Riecke v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n

• Citation: 206 Mo. App. 246,227 S.W. 631
• Decision Date: 08 February 1921
• Docket Number: No. 16320.,16320.
• Parties: RIECKE v. ANHEUSER-BUSCH BREWING ASS'N.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

227 S.W. 631

206 Mo. App. 246

RIECKE v. ANHEUSER-BUSCH BREWING ASS'N.

No. 16320.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

February 8, 1921.

Rehearing Denied February 24, 1921.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Kent K. Koerner, Judge.

Action by Martha Riecke against the Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Nagel & Kirby and Everett Paul Griffin, all of St. Louis, for appellant.

Edward W. Foristel and Frank H. Haskins, both of St. Louis, for respondent.

BIGGS, C.

With the permission of and at the invitation of defendant, plaintiff went upon a tour of inspection of defendant's plant, where it manufactures a nonintoxicating beverage called Bevo. While thus engaged plaintiff received injuries by reason of the explosion of a bottle of Bevo, and on account thereof she recovered a judgment for $1,000, from which defendant has appealed.

Two questions are presented, namely: (1) Whether the facts warrant the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; and (2) whether the verdict and judgment are excessive.

The charge was general negligence, and plaintiff relies entirely upon the application of the doctrine of presumptive negligence to the facts in evidence. The jury were instructed that, if they believed from the evidence that, whilst plaintiff was in the plant, a bottle filled with liquid, which was being handled by one of defendant's servants, exploded and a piece of glass struck and injured plaintiff, and that the contents of said bottle was manufactured and placed in said bottle by defendant, the law presumes that the explosion of the bottle and the consequent injury to plaintiff was caused by defendant's negligence, and that the verdict should be for plaintiff, unless the jury should find that, notwithstanding this presumption, said explosion and injury to plaintiff was not caused by negligence on the part of defendant.

The facts are these: While inspecting the plant at the invitation of defendant and under the guidance of an employé, plaintiff with others arrived at what is termed the "Bevo room," and while watching a girl employé of defendant place labels on bottles of Bevo, one of the bottles exploded, and a piece of glass struck plaintiff on the end of her nose. At the time, plaintiff was standing about six feet from the girl labeling the bottles. It appeared that the bottles were on a long table, and the girl employé would push them from her after labeling each, and that she pushed one with considerable force, and when it hit the others it exploded. It was conceded that the bottle belonged to defendant; that the contents was manufactured and put in the bottle by defendant, and that it was in the hands of and under the control of defendant from the time they received the bottles from the glass manufacturers until the explosion. It appeared that defendant purchased all its bottles from three manufacturers; that they bought only the highest grade of bottles; that a part of each order of bottles was tested before purchase, and that all of the bottles were made from a steel mold, which was also examined and tested by the defendant before it was used in the manufacture of bottles.

It was shown by defendant that Bevo was not naturally an explosive substance, and is not a highly charged liquid, but that if too much gas were put in the bottle it would burst. According to one of defendant's witnesses, this was the first time that a bottle had ever exploded.

It is not contended by the plaintiff that there is any direct evidence of negligence on the part of defendant that caused the explosion, but the plaintiff relies entirely upon the presumption that arises from a showing that the explosion occurred. It is asserted that from the fact of the explosion under the conditions and circumstances the law presumes some negligent act on the part of the defendant, and that the burden was then cast upon the defendant to acquit itself of negligence which arose against it by reason of the presumption.

Defendant has cited us to several cases from other jurisdictions which hold that the mere explosion of a bottle filled with a liquid charged with gas to the injury of another does not raise a presumption of negligence, and hence it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove some specific act of negligence on the part of the defendant. Wheeler v. Laurel Bottling Works, 111 Miss. 442, 71 South. 743, L. R. A. 1916E, 1074; Glaser v. Seitz, 35 Misc. Rep. 341, 71 N. Y. Supp. 942; Stone v. Van Noy News Co., 153 Ky. 240, 154 S. W. 1092; Bates v. Batey & Co., [1913] 3 K. B. (Eng.) 351; Guinea v. Campbell, 22 Quebec S. C. In these cases either the plaintiff did not rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, or else the bottle that exploded was no longer in the hands of the defendant, but had passed from it, and at the time of the explosion was under the control of another. The cases referred to are not authoritative in support of defendant's position, as the facts of this case are entirely different from the facts in the cases referred to.

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