Rieck v. Medical Protective Co. of Fort Wayne, Ind.
| Decision Date | 28 June 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 99,99 |
| Citation | 64 Wis.2d 514,219 N.W.2d 242 |
| Parties | Hazel M. RIECK et al., Respondents, v. The MEDICAL PROTECTIVE COMPANY OF FORT WAYNE, INDIANA, a foreign stock insurance company, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Binder, Zirbel & Howard, Milwaukee, for appellants. Irving W. Zirbel, Milwaukee, of counsel.
Edward P. Rudolph, Milwaukee, for respondents.
This is an action for damages based on the birth of a normal child, healthy and well. The action is brought by the father who sired and the mother who bore the baby boy against a clinic and the obstetrician who allegedly failed to determine and timely inform the mother that she was pregnant.
The basis of the parents' action is that the child, their fourth, was an unwanted addition to the family circle. There is no allegation that the child, once born, is or will continue to be an unwelcome member of the family household. Nor is there any allegation that the parents sought to terminate their parental rights to the child, 1 or place him for adoption. 2 The complaint alleges only that, if the parents had been timely informed of the fact of the mother's pregnancy, they would not have permitted the child to be born to them. The prayer for relief does not suggest that the allegedly negligent obstetrician is to raise the child. The parents will do that. What is demanded is that the costs of rearing the child be transferred to the obstetrician, the clinic and their insurer.
The complaint raises question of public policy, or, more precisely, whether the public policy tests, heretofore laid down by this court, are here met. In this state, negligence plus an unbroken sequence of events establishing cause-in-fact does not necessarily lead to a determination that a defendant is liable for plaintiff's injuries. 3 Recovery, or the determination to impose or not to impose liability, involves public policy considerations. 4 Even where the chain of causation is complete and direct, recovery may sometimes be denied on grounds of public policy because: (1) The injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor; or (3) in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the harm; or (4) because allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden (in the case before us, upon physicians and obstetricians); or (5) because allowance of recovery would be too likely to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point. 5 Any one of these public policy considerations could be sufficient to deny recoverability. We find more than one applicable to the allegations of this complaint, requiring a denial of recovery of damages upon the allegations of this complaint upon public policy grounds.
To permit the parents to keep their child and shift the entire cost of its unbringing to a physician who failed to determine or inform them of the fact of pregnancy would be to create a new category of surrogate parent. Every child's smile, every bond of love and affection, every reason for parental pride in a child's achievements, every contribution by the child to the welfare and well-being of the family and parents, is to remain with the mother and father. For the most part, these are intangible benefits, but they are nonetheless real. 6 On the other hand, every financial cost or detriment--what the complaint terms 'hard money damages'--including the cost of food, clothing and education, would be shifted to the physician who allegedly failed to timely diagnose the fact of pregnancy. We hold that such result would be wholly out of proportion to the culpability involved, and that the allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden upon physicians, under the facts and circumstances here alleged.
The complaint here alleges what the parents of the child would have done if they had been informed of the fact of pregnancy at the time of the mother's consulting the obstetrician sued. At the time of trial it is entirely predictable that the parents would have firmly testified to the fact of such intention, and its fixed and unalterable character. It is cultivating the obvious to state that, if the door were opened to recovery under such allegation and such subjective testimony as to state of mind or intention, the temptation would be great for parents, where a diagnosis of pregnancy was not timely made, if not to invent an intent to prevent pregnancy, at least to deny any possibility of change of mind or attitude before the action contemplated was taken. We have no hesitancy in concluding that to hold that the allegations of this complaint constitute a cause of action for recoverable damages would open the way for fraudulent claims and would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.
On this appeal the issue is raised as to a duty on the part of parents, claiming that a child of theirs is unwanted, to take steps to terminate their...
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Boone v. Mullendore
...Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974). In Alabama, in order to state a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must show that the defendant has ......
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Wrongful life claim barred by public policy.
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