagreed and affirmed the sentences imposed by the Circuit Court. See Ridgeway v. State, 140 Md.App. 49, 779 A.2d 1031 (2001). The petitioner sought, and we granted, a writ of certiorari to consider the propriety of the trial judge's imposition of five-year sentences for each of petitioner's three reckless endangerment convictions after the vacatur of the prior ten-year sentences for each first degree assault.
A court's revisory power with respect to the sentencing of a criminal defendant is provided in Maryland Rule 4-345, which states in part:
The dispute in this case, and the decisional issue before this Court, is whether the trial judge's correction of the petitioner's sentence was pursuant to subsection (a) or subsection (b) of Rule 4-345. This distinction is of obvious significance because, as the Rule itself states, an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time, while correcting a mistake in a sentencing order that results in an increased sentence may only occur "before the defendant leaves the courtroom following the sentencing proceedings." Rule 4-345(a) and (b).
The petitioner argues that when the trial court recalled the parties after the initial sentencing hearing, it was modifying a "mistake in the announcement of a sentence" pursuant to subsection (b) of the Rule. The petitioner claims that he was, in essence, sentenced to zero years of imprisonment for the three reckless endangerment convictions initially, but that his sentence was increased to a total of fifteen years after the court's recall of the parties. Because the petitioner had left the courtroom following the initial sentencing proceeding, the Rule, the petitioner claims, prohibited the subsequent increase in the sentence.
The State argues, and the Court of Special Appeals agreed, that subsection (b) was inapplicable under the circumstances of this case because when the trial court recalled the parties, it was correcting an illegal sentence pursuant to subsection (a) rather than modifying the petitioner's sentence pursuant to subsection (b).
We agree with the State and affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. The sentences for the three first degree assault convictions were illegal and properly vacated pursuant to subsection(a) of Rule 4-345. A court cannot punish a defendant for a crime for which he or she has been acquitted. Thus, the court's re-sentencing on the reckless endangerment counts was not to correct a mistake, but rather, it was to correct this illegal sentence.
As we have oft stated, the legality of a sentence may be determined at any time, even on appeal. See Rule 4-345(a); see also State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 183-84, 742 A.2d 508, 516 (1999); State v. Griffiths, 338 Md....
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