Rieheman v. Cornerstone Seeds, Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 08A02-9602-CV-92,08A02-9602-CV-92 |
| Citation | 671 N.E.2d 489 |
| Parties | Ted L. RIEHEMAN and Cindy Rieheman on behalf of Natalie Rieheman, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. CORNERSTONE SEEDS, INC., and Alan Jones, Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Ted and Cindy Rieheman, on behalf of Natalie Rieheman (hereinafter referred to collectively as Riehemans) appeal the trial court's order dismissing their claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the Riehemans raise one issue: whether at the time of her injury Natalie was employed as a farm or agricultural employee within the meaning of § 9 of the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act (Act).
We reverse.
Cornerstone Seeds, Inc. (Cornerstone) is a wholesale production company which sells seed corn to retail seed corn businesses. Cornerstone does not produce the seed corn, but enters into contracts with individual farmers who plant and harvest the corn and deliver it to Cornerstone. Cornerstone supplies the individual farmers with the seed stock, plants the male corn, 1 hires employees to perform such duties as removing the male corn plants, roguing (the practice of removing from the field all corn plants that are not common to the variety originally planted), detasseling, shelling the corn, and drying the seed. Cornerstone also designates to the farmer when the corn is to be harvested and delivered. Cornerstone pays the farmers a flat price per bushel of seed corn produced and delivered to the company.
Each year, during the month of July, Cornerstone hires employees to detassel the seed corn by walking through the fields and pulling the tassels off the top of the corn. Detasseling improves the productivity of the seed corn when it is actually planted in the following growing season. Detasseling jobs do not last the entire summer. Detasseling employees are only needed for approximately three weeks in July.
The detasselers Cornerstone hires meet at various locations and are transported by Cornerstone to the fields in which they will work. Cornerstone directs the detasselers' work by deciding which field will be detasseled and by training the employees in how to detassel the plants.
In July of 1994, Natalie Rieheman was hired by Cornerstone as a corn detasseler. On July 19, 1994, Natalie was transported by a Cornerstone employee to a farm to detassel corn plants. A rain storm developed while the detasseling took place, and Natalie and the other detasselers left the field to take shelter from the storm. Before doing so, Natalie attempted to retrieve her lunch from the back of a Cornerstone transportation truck driven by Alan Jones, a fellow employee of Cornerstone. While attempting to retrieve her lunch, Natalie slipped and fell and was struck by the transportation truck. Natalie sustained serious injury.
On February 13, 1995, the Riehemans filed a Complaint against Cornerstone and William Jones (the President and General Manager of Cornerstone) based upon the injuries Natalie sustained while working as a detasseler. Cornerstone filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, alleging that the sole remedy for Natalie's injuries was limited to that provided by the Act. The trial court granted Cornerstone's Motion to Dismiss, finding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Natalie, at the time of her employment, was not a farm employee and was therefore subject to the provisions of the Act.
When an employer defends against an employee's tort claim on the basis that the employee's sole remedy is to pursue a claim for benefits under the Act, such a defense should be advanced through a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Foshee v. Shoney's, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 1277, 1280 (Ind.1994). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court has considerable latitude in devising procedures to bring to light the facts pertinent to jurisdiction, and it is well established that in doing so it may consider not only the complaint and motion but any affidavits or other evidence submitted. Perry v. Stitzer Buick GMC, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 1282, 1286-87 (Ind.1994). On appeal from an order of dismissal pursuant to Ind.Trial Rule 12(B)(1) where there are no facts in dispute for purposes of the appeal, we review the issue de novo. See Doe By Roe v. Madison Center Hospital, 652 N.E.2d 101, 103 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) ()
Whether Natalie, at the time of her injury, was a farm or
agricultural employee
The Rieheman's argue that the trial court erred in dismissing her civil suit against Cornerstone for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The gravamen of the Riehemans' argument is that individuals employed as corn detasselers are agricultural employees within the meaning of § 9 of the Act, and are, therefore, exempt from the Act's provisions. Cornerstone argues that the Riehemans' personal injury claim fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Act. Cornerstone contends that because it engages in a business that farmers do not ordinarily conduct, and because the corn detasselers perform tasks not ordinarily performed by farmers, Natalie was not a farm or agricultural employee at the time of her injury.
Section 9 of the Act excludes farm or agricultural employees from the benefits of the Act. Whether a worker is or is not a farm or agricultural employee must be determined from the character of the work she is required to perform and not from the general occupation or business of the employer. Evansville Veneer & Lumber Co. v. Mullen, 116 Ind.App. 616, 619, 65 N.E.2d 742, 743-44 (1946). In making such determination, the whole character of the employment must be considered. Id.
The terms "farm employee" and "agricultural employee" have substantially the same meaning. Fleckles v. Hille, 83 Ind.App. 715, 716, 149 N.E. 915, 915 (1925). If...
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