Ridley v. Grandison

• Decision Date: 09 March 1990
• Docket Number: No. S89A0510,S89A0510
• Citation: 389 S.E.2d 746,260 Ga. 6
• Parties: RIDLEY v. GRANDISON a/k/a Ridley.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 746

389 S.E.2d 746

260 Ga. 6

RIDLEY v. GRANDISON a/k/a Ridley.

No. S89A0510.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 9, 1990.

E. Thomas Shaffer, Macon, for Ridley.

W. Louis Sands, Macon, for Grandison.

SMITH, Presiding Justice.

We granted the appellant's discretionary application, and we affirm. The appellant, Jerome Ridley, and the appellee, Mae Grandison, a/k/a Mae Ridley, met in Virginia in 1976. Sometime in 1979, the appellant moved into the appellee's apartment with the appellee and her son, and they resided there together for approximately six years.

In June 1985, the appellant moved to Macon and in December 1985, the appellant moved the appellee and her son to Macon. He claimed the moving expenses on his federal tax return; he claimed the appellee's son for federal and state income tax purposes; and filed taxes as head of household. Shortly after moving into their Macon home, the parties completed a credit application with a local furniture company. The application stated: "Whether or not married, you have the right to apply for credit separately from or jointly with your spouse or another person." The parties checked the box marked "married," and the appellee signed the application as "Mae Ridley." The parties obligated themselves for an amount in excess of five thousand dollars for the furniture they purchased with the approved credit application.

In 1988 the appellee filed a complaint for divorce; one of the grounds was adultery. In her complaint she alleged that she and the appellant had a common law marriage. The jury found that a common law marriage existed and awarded the parties a divorce. There was a division of property and liabilities on the property and the appellee was awarded alimony for three years.

After a hearing, the trial court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding and verdict and the appellant's motions for j.n.o.v. and new trial were denied.

There was evidence to support the jury's verdict in this case, and this Court will not disturb a verdict if there is any evidence to support the verdict. Horton v. Kitchens, 259 Ga. 446, 383 S.E.2d 871 (1989).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except WELTNER, HUNT, and FLETCHER, JJ., who dissent. HUNT, Justice, dissenting.

In the absence of a positive legislative enactment declaring unlicensed, nonceremonial marriages to be void, common law marriages have been recognized in Georgia since at least 1960. Under OCGA § 19-3-1 the essential elements of a marriage, are (1) the parties must be able to contract, (2) there must be an actual contract, and (3) there must be consummation according to law. These three requirements must be met at one period in time in order to form a common law marriage. Brown v. Brown, 234 Ga. 300, 301 (215 SE2d 671) (1975).

When the relationship between the parties begins as an illicit arrangement, the burden is on the party asserting the validity of the marriage to show that the illicit relationship ended and that the parties did actually enter a marriage contract [Cit.] ... "This may be done by ... such circumstances as the act of living together as man and wife, holding themselves out to the world as such, and repute in the vicinity and among neighbors and visitors that they are such, and indeed all such facts as usually accompany the marriage relation and indicate the factum of marriage. The evidence in each case is for the jury." [Cit.]

Id., at 302

1. The evidence in support of the existence of a marriage included (1) Grandison's testimony that "I consider myself as married to Mr. Jerome Ridley. ... He helped me to see after my child and he did not leave;" and,

Q: After you got to Georgia, did you and Jerome Ridley ever talk about getting married? A: No. I figured that we were already married. He brought me down here.

(2) A witness testified:

I knew personally what their relationship was. I knew that they had not been legally married but nonetheless I considered them married. ... To me they were a couple.

And (3) documentary evidence was presented, showing her signature as "Mae Ridley," on a credit card application, signed also by Ridley, that classified the parties as "married;" various bills and charge card tickets that identified Grandison as "Ms. Ridley," "Mae Ridley," or "Mrs. Ridley;" checks that Grandison wrote on Ridley's checking account signed by her in his name, and with his permission; and income tax returns on which Ridley claimed Grandison's child as his son, used a filing status as head of household, and claimed the expenses of moving Grandison and her son from Virginia to Georgia.

2. Ridley offered as evidence the parties were not common law married that, in Virginia, each party filed separate income tax returns with Grandison filing as single and Ridley filing as head of household, while neither party ever filed a state or federal income tax return as married; the parties maintained separate checking accounts in Virginia, while in Georgia, Ridley had the only checking account; the parties maintained individual charge accounts in their own names; Gradison completed job applications in Georgia listing herself as single; Ridley listed himself as single on several work-related papers; and neither party ever introduced the other as a spouse.

3. The credit application mentioned above provides some evidence from which the jury could have found that Ridley and Grandison held themselves out as man and wife -- if not "to all the world," at least to a financial source. That evidence, however, is atomized by the following colloquy during the cross-examination of Grandison:

Q: What name is on your driver's license? A: Mae Katherine Grandison.

Q: And you list yourself as being single don't you? A: Yes I do.

Q: Okay, and when you list yourself -- So we don't get confused -- you understand that geing single is not being married; is that your understanding? A: No.

Q: In other words, if you're single, are you married? If you're married, are you single? A: You're getting the issue -- single for what purpose?

Q: I mean I think either you're single or married. I don't think there's any halfway into it or halfway out of it. Which way is it A: I am single. [Emphasis supplied.]

Q: Okay, you're single? You have listed your other places -- Now, you've applied and you've worked at several places in Georgia and you've applied in several other places, have you not? A: Yes, I have.

Q: Did you list yourself as single or as being married? A: As single. ...

Q: Do you ever recall a single incident when he introduced you and said to someone, "This is my wife?" A: No, I would say, no.

Q: Thank you. You never introduced him to anyone as your husband either, did you? A: No.

Grandison's statement, "I am single," defeats her claim.

That is, where both parties, as here, deny in court the existence of a marriage contract, characteristics of marriage such as those referred to in division 1, cannot, by themselves, establish the existence of a marriage contract. I would hold that the trial court should have granted Ridley's motion for judgment n.o.v. and, therefore, must dissent.

I am authorized to state that Justices WELTNER and FLETCHER join in this dissent.

WELTNER, Justice, dissenting.

1. I join in Justice Hunt's dissent. Three of us concluded that the evidence demands a verdict for Ridley and entitles him to a judgment n.o.v. A majority of four has prevailed in holding that the jury's verdict must be upheld because there is some evidence to support it. The very nature of this dispute illustrates the reasons that I maintain that it is time for a re-examination of common law marriage.

2. There can be no criticism of the reasons for the recognition, at the outset, of common law marriage. It is both a heritage from our frontier days, as well as a means of avoiding the disadvantages of "illegitimacy" that burden the child whose parents have foregone a ceremonial marriage. ¹ There is, however, substantial need for a new and critical inquiry as to whether prevailing principles of common law marriage serve the present age.

3. This very case presents a strong argument for such a reassessment, bearing in mind its uncertainties and delays, and the enormity of resources devoted to it. The complaint for divorce was filed in June of 1988. The parties spent three days in trial, calling seven witnesses, amassing a transcript of 439 pages, and entering into evidence seventeen exhibits--largely to determine whether or not they were married! And at the dawn of the new year, 1990, that issue remained yet unresolved.

4. The factual circumstances outlined in our recent case of Vaughn v. Vaughn, 255 Ga. 76, 337 S.E.2d 763 (1985), offer further support:

The parties were divorced. They continued to live together, ostensibly as husband and wife. After a period of time, the former husband underwent a ceremony of marriage with another woman, and the two of them now have a small child.

Soon after that ceremony, Vaughn's first wife filed an action against him, alleging that the parties had become married "by the common law," and were then husband and wife, notwithstanding the earlier divorce. She sought alimony and other relief. The question of the alleged marriage was tried by a jury, which found in favor of the first wife.

That finding, of course, had the effect of voiding the ceremonial marriage to which Vaughn had undertaken, and imposing upon the child born to the parties all of the disadvantages of what the law terms "illegitimacy." [Id. at 76-7, 337 S.E.2d 763 dissent.]

Thus, the very purpose of the initial recognition of common law marriage was defeated by the principles that we have developed to preserve it.

Solution

5. Plainly, the law of common law marriage is chaos that cries out for order. ² The materials found in the Appendix represent only eight years of turmoil, and only that disclosed at the appellate level. They reflect documentation of controversies that have been assembled...